Country files
Morocco
la liberté d’expression
Reformes
Le pluralisme
Censure/autocensure
Désinformation
Accès à l'information
Sécurité des journalistes
Modèles économiques des médias
Médias indépendants : états des lieux et défis
Education aux médias : développement et défis
Genre et médias
Couverture des questions environnementales
Couverture du thème migratoire
Développement et utilisation de l'IA dans les médias
Reporters Without Borders: 120/180
Freedom House: 37/100 Partially free
Corruption Index ( International Transparency ) 99/180
The Moroccan media landscape is evolving within a context marked by institutional transformations and persistent economic difficulties. In 2025, the government initiated several reforms aimed at restructuring the press sector. These developments are taking place while the conditions for practicing journalism remain precarious. In this context, the national media ecosystem continues to face significant structural challenges.
Freedom of expression
Freedom of expression in Morocco is heavily regulated. Although formally guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise remains limited by a broadly worded legal framework. The increasing number of prosecutions targeting journalists and critical voices contributes to a climate of self-censorship, particularly on sensitive topics.
Reforms
In 2025, the government launched several reforms aimed at modernizing the media sector, particularly the print media, which had been mired in a structural and institutional crisis for several years. At the end of the year, the House of Representatives adopted a bill on the restructuring of the National Press Council (CNP). Strongly contested by professionals due to its impact on the independence of the self-regulatory body, the bill was ultimately partially struck down by the Constitutional Court and is currently being debated in Parliament in an amended form. Simultaneously, a new framework for public support for the press was established. While the subsidy budget was significantly increased, certain stricter eligibility criteria, such as the minimum number of journalists in online newsrooms or the revenue threshold, may limit the participation of smaller organizations, particularly regional media outlets, which nevertheless play a vital role in providing local news. Finally, in the audiovisual sector, the government initiated the creation of a holding company aimed at bringing together the main public media outlets, with the objective of centralizing their management and strengthening the coordination of their actions.
Pluralism
The Moroccan media landscape is diverse: print media, audiovisual channels, and a rapidly expanding digital sector, where online media foster spaces for debate and the dissemination of opinions. However, this pluralism remains limited by political, economic, and judicial pressures that can influence the editorial independence of the media . Consequently, while pluralism is indeed real in its diversity of platforms and actors, its framework remains largely formal.
Censorship and self-censorship
Self-censorship is widespread in the profession, particularly around three sensitive topics commonly referred to as “red lines”: the monarchy, religion, and territorial issues related to the Western Sahara. Indeed, while the Press Code has eliminated criminal penalties for freedom of expression, the Penal Code provides for prison sentences for any speech or writing that infringes upon these key subjects. Certain political or security-related topics may also be subject to self-censorship.
Censorship, for its part, remains present but manifests itself mainly in indirect ways. Either through economic pressure, particularly through advertising boycotts, or through legal means.
The sentence upheld on appeal in June 2025 against journalist Hamid El Mahdaoui, sentenced to 18 months in prison and a fine of 1.5 million dirhams (€137,000) for defamation against the Minister of Justice, is a telling example.
Disinformation
A global scourge, disinformation has not spared Morocco. The proliferation of online media and the use of sensationalism by some media outlets have exacerbated the lack of ethical rigor and the spread of fake news.
To address this, several mechanisms have been put in place, starting with a legal framework aimed at penalizing the dissemination of fake news. In parallel, the authorities recently launched a monitoring and analysis unit to track disinformation campaigns. On the media side, some newsrooms have developed practices to control viral information. Finally, several training and awareness workshops are being organized for professionals to strengthen their fact-checking skills. However, despite these efforts, disinformation remains a major challenge, particularly due to the structural crisis facing the press sector, which weakens the production of quality content and hinders the fight against fake news. According to the Digital News Report 2025, approximately 54% of Moroccans admit to having difficulty distinguishing between truth and falsehood online.
Access to information
Access to information remains limited due to a lack of transparency and communication from the authorities. Although a specific law exists, Law No. 31-13, which came into force in 2019, it has not guaranteed easy and transparent access to information, particularly for independent journalists. The CDAI (Commission for the Right to Access to Information ) , responsible for ensuring the proper application of this right, has recorded a significant increase in complaints filed since its creation, revealing the limitations of the current system.
Since September 2024, an institutional debate has been underway to revise this law, in order to better meet accessibility requirements and overcome identified challenges. A complete overhaul of the law may be on the agenda .
Security of journalists
The safety of journalists remains fragile and exposed to multifaceted risks: digital surveillance, pressure on their associates, and other forms of intimidation can be used against them when they investigate sensitive topics. Defamation also remains a tool of repression that can be used to discredit journalists. Finally, criminal prosecutions can also be exploited as leverage against certain critical voices.
Media Economic Models
The majority of traditional media outlets rely on a business model primarily based on public subsidies and an underdeveloped and highly unequal advertising market. The advertising market (excluding outdoor advertising) was worth approximately 4.9 billion dirhams in 2024, with print media accounting for only 10.2% of that.
Print : 500 million dirhams
TV: 2.5 billion dirhams
Radio: 1.9 billion dirhams
In the digital sector, where the advertising market generated between 2 and 2.5 billion dirhams, the majority of revenue was captured by international platforms, with only 7%, or 600 million dirhams, benefiting local players. The situation for press companies remains precarious; most do not generate significant profits and are operating at a reduced capacity due to their financial constraints. For over five years, the press sector has benefited from the exceptional support implemented in 2020 during the Covid-19 health crisis, under which the state covers the full salaries of journalists to preserve jobs . However, this measure has been criticized by the National Union of Moroccan Press (SNPM) and other organizations in the sector, which denounce persistent payment delays and a lack of transparency in management.
The National Association of Media and Publishers (ANME), which is calling for greater clarity in the allocation of subsidies, points out that the list of beneficiaries has not been officially published since 2005.
Independent Media: Current Situation and Challenges
According to the journalists interviewed, the space for independent media in Morocco has shrunk in recent years, particularly since the introduction in 2020 of exceptional press aid, which has increased the dependence of part of the sector on the state. Smaller media outlets have been excluded. These media outlets, excluded from this system due to their ineligibility criteria, rely on international funding. Their limited readership, which restricts access to advertising revenue, encourages them to develop consulting or training activities to maintain their operations. Faced with a constantly evolving international environment, some media outlets plan to reduce their dependence on funders by developing alternative financial models—subscriptions, premium content, memberships —in order to ensure their independence and the long-term viability of their operations.
At the same time, the rise of less expensive digital formats , such as podcasts or YouTube channels like Taoufick Bouachrine’s — “Kalam Fi Ssiassa” — has been significant. https://www.youtube.com/@Taoufik_bouachrine which has nearly 313K subscribers — opens up new spaces for expression and helps to renew journalistic practices.
Media education: development and challenges
In the digital age, media education, although essential, has not yet been taken into account by public authorities.
With the exception of a few one-off initiatives — such as the media education week in schools (initiated by UNESCO), workshops and seminars organised by ICESCO (Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) or certain activities carried out by associations and public institutions — actions remain fragmented and are not yet part of a structured national strategy aimed at integrating this discipline into school curricula.
Gender and Media
Despite legislative progress and policies promoting gender equality in Morocco, Women remain underrepresented in both information production and content. According to the HACA (High Authority for Audiovisual Communication), the share of female contributions in Moroccan newspapers and audiovisual magazines did not exceed 18% in 2024. In the print media, the deficit is just as significant, with only 25% of articles featuring women at the center of the narrative, compared to 73% for men. Primarily relegated to peripheral roles, they are most often relegated to the background in social issues related to family, health, and other aspects of daily life. In newsrooms, female journalists still face obstacles such as discrimination, harassment, and gender bias. Finally, women continue to struggle to break through the glass ceiling, with only 27% holding positions of responsibility in national media. In 2025, out of a total of 3,751 press cards issued, 1,136 were granted to women.
Coverage of environmental issues
Like media outlets in the MENA region, Moroccan media are rife with articles addressing environmental issues, but in-depth investigations remain rare. Media coverage is most often factual, focused on description or warnings, without in-depth analysis or contextualization. This superficial coverage leaves the field wide open for growing misinformation, largely fueled by social media where numerous climate-related hoaxes circulate. Apart from the online news site https://levert.ma/ or the platform https://nechfate.ma/ , specialized media are rare, which limits access to detailed information.
Coverage of the migration theme
Media coverage of migration issues, and more specifically of foreign migration to Morocco, remains primarily factual and framed. This is the conclusion of a 2025 study published by the Moroccan Network of Migration Journalists (RMJM). The report, focusing on print and online media, highlights content that leaves very little room for investigative reporting , instead favoring official narratives centered on irregular migration and security concerns. Migrants residing in Morocco are underrepresented, while migrant women and vulnerable groups remain largely invisible.
This observation can be explained by the difficulties journalists face in accessing the field, but also by editorial constraints, due to the sensitivity of the subject.
Development and use of AI in the media sectors
AI is beginning to develop in several Moroccan newsrooms, but its use remains limited due to its cost and the difficulty of its adoption. Its potential is primarily exploited to enrich and improve journalistic content, create interactive visuals, generate translations, and produce sports and financial news reports. Some initiatives, such as that of SNRT (the Moroccan National Radio and Television Company), use AI to personalize news and automate certain editorial tasks. However, AI remains out of reach for many professionals in the digital and audiovisual sectors, mainly due to a lack of training and a suitable ethical framework: 67% of professionals report being insufficiently prepared, while 33% believe that training is nonexistent (HACA, 2024/2025).
Algeria
Freedom of the press and international rankings
Journalists prosecuted or detained
Censorship, self-censorship, and independent media
Media economics and advertising
Social media, disinformation and fact -checking
International Indicators
The media situation in Algeria presents a mixed picture. While the country recorded a notable improvement in some international press freedom rankings in 2025, it remains classified as a country where the situation is considered difficult.
Summary table
This improvement in the RSF ranking is partly explained by comparative developments between countries and the release in 2024 of journalist El Kadi Ihsane, after 22 months of incarceration.
However, several international organizations point out that this statistical increase does not mean that legal proceedings against journalists have disappeared.
Freedom of expression
The 2020 Algerian Constitution formally guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of the press. In practice, however, the exercise of journalism remains subject to several penal and administrative provisions.
Journalists, activists, or researchers critical of institutions can be prosecuted on the basis of criminal charges such as:
attack on national unity
apology for terrorism
spreading false information
disclosure of classified documents
harm to the national interest
Several international NGOs (RSF, Amnesty International, Article 19) report an increasing legalization of media content , particularly on digital platforms.
Debate spaces still exist mainly online, but they are subject to increased surveillance.
Legal framework for the media
Law No. 23-14 of August 27, 2023 relating to information constitutes the major recent reform of the sector.
It introduces several important provisions:
strict ban on all foreign funding of national media
obligation to host electronic press websites under the national .dz domain
clarification of the status of the professional journalist
creation of a Code of Ethics Council elected by journalists
strengthening the prerogatives of the Press Regulatory Authority (ARPE)
However, several institutions provided for by law are not yet operational, including:
the Ethics Council
the Press Regulatory Authority
In the Penal Code, certain articles are regularly cited in cases involving journalists.
Article 63 bis: Deals with the disclosure of confidential information (national security/economy) on social networks, punishable by life imprisonment.
Article 87 bis (and following): Considered a vague definition of terrorism, this article has been frequently used since 2021 to prosecute journalists for alleged acts of "conspiracy" or support for organizations considered terrorist.
Article 96 : Harm to the national interest It penalizes the distribution of leaflets, bulletins or flyers that are likely to harm the national interest.
Article 95 bis : Foreign financing sanctions the financing of activities that undermine public order or national unity.
Article 196 bis : Spreading false news likely to cause harm to public order or safety.
These provisions are criticized by some organizations as potentially being used to limit critical expression.
Media pluralism
The Algerian media landscape is characterized by an essentially quantitative pluralism.
The country has:
more than a hundred daily newspapers
nearly 200 news sites
several private television channels (often registered abroad)
However, editorial diversity remains limited.
A large part of the public and private press adopts positions close to those of the institutions, particularly on subjects considered to be sovereign functions:
defense
national security
foreign policy
Independent media outlets face several difficulties:
refusal or delay in granting approvals
technical blockages (DNS)
Refusal of accreditation for certain official events
lack of access to public advertising.
Censorship and self-censorship
Prior direct censorship is relatively rare.
However, several observers mention widespread self-censorship , linked to:
at the risk of prosecution
to economic pressures
to administrative suspensions.
Topics considered sensitive include:
the army
national unity
the institutions of sovereignty.
Some topics remain under-investigated by the media, particularly those related to public procurement.
Journalists detained or prosecuted (February 2026)
At least four journalists are in detention or facing charges in cases related to their activities.
Christophe Gleizes
held since July 2025
sentenced to 7 years in prison
Reason: Apology for terrorism
pardon request filed in December 2025
RSF mobilization in January 2026.
Abdelali Mezghiche
pre-trial detention since February 2026
accusations: content detrimental to the national interest and incitement to a gathering.
Omar Ferhat
head of the online media outlet Algérie Scoop
pre-trial detention
accusations: spreading false news.
Sofiane Ghirous
contributor to the same media outlet, Algeria Scoop
pre-trial detention
Similar accusations.
The use of pre-trial detention in cases related to media expression is regularly highlighted by NGOs.
Illustrative cases of private media
Twala
Online media launched in 2020.
15-day administrative suspension (September 30 – October 14, 2025)
withdrawal of public advertising managed by ANEP.
Algeria Scoop
Online media outlet whose managers are currently being prosecuted for spreading fake news.
Public advertising has been withdrawn since February 2nd.
These cases illustrate the economic and legal fragility of independent media.
Disinformation and social networks
The media landscape is also marked by a strong circulation of misinformation on social networks.
Journalists can be targeted by:
smear campaigns
trolling
doxing.
For example, journalist Salima Tlemçani was subjected to online attacks after covering a trial involving a fugitive businessman.
Fact -checking initiatives exist, but they have limited resources.
Access to information
Access to public data remains a major challenge.
Algeria does not yet have a law equivalent to the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act ).
Journalists are largely dependent on:
official statements
from the public press agency APS .
Administrative culture remains marked by a high degree of opacity, making independent verification of economic or social information difficult.
Security of journalists
The physical safety of journalists is generally stable.
However, legal certainty remains a concern.
The risks include:
police summonses
lengthy legal proceedings
pre-trial detentions.
Journalist Mustapha Bendjama , for example, is facing about ten legal proceedings. He also served two years in prison in the case related to the escape of influencer Amira Bouraoui.
Media Business Models
Three models dominate:
Public media
Funded directly by the public treasury.
Dominant private media
Strong dependence on public advertising managed by ANEP , which constitutes a major economic lever.
Independent media
They try to survive thanks to:
to private advertising
to digital subscriptions.
However, the private advertising market remains limited and reluctant to support media perceived as critical.
Media Literacy (MIL)
Algeria does not yet have a structured national media education policy.
Existing initiatives are primarily led by institutions:
UNESCO
the Ministry of Communication
Moudjahid ’s MediaLab
professional groups.
The main challenge remains raising public awareness about verifying information circulating on social media.
Gender and Media
There are many women in newsrooms, particularly in the French-language press.
However, they remain underrepresented in leadership positions.
Coverage of gender-related issues is progressing, but it sometimes remains occasional or sensationalist.
Coverage of environmental issues
Recurring climate crises (drought, fires) have increased media attention on the environment.
However :
journalistic expertise remains limited
The coverage is often based on official financial statements.
Initiatives are emerging, such as an environmental prize launched by the media outlet Tariq News , as well as a prize initiated by the Lafarge-Holcim group. For encourage the media to address these topics more frequently and with much greater rigor.
Migration Coverage
Migration is a sensitive issue.
Journalists have limited access to transit areas in the south of the country.
The coverage varies between:
the human tragedy of the Algerian harraga
the security approach regarding sub-Saharan migrants.
Several observers also mention a tacit media blackout in recent years concerning the departures of harraga to Spain or Italy.
Artificial intelligence and media
The use of artificial intelligence in Algerian media remains limited.
The APS agency and some newsrooms are experimenting with automatic content generation tools, but this remains at the trial-and-error and experimental stage.
However, there is still no national ethical framework to manage the risks:
deepfakes
automated plagiarism
image or video manipulation.
Overall Analysis
The media situation in Algeria has two sides :
Positive developments
progression in the RSF ranking
absence of major physical attacks against journalists
significant media pluralism in terms of numbers.
Persistent difficulties
legal proceedings against certain journalists
recourse to pre-trial detention
economic dependence on public advertising
self-censorship and restrictions on access to information.
Several organizations believe that a lasting improvement would require:
reforms to the Penal Code
effective guarantees of economic independence for the media
better legal protection for journalists.
The media climate thus remains marked by increased vigilance and an open debate on the real guarantees of freedom of expression and the right to information in Algeria.
File available soon.
Libya
Legal Framework & Media Reform
Gender & Digital Violence
Migration & Media Coverage
Disinformation & AI
Environment
Local Monitoring
Reporters Without Borders rank : 137/180 (2025)
Index Freedom House : 10/100 (2025)
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International) : 173/180 (2025)
These rankings collectively reflect a media environment characterized by structural fragility, weak institutional safeguards, and high levels of corruption and political interference.
Freedom of Expression
Freedom of expression in Libya remains severely restricted, with journalists facing intimidation, sustained pressure from state authorities and armed actors, and widespread self-censorship. As journalist Intissar Al-Barassi notes, there has been no meaningful expansion of the margin of freedom in recent years; instead, public expression has increasingly receded due to fear and a perception of futility. She argues that since 2014, persistent pressures have reshaped the media into political instruments serving dominant actors.
Similarly, Reda Fhelboom, head of the Libyan Organisation for Independent Media (LOFIM), observes that no significant improvement has occurred compared to the previous year. He highlights the continued detention and military trial of journalist Salhine Zerouali in Benghazi under amendments to military procedures and counterterrorism laws that allow civilians to be tried in military courts, with limited transparency surrounding the proceedings. Although no new arrests were reported, restrictions persist, and cases of defamation and hate speech on television and social media have increased. Despite documented violations by the General Authority for Monitoring Media Content, enforcement remains slow, reinforcing structural weaknesses such as fragmented governance, militia influence, and limited judicial independence that continue to undermine meaningful freedom of expression. While there has been limited progress—reflected in a slight improvement in Libya’s ranking by Reporters Without Borders and ongoing discussions around legal reform—structural challenges persist.
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
No new media laws have been released in 2025. Journalism in Libya continues to be regulated primarily by the Publications Law (Law No. 76 of 1972), legislation that predates modern media forms and fails to address the complexities of radio, television, digital media, or social platforms, leaving journalists without legal protections or clarity on basic issues such as accreditation, work permits, and operational rights.
Pluralism
The Libyan media landscape is pluralistic in appearance, particularly in television, where multiple political currents are represented. Yet this plurality reflects political fragmentation rather than genuine independence. Most channels are either government-funded or aligned with dominant political and military actors, shaping partisan narratives that reinforce polarization. As Al-Barassi notes, many outlets claim independence while remaining structurally tied to power centers, resulting in biased coverage and weak professional standards.
This fragmentation is also geographic. Fhelboom observes that western and eastern media openly criticize each other’s authorities, with Tripoli offering a relatively wider margin of expression than the east or south. However, this variation does not indicate substantive freedom; rather, it reflects a divided media sphere in which outlets function as instruments of competing power structures.
Local municipal radio stations continue to cover citizens’ daily concerns despite aligning with dominant authorities in their areas, while private commercial radio has largely abandoned political reporting in favor of entertainment to protect advertising revenue. Independent media remain scarce, and print journalism has nearly disappeared. The polarized nature of this environment was evident in coverage of the killing of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, where outlets framed the event along factional lines, with only Al-Wasat TV demonstrating comparatively higher professional standards. The Libyan media system reflects characteristics of polarized pluralism within a fragmented state context.
Censorship & self-censorship
Drawing on the writer and journalist Saad Al-Asha’s assertion that “self-censorship lies in its consequences… in avoiding a losing battle with society,” freedom of expression in Libya can be understood as constrained by an interaction between social pressure and state practice. Al-Asha argues that, unlike states that actively safeguard freedom of expression against societal norms, the Libyan state tends to conform to prevailing public opinion under the rubric of “public morality,” thereby reinforcing self-censorship. This dynamic is particularly evident with regard to socially sensitive issues, which successive governments since the fall of the Gaddafi regime have largely avoided addressing. These authorities operate primarily as interim governments lacking coherent long-term projects, prioritizing short-term political goals over public interest or sustained positive social change.
By contrast, political issues are subject to direct and severe repression. Journalists and critics who attempt to expose corruption or express opposition to either of the rival governments face arrest, torture, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, and defamation. The detention and torture of economic journalist Ahmed Al-Senussi, following his publication of documents alleging corruption within the Ministry of Economy of the Tripoli-based government, exemplifies this pattern, as reported by both Human Rights Watch and Al-Quds Al-Arabi. In eastern Libya, repression has been even more extensive, with cases of enforced disappearance affecting not only journalists and media professionals but also members of parliament, according to Human Rights Watch reports.
Disinformation and Misinformation
Libyan media remain heavily affected by disinformation and misinformation, particularly in politically sensitive and high-profile cases. As Fhelboom notes, despite numerous training workshops provided to journalists and the establishment of the General Authority for Monitoring Media Content to combat hate speech and misinformation, many outlets continue to rely on unverified information circulated through social media. This practice has contributed to the widespread dissemination of false or misleading reports, particularly in major political and security incidents, such as the reported killing of Chief of Staff Omar Al-Haddad and the case of blogger Khansa Mujahid, where local and even regional media reproduced unverified claims originating from anonymous or politically motivated sources. According to Fhelboom, such reporting not only misled public opinion but also complicated investigative processes and allowed politically funded outlets to instrumentalize false narratives for strategic messaging.
Similarly, Al-Barassi observes that fact-checking and anti-disinformation initiatives have emerged over the past five years, often funded by international donors. These projects contributed to raising public awareness about manipulation, fake news, and digital deception, and led to the establishment of several fact-checking platforms. However, most initiatives were short-term and lacked financial sustainability, limiting their long-term structural impact.
Recent 2025 reports by international organizations indicate that misinformation in Libya remains closely tied to political polarization, weak editorial standards, and the absence of strong institutional verification mechanisms. Media outlets frequently prioritize speed and political alignment over fact-checking, while digital environments—particularly social media—serve as primary information sources for journalists, amplifying unverified narratives. Although monitoring bodies and civil society organizations have documented violations and issued warnings, enforcement remains slow and fragmented, and no comprehensive national strategy against disinformation has been institutionalized.
Access to Information
There is currently no law guaranteeing the right of access to information in Libya unlike other countries in the region such as Tunisia. Journalists argue that recently formed governmental institutions have failed to introduce meaningful reforms to facilitate access to information or to enact legislation protecting journalism and strengthening media independence. She further notes the absence of regulatory measures addressing publication restrictions, accreditation procedures, or the legal status of independent journalists.
Echoing these concerns, (LOFIM) stresses that effective access to information remains largely nonexistent in practice, despite a governmental circular issued by the Government of National Unity promoting transparency in the publication of official data. In reality, most public institutions continue to withhold information from journalists and media outlets. Only a limited number of bodies—such as the Anti-Corruption Authority and the Financial Crimes Investigation Agency—have demonstrated relative openness and cooperated with civil society organizations by providing data for investigative reporting.
Ongoing political division and institutional uncertainty have intensified journalists’ vulnerability, placing them under suspicion by authorities in both eastern and western Libya. In this context, journalistic practice is marked by caution and constrained by insecurity, while the absence of a unified journalists’ union further weakens collective professional protection.
Journalists’ Security
As of 2025, journalists in Libya continue to face serious security threats, including arbitrary arrest and detention, judicial harassment, threats and intimidation, physical assault, and the confiscation of equipment by both state and non-state actors. Enforced disappearances remain a significant concern, particularly in eastern Libya, alongside widespread impunity for violations against media workers. These risks are exacerbated by political fragmentation, the presence of armed groups, and restrictive legal frameworks that enable authorities to suppress critical reporting. International monitoring organizations have consistently documented these abuses, noting that the absence of accountability and effective legal protections has created a climate of fear that severely undermines independent journalism and freedom of expression (Reporters Without Borders, 2024; Human Rights Watch, 2025; ARTICLE 19, 2024).
Media Business Models
In Libya, the business models of mainstream and independent media diverge significantly and are strongly shaped by political fragmentation, insecurity, and weak market structures. Mainstream television channels and major media outlets typically operate through opaque funding arrangements linked to political actors, armed groups, or affiliated business elites. Their revenues derive largely from politically aligned advertising, patronage networks, or direct government support, rather than from audience-based or market-driven income. As a result, these outlets prioritize political influence and narrative control over commercial sustainability, which severely limits editorial independence.
By contrast, independent media outlets—many of which operate digitally or from the diaspora—function largely outside conventional commercial frameworks. They rely primarily on donor funding, grants from international organizations, project-based support, and limited digital advertising. While this funding structure affords greater editorial autonomy, it also renders these outlets financially fragile and highly vulnerable to disruption or closure. Civil society–based media organizations, such as the Libyan Organisation for Independent Media, generally operate as non-profit entities focused on advocacy, training, and the protection of press freedom rather than profit generation. Similar funding patterns characterize online and expatriate-hosted news platforms such as Libya Herald and Local Libya, which depend on donor support, civil society partnerships, and collaboration with international NGOs to sustain their operations. International monitoring organizations consistently emphasize that the absence of a stable advertising market, combined with legal uncertainty and persistent security risks, continues to obstruct the development of sustainable and independent media business models in Libya.
Media literacy : development and challenges
Efforts to enhance media literacy in Libya have been led mainly through projects funded by international organizations, which, despite producing useful materials and training initiatives, have struggled to achieve sustained progress. These programs often repeat similar activities year after year and have faced obstacles such as limited cooperation from governmental institutions, which undermines their ability to engage formal education systems and broaden civil society effectively. At a more professional level, Libyan civil society organizations such as the Libyan Organization for Independent Media and the Libyan Center for Freedom of the Press have undertaken monitoring and capacity-building initiatives aimed at improving journalistic quality and promoting ethical standards in media practice. For example, these groups have documented professional violations, advocated for dialogue on establishing a media code of ethics, and raised awareness of ethical reporting principles, as part of broader campaigns for media reform (ARTICLE 19, 2025). However, these efforts have frequently stalled due to a lack of sustainable funding or increasing political and security pressures that restrict civil society activity. The absence of a robust media literacy framework further compounds the challenges faced by journalists and citizens seeking to navigate an environment marked by weak press freedom, entrenched legal limitations, and persistent threats to free expression in Libya.
Gender and media
Female journalists in Libya operate within a highly constrained professional environment shaped by insecurity, political polarization, and entrenched social norms. While women remain present in newsrooms and media platforms, their participation is often precarious, and their professional advancement is limited by harassment, threats—both online and offline—and the absence of effective institutional protection. As Al-Barassi argues, the marginalization of women from meaningful political participation has directly affected media agendas. Despite the existence of formal gender quotas, women’s representation remains largely symbolic and is frequently determined by regional or tribal power-sharing rather than merit, resulting in limited influence and visibility. This marginal role is reflected in media coverage, where issues related to women’s rights and gender equality are rarely prioritized. In particular, coverage of gender-based and domestic violence—despite numerous cases involving women and children, including fatal incidents reported in 2025—has been sporadic and superficial. The failure of media institutions to address these issues critically mirrors broader structural constraints, including weak legal protections, social stigma, and political disincentives, which together marginalize both female journalists and gender-related issues within Libya’s public sphere.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Environmental issues remain peripheral within Libyan media, with no specialized environmental outlets and few formally trained environmental journalists. According to Fhelboom, topics such as pollution, oil-related environmental damage, groundwater contamination, and climate change receive limited sustained coverage, contributing to weak public pressure on state institutions.
Intissar Al-Barassi notes that until recently, environmental reporting remained largely awareness-based and avoided investigative depth. However, when journalists began examining environmental violations involving influential actors, coverage encountered pressure and attempts at restriction. Journalist Hindia Al-Oshaibi similarly describes earlier difficulties accessing official environmental data, often relying instead on local associations and informal sources. While international interest in climate issues has recently encouraged more investigative approaches, engagement remains fragile and inconsistent.
From an international perspective, this situation contrasts with frameworks promoted by UNESCO and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which emphasize environmental journalism as central to accountability, transparency, and public participation in environmental governance.
Coverage of the migrations topic
Journalists in Libya face significant structural, political, and professional challenges when covering migration issues, resulting in limited, selective, and often distorted reporting. As Al-Barassi notes, state and pro-government media tend to frame migration from the perspective of dominant authorities, privileging security narratives and at times justifying harsh practices as part of “state duty.” Migration is rarely prioritized within editorial policies, and in-depth humanitarian or rights-based reporting remains marginal.
Journalist Hind Al-Oshaibi further observes that coverage is generally weak and shaped by stereotypical portrayals of migrants as criminals, threats to sovereignty, or a societal burden. Issues affecting migrant women and children—particularly their living conditions, vulnerabilities, and integration challenges—are largely neglected. Practical reporting barriers compound these biases: access to detention centers or informal migrant settlements is highly restricted, and journalists face difficulties obtaining permissions, safe access, or reliable documentation, sometimes encountering financial demands for basic access to sources or locations.
One of the well-known journalists and activists emphasizes the political sensitivity of migration due to the involvement of both governmental and non-governmental actors. He argues that the issue is genuinely burdensome for the country, affecting multiple aspects of daily life, yet local journalists face significant risks when attempting comprehensive coverage. While international media often highlight documented abuses and violations—which are real and serious—such reporting may overlook the broader structural and socioeconomic dimensions of the crisis. The cessation of donor-funded independent projects that previously enabled more balanced reporting has further narrowed the space for nuanced coverage. Within a polarized and securitized media environment, migration reporting thus remains constrained by political interests, public hostility, limited institutional transparency, and safety risks for journalists.
AI development and use in the media sector
Although still emerging, AI is beginning to reshape the disinformation ecosystem. The dynamics described above regarding disinformation are increasingly intertwined with the unregulated use of artificial intelligence (AI) in Libyan newsrooms. As journalist Al-Barassi notes, AI has not been formally integrated into editorial workflows, despite its growing informal presence in journalistic practice. This has created a fragmented environment in which lower-level journalists rely on AI tools without consistent oversight, while senior editorial structures often lack the capacity to assess AI-assisted content.
While Fhelboom argues that AI use in practice remains largely instrumental and politically driven. It is frequently employed to generate content or images deployed in partisan attacks, or to create fictitious accounts through which politically aligned narratives are disseminated as part of ongoing media warfare. In the absence of regulatory frameworks or structured professional training, AI becomes embedded within the same polarized information ecosystem described earlier.
Consequently, rather than mitigating misinformation, AI tools are often absorbed into existing patterns of political contestation, amplifying manipulated or synthetic content—including fabricated images and coordinated narrative campaigns—and reinforcing the broader disinformation dynamics that characterize Libya’s fragmented media landscape.
Libya
Depuis que la Libye s’est enfoncée dans la guerre civile en 2014, les journalistes sont devenus des cibles et les médias des armes au service des factions en conflit. En se montrant de plus en plus partisans, les médias sont perçus comme des parties prenantes du conflit.
Les attaques contre les journalistes libyens sont favorisées par le cadre légal de l’ère Kadhafi qui n’a pas été aboli, comme la loi sur la presse de 1972, qui prévoit des peines de prison à perpétuité en cas de publication de nouvelles pouvant « porter atteinte à la réputation du pays et la confiance qui lui est portée à l’étranger ». De nouveaux délits restreignant la liberté d’expression et de la presse ont été ajoutés par les autorités en place après 2011. L’agence anti-terroriste, chapeautée par un groupe armé, a le pouvoir, depuis 2018, de censurer « toute information pouvant menacer la sécurité du pays, la sécurité de la société ou la sécurité nationale ».
La Libye est un pays dont la majorité de la population est de confession musulmane et porte des valeurs conservatrices. Le ministère des médias et les conventions sociales interdisent la diffusion d’images ou productions qui montrent le prophète Mohamed et ses compagnons.
Les sujets sur l’athéisme, la sexualité, les minorités de genre, les revendications féministes sont sensibles et considérés comme des lignes rouges à ne pas franchir par la plupart des médias et acteurs publics. La question de la participation des femmes à la vie politique est en revanche un sujet de plus en plus évoqué dans l’espace public. Comme dans le reste du monde, les femmes journalistes sont néanmoins les cibles privilégiées de cyberharcèlement.Les journalistes ont payé un lourd tribu dans les guerres civiles qui se sont succédées depuis 2011. Dans la décennie qui a suivi la révolution de 2011, plus de 30 journalistes et blogueurs ont été tués en Libye et, dans la plupart des cas, les coupables n’ont pas été traduits en justice. Depuis 2015, 247 journalistes ont été arrêtés ou ont été victimes de violences physiques par des militaires et groupes paramilitaires selon Libya Platform.
Entre mai 2020 et mai 2021, la Libyan Organization for independent Media (LOFIM) a recensé des violences contre 54 journalistes dont 45% à Tripoli, 41% à Benghazi. Ils ont été victimes d’attaques, arrestations, interrogatoires par forces de sécurité ou fouilles de téléphone. En 2021 et 2022, LOFIM a recensé 10 attaques allant d’arrestations à des disparitions forcées de journalistes.
L’implosion du régime kadhafiste en 2011 a permis l’éclosion de dizaines de nouveaux médias, créés par des groupes révolutionnaires, hors de toute régulation. Deux ans plus tard, la parenthèse s’est refermée et la plupart des médias indépendants des nouvelles autorités ou groupes armées ont été attaqués ou fermés.
La déclaration constitutionnelle garantit la liberté de la presse mais aucun décret n’en protège l’exercice. Il existe seulement une circulaire datant du 3 mai 2021, émise par le gouvernement dit d’unité nationale (GUN) interdisant les arrestations et détentions de journalistes. Ce gouvernement formé en 2021, sous l’égide de l’ONU, s’était engagé à restructurer les organes contrôlant les médias. Aucune réforme n’a été engagé à ce jour. A Tripoli, un conseil des droits de l’Homme, rattaché au gouvernement, a été créé mais son activité réelle reste opaque et inconnue des défenseurs des droits humains et journalistes indépendants interviewés pour ce rapport.
Depuis 2014, un nouvel arsenal législatif cible les journalistes. Insulter les autorités, les emblèmes de l’Etat et son drapeau sont des délits passibles de prison. La formulation vague de ces textes offre une large interprétation aux autorités répressives.
Les journalistes, blogueurs et autres personnels de médias sont victimes d’arrestations et ciblés par toutes les parties, tandis que le personnel judiciaire est attaqué pour empêcher le fonctionnement normal de la justice. Les arrestations de journalistes au motif qu’ils ne possèdent pas de permis de travail sont régulières. A l’Est, plusieurs journalistes ont été poursuivis par des tribunaux militaires.
File available soon.
Palestine
Reporters without Borders Index (most recent): 163
Freedom House Index: Gaza Strip 2/100. West Bank 22/100
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): N/A
Freedom of Expression
The war in Gaza and the ongoing Israeli escalation in the West Bank have impacted the freedom expression not only through the deliberate targeting of journalists but also with the wider freedom of expression. The main concerning issue regarding freedom of expression is the polarizations between those who believe that the events of October 7th resulted in a catastrophe for Palestinians, and those who say that Israel did not want an excuse to destroy the Gaza Strip or continue commenting crimes in the West Bank. This also applies to the critics of Hamas who have been portrayed as “traitors” or “betrayals” or even accused of being “collaborators” with Israel. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA), defamation was one of the most common patterns faced by journalists, with 55.6% of journalists being subjected to organized campaigns across digital platforms to defame them, followed by hacking and data theft at 48.1%, and electronic surveillance at 46.3%, in addition to other forms of digital violence such as digital harassment, threats, bullying, hate speech and identity theft.
Social media companies are still playing a vital role is viloating the Freedom of expression in Palestine. According to 7amleh’s Deceomber 2025 report “A total of 7 violations were documented involving account restrictions, along with 6 cases of content removal, 3 cases of account suspensions, and 2 instances of shadow banning, while 5 additional cases were distributed across various other types of digital sanctions.”
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
There have been no fundamental changes to media laws in Palestine. The Cybercrime Law continues to be a major concern for policymakers, journalists, and civil society organizations. Following numerous objections, the Palestinian Cabinet decided on April 30, 2025, to form a national committee to amend Decree-Law No. (10) of 2018 concerning cybercrimes, communications crimes, and information technology, and its amendments. The committee includes representatives from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Public Prosecution, the Ministry of Communications and Digital Economy, the General Secretariat of the Cabinet, and civil society organizations. The committee’s objective is to review the objections and submit recommendations to the government.
As for the Right to Information Law, the Ministry of Justice published a draft decree-law on November 4, 2025, which reignited the debate surrounding it. Some considered the latest version an improvement over previous drafts, but still requires addressing several fundamental issues, most notably the expansion of security and economic exceptions and the absence of clear provisions to ensure the harmonization of legislation, making the Right to Information Law the supreme reference in case of any conflict. Supporters of the law, however, considered it a fundamental pillar for promoting integrity and preventing corruption, given that the exceptions are precisely defined.
Pluralism
Despite the large number of media outlets in Palestine, however, the media still suffers from a superficial and artificial diversity due to limited variety, innovation, and renewal in content and programming. Most of the programming in TV and radio, for example, follow the same pattern, they have become elitist, featuring mainly analysts, politicians and academics to discuss public matters, while ordinary citizens are rarely represented. Many local Palestinian media outlets have been transformed into propaganda tools for political parties, especially with the war on Gaza. In addition to the lack of diversity in presentation, particularly evident is the absence of investigative journalism, except for a few rare attempts. Furthermore, the Palestinian media has failed to fulfil its oversight role over political power. Print journalism has failed to engage with technological advancements in the new digital media landscape and has been unable to adapt to the evolving organizational structure and its relationship with young audiences. This has contributed to a decline in readership among Palestinian youth. Furthermore, print media suffers from a profound structural crisis across all levels, from distribution to editorial boards. This context has enabled the prominence of social media, mainly Facebook, the fact that generated a disillusion among the Palestinian public with democracy and media diversity.
Censorship & self-censorship
In Palestine, there is no pre-censorship on publications but post-censorship, mainly by Isreal, in addition to the Palestinian political system in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as social censorship, companies and advertisers. This has led media outlets and journalists to set their own self-censorship or ‘pre-censorship’ for subjects that may include controversial taboo topics, political criticism or corruption-related topics. In addition to the traditional forms of censorship, Palestinian journalists and activists are subject to digital threats and violations. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA) the Israeli occupation and the authorities in the West Bank and Gaza employ digital tools to monitor content, block accounts, or summon journalists based on their online activity.
Disinformation and Misinformation
A study published by the Palestinian Observatory for Fact-Checking and Media Literacy (Tahaqaq) revealed that misleading content (47.25%) dominated the Palestinian digital landscape during February and March 2025, followed by false content at 44.44%, and harmful content at 8.31%. The high percentage of false content reflects the significant overlap in the Palestinian information landscape, where errors are prevalent in contexts that can be misinterpreted or exploited. This type of content is often attributed to the recirculation of old material, ack of knowledge, or poor editing skills, rather than necessarily to direct manipulation. The study also reveals that there is a clear dominance of individual sources over the information landscape, as the pages of individuals and ordinary users contributed the largest share of misleading and false content. This is attributed to the limited information awareness among the public, in addition to the great emotional impact during crises, which leads to the circulation of information without verification. As for news platforms, their danger is doubled, as they give misleading information an appearance of formal credibility, which contributes to its wider spread, especially when it is quoted or republished through other platforms linked to entities with political orientations.
Disinformation and misinformation are also part of the war on Gaza. Much of this content was widely disseminated online, with tens of millions of posts circulating on social media. A variety of sources, including government officials, media outlets, and social media influencers in various countries, contributed to the spread of this misinformation and disinformation. Several Palestinian institutions play a central role in combating misinformation and disinformation. The most prominent are 7amleh, Tahaqaq and Kashif. Additionally, some outlets play a major role in challenging misleading narratives through investigative journalism by providing documented reporting that helps counter widespread misinformation about Palestine.
Access to Information
The absence of a right to information law in Palestine creates a fertile ground for the spread of rumours, fabricated news, and misinformation. Those seeking information who cannot find it through official channels and legal means will resort to alternative methods, which may yield accurate information, rumours, distorted information, or outright fabrication. The national debate surrounding the right to information law has resurfaced following the publication of the draft law for 2025, which was first proposed over twenty years ago but never passed. The most significant problem with the 2025 draft lies in its vague exceptions related to broad concepts such as “national security,” “national economy,” and “public interest.” These terms could be used to deny citizens access to information if left undefined. Furthermore, the draft prioritizes other laws of a confidential or security nature in cases of conflict, potentially rendering the new law ineffective. (Please see section 2 Media Laws)
Journalists Security
Despite the ceasefire in Gaza, Isreal continues to target journalists. On 21 January 2026, an Israeli drone strike on a vehicle in central Gaza killed freelance photographer Abed Shaat, a regular contributor to Agence France-Presse (AFP), Mohammad Qeshta, a spokesperson for the Egyptian Committee who reported news to his Telegram, and Anas Ghnaim, a freelance photographer and drone operator who worked for Smart Media. The attack came while the three journalists were on assignment for the Egyptian Committee.
The West Bank continues to be a hostile environment for journalists. Attacks against journalists are not limited to Israeli soldiers but also to Israeli settlers. Video images showed, on many occasions, the direct and deliberate targeting of journalists by Israeli soldiers, whether in the form of physical attacks or by firing teargas and stun grenades at them, in some cases live ammunition was used.
Israeli settlers, often guarded by soldiers, have also been attacking journalists. Most prominent was the attack on Reuters photojournalist Raneen Sawafta, who escaped death after being severely beaten by settlers in the village of Beita north of the West Bank. Sawafta was accompanied by Reuters security adviser Grant Bowden who was beaten as he tried to protect her.
Media Business Models
Within the complexity of the political, economic and social context, the media business models in Palestine remain the same. The most significant is the donor-funded one, depending on projects supported by international donors. However, this source of funding is no longer as used to be due to the lack of funding at origin. The other model is advertisingbased which is limited and inconsistent due to the small market size, political and economic constrains, as well as competition with social media adverting. Most of the media outlets adopt a hybrid Nonprofit–Commercial Models combining donor funding, advertising, and commercial services.
Independent Media: state and challenges
Independent media in Palestine represent a rare space for free expression amidst a complex political environment and immense security and economic pressures. Independent journalists operate under exceptional circumstances, facing restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation, including arrests, harassment, and bans on coverage, as well as internal challenges related to political division and political polarization. Among the most prominent are Ma’an News Agency, Watan Media Network, Palestine Media Network, Nisaa FM Radio, Ajyal Network, 24 FM and Youth Radio Shabab FM, among others. However, these media outlets face significant challenges. In addition to political and security pressures, they suffer from weak funding and, more recently, a near-complete absence of advertising revenue due to the political situation and competition from social media.
Independent media attracts a broad audience seeking reliable information that is not subject to political authority or Palestinian factions. This audience comprises diverse groups, including young people, who constitute the largest segment of society, activists and those interested in public affairs, as well as the general public seeking an independent narrative.
Media literacy: development and challenges
Palestine is witnessing increasing activity in media and information literacy (MIL) to promote critical thinking and fact-checking, especially in light of the spread of misinformation. Institutions such as the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, UNESCO Palestine, PYALARA, Al-Quds Open University, and the Ministry of Education, to name a few, are leading comprehensive training programs and initiatives targeting students and teachers, focusing on digital literacy, countering hate speech and cyberbullying, and fact-checking, as part of efforts to protect social and national awareness.
Despite this, there are still a number of challenges to MIL in Palestine; the lack of institutional awareness of the importance of media and information literacy, the weakness of qualified personnel to implement media and information literacy, the lack of necessary material and technological resources, and the impact of political and economic conditions on the development of education in the field of media and information literacy.
Gender and media
Gender is an essential part of the Palestinian media landscape, both in terms of female representation in newsrooms and the nature of media discourse itself. Palestinian media provides extensive coverage of women’s issues, but it does so within a highly complex socio-political context, where gender issues are intertwined with the occupation, war, and economic and social pressures. This coverage is not uniform; it ranges from highlighting women’s role in the struggle and society to focusing on their daily suffering and offering limited criticism of social structures. In addition to issues related to the occupation, Palestinian media covers women’s issues related to domestic violence, discrimination in the labour market, early marriage, and women’s role in politics and society. However, these issues often recede in the face of political coverage. That said, some media coverage is influenced by stereotypes that often portray women as victims or secondary figures, rather than highlighting their essential role in political and social life.
Recent years have witnessed the rise of Palestinian media initiatives that seek to promote gender equality, whether through producing content that sheds light on women’s issues or by training and empowering young female journalists in the digital sphere. Social media platforms have also played a significant role in giving women a wider space to express their opinions and challenge traditional narratives. However, achieving a more gender-sensitive Palestinian media remains contingent on institutional reforms, the development of equitable editorial policies, and a deeper cultural shift within society.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Environmental issues in Palestine generally receive little media attention unless directly linked to the conflict with Israel. For example, there have been numerous reports on the environmental impacts of chemical waste from West Bank settlements that flows into Palestinian agricultural land, or on the effects of Israel’s construction of the separation wall in the West Bank. During the war in Gaza, some reports were published on the war’s environmental impacts. This lack of attention to environmental issues stems from the Palestinian media’s preoccupation with rapidly unfolding events and its focus on breaking news and issues related to the occupation. Discussions of environmental issues in the media are usually conducted by specialized civil society organizations such as the Applied Research Institute or the Ma’an Development Centre, as well as by the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority. In addition, there were some initiatives. In 2022, the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority and the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University launched a training program for young environmental journalists, implemented by Revolve Mediterraneo with funding from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, whereby 25 male and female students from 6 universities in the West Bank and Gaza participated: Palestine, Birzeit, Al-Aqsa, Hebron, An-Najah, and Al-Quds Open University. They presented visual and written journalistic materials addressing various environmental topics.
Coverage of the migration topic
Coverage of migration and displacement in Palestinian media is directly linked to the political, social, and economic realities experienced by Palestinians both within Palestine and in the diaspora. The issue of migration is an integral part of the conflict itself. Therefore, Palestinian media addresses it on three levels: internal displacement resulting from wars and Israeli aggression; external migration due to economic and political circumstances; and historical displacement since 1948, along with its associated narratives and rights.
Palestinian media focuses on the humanitarian dimension, highlighting the suffering of displaced families, the loss of homes and livelihoods, homelessness, and giving particular attention to children, women, and the elderly. On the political front, it emphasizes the connection between displacement and Israeli policies such as forced displacement and collective punishment. It also highlights the role of the international community and human rights organizations, presenting the Palestinian narrative in contrast to the Israeli narrative. On the economic and social front, Palestinian media focuses on issues such as poverty, the labour market, unemployment, and the lack of services and infrastructure in refugee camps, whether in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or in the Palestinian diaspora, especially the situation of refugees in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Sometimes, the Palestinian media highlights stories of success and integration in Europe, America, Canada and other countries of refuge.
AI development and use in the media sector
Palestine is still moving slowly towards using AI in media, due to the lack of a clear strategy for ethical guidelines, and the shortage of qualified personnel and expertise in AI-related technologies. Among the initiatives seeking to introduce AI into newsrooms is a study prepared by the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, funded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), entitled “How to Integrate Artificial Intelligence into Journalism and Media Education?”, given its growing necessity in the media industry.
In October 2025, the World Association of Publishers and News Makers (WAN IFRA) held a meeting with editors-in-chief of Palestinian media outlets to discuss ways to integrate AI into newsrooms, ensuring it serves as a partner rather than a replacement for journalists.
While content production with the use of AI may be relatively little, Palestinian media institutions use AI in several areas, such as big data analysis, deepfake detection, and faster translation and content production. It also helps monitoring global media discourse on the Palestinian issue and understanding its trends. However, the greatest challenge remains the potential bias in algorithms and the lack of technical resources, making the development of independent Palestinian tools a crucial step in strengthening the presence of the Palestinian narrative in the digital sphere.
Palestine
Reporters without Borders Index (most recent): 163
Freedom House Index: Gaza Strip 2/100. West Bank 22/100
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): N/A
Freedom of Expression
The war in Gaza and the ongoing Israeli escalation in the West Bank have impacted the freedom expression not only through the deliberate targeting of journalists but also with the wider freedom of expression. The main concerning issue regarding freedom of expression is the polarizations between those who believe that the events of October 7th resulted in a catastrophe for Palestinians, and those who say that Israel did not want an excuse to destroy the Gaza Strip or continue commenting crimes in the West Bank. This also applies to the critics of Hamas who have been portrayed as “traitors” or “betrayals” or even accused of being “collaborators” with Israel. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA), defamation was one of the most common patterns faced by journalists, with 55.6% of journalists being subjected to organized campaigns across digital platforms to defame them, followed by hacking and data theft at 48.1%, and electronic surveillance at 46.3%, in addition to other forms of digital violence such as digital harassment, threats, bullying, hate speech and identity theft.
Social media companies are still playing a vital role is viloating the Freedom of expression in Palestine. According to 7amleh’s Deceomber 2025 report “A total of 7 violations were documented involving account restrictions, along with 6 cases of content removal, 3 cases of account suspensions, and 2 instances of shadow banning, while 5 additional cases were distributed across various other types of digital sanctions.”
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
There have been no fundamental changes to media laws in Palestine. The Cybercrime Law continues to be a major concern for policymakers, journalists, and civil society organizations. Following numerous objections, the Palestinian Cabinet decided on April 30, 2025, to form a national committee to amend Decree-Law No. (10) of 2018 concerning cybercrimes, communications crimes, and information technology, and its amendments. The committee includes representatives from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Public Prosecution, the Ministry of Communications and Digital Economy, the General Secretariat of the Cabinet, and civil society organizations. The committee’s objective is to review the objections and submit recommendations to the government.
As for the Right to Information Law, the Ministry of Justice published a draft decree-law on November 4, 2025, which reignited the debate surrounding it. Some considered the latest version an improvement over previous drafts, but still requires addressing several fundamental issues, most notably the expansion of security and economic exceptions and the absence of clear provisions to ensure the harmonization of legislation, making the Right to Information Law the supreme reference in case of any conflict. Supporters of the law, however, considered it a fundamental pillar for promoting integrity and preventing corruption, given that the exceptions are precisely defined.
Pluralism
Despite the large number of media outlets in Palestine, however, the media still suffers from a superficial and artificial diversity due to limited variety, innovation, and renewal in content and programming. Most of the programming in TV and radio, for example, follow the same pattern, they have become elitist, featuring mainly analysts, politicians and academics to discuss public matters, while ordinary citizens are rarely represented. Many local Palestinian media outlets have been transformed into propaganda tools for political parties, especially with the war on Gaza. In addition to the lack of diversity in presentation, particularly evident is the absence of investigative journalism, except for a few rare attempts. Furthermore, the Palestinian media has failed to fulfil its oversight role over political power. Print journalism has failed to engage with technological advancements in the new digital media landscape and has been unable to adapt to the evolving organizational structure and its relationship with young audiences. This has contributed to a decline in readership among Palestinian youth. Furthermore, print media suffers from a profound structural crisis across all levels, from distribution to editorial boards. This context has enabled the prominence of social media, mainly Facebook, the fact that generated a disillusion among the Palestinian public with democracy and media diversity.
Censorship & self-censorship
In Palestine, there is no pre-censorship on publications but post-censorship, mainly by Isreal, in addition to the Palestinian political system in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as social censorship, companies and advertisers. This has led media outlets and journalists to set their own self-censorship or ‘pre-censorship’ for subjects that may include controversial taboo topics, political criticism or corruption-related topics. In addition to the traditional forms of censorship, Palestinian journalists and activists are subject to digital threats and violations. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA) the Israeli occupation and the authorities in the West Bank and Gaza employ digital tools to monitor content, block accounts, or summon journalists based on their online activity.
Disinformation and Misinformation
A study published by the Palestinian Observatory for Fact-Checking and Media Literacy (Tahaqaq) revealed that misleading content (47.25%) dominated the Palestinian digital landscape during February and March 2025, followed by false content at 44.44%, and harmful content at 8.31%. The high percentage of false content reflects the significant overlap in the Palestinian information landscape, where errors are prevalent in contexts that can be misinterpreted or exploited. This type of content is often attributed to the recirculation of old material, ack of knowledge, or poor editing skills, rather than necessarily to direct manipulation. The study also reveals that there is a clear dominance of individual sources over the information landscape, as the pages of individuals and ordinary users contributed the largest share of misleading and false content. This is attributed to the limited information awareness among the public, in addition to the great emotional impact during crises, which leads to the circulation of information without verification. As for news platforms, their danger is doubled, as they give misleading information an appearance of formal credibility, which contributes to its wider spread, especially when it is quoted or republished through other platforms linked to entities with political orientations.
Disinformation and misinformation are also part of the war on Gaza. Much of this content was widely disseminated online, with tens of millions of posts circulating on social media. A variety of sources, including government officials, media outlets, and social media influencers in various countries, contributed to the spread of this misinformation and disinformation. Several Palestinian institutions play a central role in combating misinformation and disinformation. The most prominent are 7amleh, Tahaqaq and Kashif. Additionally, some outlets play a major role in challenging misleading narratives through investigative journalism by providing documented reporting that helps counter widespread misinformation about Palestine.
Access to Information
The absence of a right to information law in Palestine creates a fertile ground for the spread of rumours, fabricated news, and misinformation. Those seeking information who cannot find it through official channels and legal means will resort to alternative methods, which may yield accurate information, rumours, distorted information, or outright fabrication. The national debate surrounding the right to information law has resurfaced following the publication of the draft law for 2025, which was first proposed over twenty years ago but never passed. The most significant problem with the 2025 draft lies in its vague exceptions related to broad concepts such as “national security,” “national economy,” and “public interest.” These terms could be used to deny citizens access to information if left undefined. Furthermore, the draft prioritizes other laws of a confidential or security nature in cases of conflict, potentially rendering the new law ineffective. (Please see section 2 Media Laws)
Journalists Security
Despite the ceasefire in Gaza, Isreal continues to target journalists. On 21 January 2026, an Israeli drone strike on a vehicle in central Gaza killed freelance photographer Abed Shaat, a regular contributor to Agence France-Presse (AFP), Mohammad Qeshta, a spokesperson for the Egyptian Committee who reported news to his Telegram, and Anas Ghnaim, a freelance photographer and drone operator who worked for Smart Media. The attack came while the three journalists were on assignment for the Egyptian Committee.
The West Bank continues to be a hostile environment for journalists. Attacks against journalists are not limited to Israeli soldiers but also to Israeli settlers. Video images showed, on many occasions, the direct and deliberate targeting of journalists by Israeli soldiers, whether in the form of physical attacks or by firing teargas and stun grenades at them, in some cases live ammunition was used.
Israeli settlers, often guarded by soldiers, have also been attacking journalists. Most prominent was the attack on Reuters photojournalist Raneen Sawafta, who escaped death after being severely beaten by settlers in the village of Beita north of the West Bank. Sawafta was accompanied by Reuters security adviser Grant Bowden who was beaten as he tried to protect her.
Media Business Models
Within the complexity of the political, economic and social context, the media business models in Palestine remain the same. The most significant is the donor-funded one, depending on projects supported by international donors. However, this source of funding is no longer as used to be due to the lack of funding at origin. The other model is advertisingbased which is limited and inconsistent due to the small market size, political and economic constrains, as well as competition with social media adverting. Most of the media outlets adopt a hybrid Nonprofit–Commercial Models combining donor funding, advertising, and commercial services.
Independent Media: state and challenges
Independent media in Palestine represent a rare space for free expression amidst a complex political environment and immense security and economic pressures. Independent journalists operate under exceptional circumstances, facing restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation, including arrests, harassment, and bans on coverage, as well as internal challenges related to political division and political polarization. Among the most prominent are Ma’an News Agency, Watan Media Network, Palestine Media Network, Nisaa FM Radio, Ajyal Network, 24 FM and Youth Radio Shabab FM, among others. However, these media outlets face significant challenges. In addition to political and security pressures, they suffer from weak funding and, more recently, a near-complete absence of advertising revenue due to the political situation and competition from social media.
Independent media attracts a broad audience seeking reliable information that is not subject to political authority or Palestinian factions. This audience comprises diverse groups, including young people, who constitute the largest segment of society, activists and those interested in public affairs, as well as the general public seeking an independent narrative.
Media literacy: development and challenges
Palestine is witnessing increasing activity in media and information literacy (MIL) to promote critical thinking and fact-checking, especially in light of the spread of misinformation. Institutions such as the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, UNESCO Palestine, PYALARA, Al-Quds Open University, and the Ministry of Education, to name a few, are leading comprehensive training programs and initiatives targeting students and teachers, focusing on digital literacy, countering hate speech and cyberbullying, and fact-checking, as part of efforts to protect social and national awareness.
Despite this, there are still a number of challenges to MIL in Palestine; the lack of institutional awareness of the importance of media and information literacy, the weakness of qualified personnel to implement media and information literacy, the lack of necessary material and technological resources, and the impact of political and economic conditions on the development of education in the field of media and information literacy.
Gender and media
Gender is an essential part of the Palestinian media landscape, both in terms of female representation in newsrooms and the nature of media discourse itself. Palestinian media provides extensive coverage of women’s issues, but it does so within a highly complex socio-political context, where gender issues are intertwined with the occupation, war, and economic and social pressures. This coverage is not uniform; it ranges from highlighting women’s role in the struggle and society to focusing on their daily suffering and offering limited criticism of social structures. In addition to issues related to the occupation, Palestinian media covers women’s issues related to domestic violence, discrimination in the labour market, early marriage, and women’s role in politics and society. However, these issues often recede in the face of political coverage. That said, some media coverage is influenced by stereotypes that often portray women as victims or secondary figures, rather than highlighting their essential role in political and social life.
Recent years have witnessed the rise of Palestinian media initiatives that seek to promote gender equality, whether through producing content that sheds light on women’s issues or by training and empowering young female journalists in the digital sphere. Social media platforms have also played a significant role in giving women a wider space to express their opinions and challenge traditional narratives. However, achieving a more gender-sensitive Palestinian media remains contingent on institutional reforms, the development of equitable editorial policies, and a deeper cultural shift within society.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Environmental issues in Palestine generally receive little media attention unless directly linked to the conflict with Israel. For example, there have been numerous reports on the environmental impacts of chemical waste from West Bank settlements that flows into Palestinian agricultural land, or on the effects of Israel’s construction of the separation wall in the West Bank. During the war in Gaza, some reports were published on the war’s environmental impacts. This lack of attention to environmental issues stems from the Palestinian media’s preoccupation with rapidly unfolding events and its focus on breaking news and issues related to the occupation. Discussions of environmental issues in the media are usually conducted by specialized civil society organizations such as the Applied Research Institute or the Ma’an Development Centre, as well as by the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority. In addition, there were some initiatives. In 2022, the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority and the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University launched a training program for young environmental journalists, implemented by Revolve Mediterraneo with funding from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, whereby 25 male and female students from 6 universities in the West Bank and Gaza participated: Palestine, Birzeit, Al-Aqsa, Hebron, An-Najah, and Al-Quds Open University. They presented visual and written journalistic materials addressing various environmental topics.
Coverage of the migration topic
Coverage of migration and displacement in Palestinian media is directly linked to the political, social, and economic realities experienced by Palestinians both within Palestine and in the diaspora. The issue of migration is an integral part of the conflict itself. Therefore, Palestinian media addresses it on three levels: internal displacement resulting from wars and Israeli aggression; external migration due to economic and political circumstances; and historical displacement since 1948, along with its associated narratives and rights.
Palestinian media focuses on the humanitarian dimension, highlighting the suffering of displaced families, the loss of homes and livelihoods, homelessness, and giving particular attention to children, women, and the elderly. On the political front, it emphasizes the connection between displacement and Israeli policies such as forced displacement and collective punishment. It also highlights the role of the international community and human rights organizations, presenting the Palestinian narrative in contrast to the Israeli narrative. On the economic and social front, Palestinian media focuses on issues such as poverty, the labour market, unemployment, and the lack of services and infrastructure in refugee camps, whether in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or in the Palestinian diaspora, especially the situation of refugees in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Sometimes, the Palestinian media highlights stories of success and integration in Europe, America, Canada and other countries of refuge.
AI development and use in the media sector
Palestine is still moving slowly towards using AI in media, due to the lack of a clear strategy for ethical guidelines, and the shortage of qualified personnel and expertise in AI-related technologies. Among the initiatives seeking to introduce AI into newsrooms is a study prepared by the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, funded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), entitled “How to Integrate Artificial Intelligence into Journalism and Media Education?”, given its growing necessity in the media industry.
In October 2025, the World Association of Publishers and News Makers (WAN IFRA) held a meeting with editors-in-chief of Palestinian media outlets to discuss ways to integrate AI into newsrooms, ensuring it serves as a partner rather than a replacement for journalists.
While content production with the use of AI may be relatively little, Palestinian media institutions use AI in several areas, such as big data analysis, deepfake detection, and faster translation and content production. It also helps monitoring global media discourse on the Palestinian issue and understanding its trends. However, the greatest challenge remains the potential bias in algorithms and the lack of technical resources, making the development of independent Palestinian tools a crucial step in strengthening the presence of the Palestinian narrative in the digital sphere.
Freedom of the press is enshrined in Article 15 of the Jordanian Constitution. The sector is mainly regulated by the Press and Publications Act and the Broadcasting Act, which covers electronic publications. In the last 10 years, several specific laws have also encroached on the freedom of the press: the law against terrorism, the law on cybercrime (2018)… Today, there are more than 20 laws and regulations governing the exercise of freedom of the press.
The law on the press and publications of 1993 and 1998The law, which has been amended several times, has allowed the emergence of many private media, granted the protection of sources and established the basis for access to public information. But it has also provided for the establishment of a license for any media, printing, bookstore or advertising agency or translation, polling institute or even research centers. In other words, the authorization is limited.
The Jordanian government adopted a National Media Strategy in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring, a strategy designed to establish “an independent Jordanian media rooted in the principles of freedom, pluralism and professionalism ». Yet, shortly thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, two amendments to the press law forced nearly 290 news sites to close because they could not meet the new regulatory requirements for licensing by the Media Commission.
Liberalized twenty years ago in 2002 with the end of the Jordanian Radio Television (JRTV) monopoly, the audiovisual sector is controlled. The broadcast media law combined the regulators (one for print and one for broadcast) into one, the Jordan Media Commission (JMC). The Commission is fully funded by the state (€1.5 million in 2019) and its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for validating – or not – the Commission’s decisions to award broadcasting licenses to radio and television stations. Less exposed, the Commission de Régulation des Télécoms has been determining the available frequencies and the conditions for broadcasting telecom services since 1995. 39 radio stations have a license, 20 of which are governmental (and 6 for universities).
The Ministry of Information has been replaced by government spokespersons who exercise supervision over the sector and the state media, alongside the Ministries of Culture, Information Technology and Finance.
As for access to information, the absence of an independent Access to Information Commission makes it impossible to obtain information on a regular basis or to seek redress when obstacles arise. In addition, the practice of transparency is selective: for example, the police reserve the exclusivity of service information on the traffic situation for their own radio station.
Jordanians are moving away from their traditional media (television and newspapers) and are getting most of their information from social networks: 88% were connected in 2018 compared to 23% in 2012. According to IPSOS (IPSOS 2018 result cited in USAID’s JORDAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT published in June 2021), during the same period (between 2012 and 2018), television consumption dropped from 93% to 80%, radio from 30% to 26%, and daily newspapers from 18% to 6% (with precipitous drops in official newspapers – Al Rai, Al Ghad and Ad Dustour).
The English-language press, which has an extremely marginal audience among the Jordanian population, is generally freer than the Arabic-language press, although monotonous and uniform; it is aimed at a mainly foreign audience, diplomats or members of NGOs.
Among the commercial media, the private television Ro’yaand its website (http://roya.tv) dominate the advertising market. Ro’ya and some private radio stations like Masaj, Dahab and Fun or again Rotana FM, share the audience with Al Ghad and the website in english Jordan News launched in 2021.
Some professional media with an information mission exist under the status of private companies without being commercial: the site 7iber, the radio Al Balad and his website AmmanNet which tries to federate local and community radio stations with an exchange of information programs, or the webTv Aramram which only broadcasts on social networks.
Jordan’s official media actors are organised in the Jordan Press Association (JPA), a single Jordanian affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists.
There is no organization for independent or unofficial media in Jordan. The community radios have grouped together in a federation that brings together the radios Al Balad, Voice of Karak, New Maan radio, Yarmouk FM and Farah Al-Nas, among others, were beneficiaries of the European support programme for Jordanian media in 2015.The Community Media Network joined the coalition of 15 Jordanian civil society organisations HIMAM.
The Jordanian market cannot absorb the large number of graduates from the seven main journalism training institutions every year. Initiated in 1982 at the public university of Yarmouk in Irbid, these trainings remain mainly theoretical and are given by professors who have never been journalists and who have no direct link with the media. The practice of journalism, the concrete phase of the profession, is therefore not part of the training.
Only two of seven universities offer electronic media courses. Six universities have radio and television production studios, and several publish student newspapers. The offer is complemented by master’s degree courses offered by the Jordan Media Institute (JMI) and by the training centers of the national television, the official news agency and the private television Ro’ya.
An independent commission on secularization education is working on the preparation of an educational curriculum to include media literacy, the result of the analysis made by UNESCO in 2015. A national strategy has been adopted until 2023, with training for primary, secondary and university teachers under the auspices of the Jordan Media Institute (JMI).
Freedom of the press is enshrined in Article 15 of the Jordanian Constitution. The sector is mainly regulated by the Press and Publications Act and the Broadcasting Act, which covers electronic publications. In the last 10 years, several specific laws have also encroached on the freedom of the press: the law against terrorism, the law on cybercrime (2018)… Today, there are more than 20 laws and regulations governing the exercise of freedom of the press.
The law on the press and publications of 1993 and 1998The law, which has been amended several times, has allowed the emergence of many private media, granted the protection of sources and established the basis for access to public information. But it has also provided for the establishment of a license for any media, printing, bookstore or advertising agency or translation, polling institute or even research centers. In other words, the authorization is limited.
The Jordanian government adopted a National Media Strategy in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring, a strategy designed to establish “an independent Jordanian media rooted in the principles of freedom, pluralism and professionalism ». Yet, shortly thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, two amendments to the press law forced nearly 290 news sites to close because they could not meet the new regulatory requirements for licensing by the Media Commission.
Liberalized twenty years ago in 2002 with the end of the Jordanian Radio Television (JRTV) monopoly, the audiovisual sector is controlled. The broadcast media law combined the regulators (one for print and one for broadcast) into one, the Jordan Media Commission (JMC). The Commission is fully funded by the state (€1.5 million in 2019) and its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for validating – or not – the Commission’s decisions to award broadcasting licenses to radio and television stations. Less exposed, the Commission de Régulation des Télécoms has been determining the available frequencies and the conditions for broadcasting telecom services since 1995. 39 radio stations have a license, 20 of which are governmental (and 6 for universities).
The Ministry of Information has been replaced by government spokespersons who exercise supervision over the sector and the state media, alongside the Ministries of Culture, Information Technology and Finance.
As for access to information, the absence of an independent Access to Information Commission makes it impossible to obtain information on a regular basis or to seek redress when obstacles arise. In addition, the practice of transparency is selective: for example, the police reserve the exclusivity of service information on the traffic situation for their own radio station.
Jordanians are moving away from their traditional media (television and newspapers) and are getting most of their information from social networks: 88% were connected in 2018 compared to 23% in 2012. According to IPSOS (IPSOS 2018 result cited in USAID’s JORDAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT published in June 2021), during the same period (between 2012 and 2018), television consumption dropped from 93% to 80%, radio from 30% to 26%, and daily newspapers from 18% to 6% (with precipitous drops in official newspapers – Al Rai, Al Ghad and Ad Dustour).
The English-language press, which has an extremely marginal audience among the Jordanian population, is generally freer than the Arabic-language press, although monotonous and uniform; it is aimed at a mainly foreign audience, diplomats or members of NGOs.
Among the commercial media, the private television Ro’yaand its website (http://roya.tv) dominate the advertising market. Ro’ya and some private radio stations like Masaj, Dahab and Fun or again Rotana FM, share the audience with Al Ghad and the website in english Jordan News launched in 2021.
Some professional media with an information mission exist under the status of private companies without being commercial: the site 7iber, the radio Al Balad and his website AmmanNet which tries to federate local and community radio stations with an exchange of information programs, or the webTv Aramram which only broadcasts on social networks.
Jordan’s official media actors are organised in the Jordan Press Association (JPA), a single Jordanian affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists.
There is no organization for independent or unofficial media in Jordan. The community radios have grouped together in a federation that brings together the radios Al Balad, Voice of Karak, New Maan radio, Yarmouk FM and Farah Al-Nas, among others, were beneficiaries of the European support programme for Jordanian media in 2015.The Community Media Network joined the coalition of 15 Jordanian civil society organisations HIMAM.
The Jordanian market cannot absorb the large number of graduates from the seven main journalism training institutions every year. Initiated in 1982 at the public university of Yarmouk in Irbid, these trainings remain mainly theoretical and are given by professors who have never been journalists and who have no direct link with the media. The practice of journalism, the concrete phase of the profession, is therefore not part of the training.
Only two of seven universities offer electronic media courses. Six universities have radio and television production studios, and several publish student newspapers. The offer is complemented by master’s degree courses offered by the Jordan Media Institute (JMI) and by the training centers of the national television, the official news agency and the private television Ro’ya.
An independent commission on secularization education is working on the preparation of an educational curriculum to include media literacy, the result of the analysis made by UNESCO in 2015. A national strategy has been adopted until 2023, with training for primary, secondary and university teachers under the auspices of the Jordan Media Institute (JMI).
Lebanon
Lebanon is governed by a sectarian system that influences all aspects of social and political life, including the media sector. As a result, the country’s competing sectarian forces have utilized various means of telecommunications to communicate with their constituents, invest in journalists, writers, intellectuals, and producers, and most importantly, shape and contribute to the public debate. This contradictory and “plural” reality of the system has allowed for an expanding margin of freedom of expression relative to its authoritarian neighbors in the region. Nevertheless, the active interventions of different political parties in the media sphere have led to issues of editorial independence and financial sustainability, particularly as different outlets have relied on political funding to sustain themselves.
Given the platform provided by these outlets, such practices and conditions interact with and reinforce a variety of societal taboos in the country. These include institutional taboos (e.g., insulting the President), religious taboos, and taboos related to gender and sexuality. Despite the plurality of the Lebanese media, the long-lasting monopoly of different political forces in the country on the media sector has allowed for an entrenched series of local despots, utilizing propaganda to justify a plethora of methods to repress oppositional actors and marginalized groups. In fact, since 2017, the number of violations against journalists, activists, and influencers in the country has dramatically increased.
In Lebanon, the media is officially governed by a system of laws that concern different sectors. Given the increasing presence and influence of news sites and alternative outlets in the online sphere, a new media law which seeks to regulate these new means of communications has also been under discussion for over a decade. Also, past studies which concern the ways in which governments have intervened in the sector have indicated that the execution of these laws and procedures has been inconsistent. Currently, the key and most relevant texts include the 1962 Press Law, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law (Law 382), the 1994 Satellite Broadcast Law (Law 531), and the 1947 Cinema Law.
The issue of pluralism in Lebanon is closely related to the country’s system. The consociational system is prevalent in different aspects of social, political, and economic life. Therefore, Lebanon does not follow the model of state-controlled monopolistic media outlets that are typically found in neighboring authoritarian Arab regimes. This has allowed for a certain degree of pluralism and cultural richness, leading to a rise in the number of newspapers, magazines, and cultural centers historically.
However, state-imposed laws and regulations have put restrictions on launching these outlets. Journalists have to navigate through repressive policies and bureaucratic avenues to operate in the media sector.
Today, social media has become the primary platform for communication in Lebanon, with a vast majority of the population using it. It has made access to information faster, and the ability to create and circulate content is more accessible to new media entrepreneurs. The availability of social media has expanded the country’s pluralistic capacity.
The question of media access also depends on the financial capacity of individuals to start new ventures, especially when the economic and security situation has not been favorable to media projects in recent years.
The absence of monopolistic state ownership does not suggest that problematic and exclusivist forms of ownership which reinforce political intervention do not exist in the sector. In fact, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) project (launched by the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders, then in partnership with the Global Media Registry) clearly demonstrates ways in which members of the influential elite and political class in the country have held shares in a variety of media outlets in the pursuit of influencing coverage and promoting the pertinent interests and frames which suit them.
Censorship in Lebanon occurs in various forms, with two significant categories being cultural censorship and political censorship. The former includes but is not restricted to banning forms of “sexual” expression and a variety of societal taboos that emerge in films, concerts, book events, and other artistic or social occasions. The latter, which is more contentious, ranges from suppressing implicit criticisms targeting key figureheads in the Lebanese political system to prohibiting “offensive” or disruptive imagery regarding the legitimacy of neighboring regimes, and initiating calls to no-platform films whose characters or plot can be linked to Israel, legally classified as an enemy country.
In the Lebanese context, while explicit violations of the principle of free speech are not uncommon, self-censorship is a much more pervasive sentiment. Through acts of intimidation and harassment, along with journalists’ increasing financial dependence on their outlets and various other political considerations, the country’s primary political forces and security institutions can impose indirect restrictions on free speech.
Despite being understudied in the Lebanese context, misinformation is a particular problem that regularly surfaces in the media sphere, especially on the much less regulated social media domain. In Lebanon, platforms such as Facebook or Twitter have their pages flooded by articles and posts riddled with fake news, which is circulated either deliberately for political purposes or unintentionally as supportive constituents are unable to isolate fake news and produce reliable information.
According to the “Access to Information” law (Law No.28) passed in 2017 (the first legal obligation for the state to publish financial and administrative documents originating from different ministries and judicial departments), and later amended in July 2021, journalists have the written right to request any document that concerns the public interest. However, regardless of these formal constraints, the actual bureaucratic process heavily relies on who is requesting the document and how political actors anticipate they will be utilized.
In Lebanon, he vast majority of press associations and syndicates are closely linked to the country’s primary sectarian political parties and figures. Due to this consistent lack of protection, journalists from different regions and domains in the country created the Alternative Media Syndicate in 2019.
All studies, indicators, and reports suggest that the basic security of journalists, media workers, reporters, researchers, and writers is being threatened. There are several dimensions to this quandary: (1) the number of direct, low-level violations constituting physical repression that have occurred in the past few years or so, (2) the continuous cycle of assassinations targeting journalists and writers with similar political patterns, and (3) character assassinations that revolve around the usage of social media to construct narratives aimed at dehumanizing specific persons and damaging their reputation, further providing the context for potential physical violence.
While the country’s economic crisis has made the status of journalists very difficult, the hardships faced by media workers preceded this crisis. This has its roots in the application of the country’s labor law, the reliance of various outlets on informal oral contracts, and the lack of reliable benefits packages, such as health insurance and productive device coverage. A study conducted by Samir Kassir Foundation raises important and crucial insights about the nature of labor rights within the media sector.
When assessing the tone, rhetoric, working conditions, and orientation in traditional media, the treatment of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community presents a clear issue in the way these matters are approached in the public domain. This treatment concerns not only the role and behavior of senior management but also how misogynistic, sexist, and homophobic discourse permeates the media sphere.
Women, the LGBTQ+ community, migrant workers, and refugees are just a few examples of marginalized groups who consistently receive discriminatory and hate speech on the online social media platforms of different television stations and newspaper outlets. Recurrent monthly monitoring-based research conducted by the Samir Kassir Foundation shows that gendered comments and slurs are an instrumental component of this hate speech.
Media training in Lebanon can be divided into two categories: training offered by international organizations, official institutions, and non-government organizations in the country, and formal academic training offered in select universities with a comprehensive curriculum. Any assessment of strengths and weaknesses should consider the progress and performance of both domains. Regarding formal academic training, there is a consensus among stakeholders that journalism and media studies in Lebanon “urgently needed more qualified faculty, locally oriented research, and relevant academic and technical resources”.
In Lebanon, a comprehensive media literacy curriculum was implemented in the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University. A product of the efforts of various foundations and international institutes and initiatives, such as the Salzburg Academy for Media and Global Change and the Open Society Foundations, the curriculum underwent a number of adaptations which made the training process more professional and implementable, but also reduced the foundational and theoretical rigor of the material. Due to the lack of adequate state preparation or intervention in these matters, alongside the fact that the question of media literacy has been confined to the programs of elite educational institutions, civil society initiatives, workshops, and programs have acted as an alternative field to discuss this issue.
Lebanon
Lebanon is governed by a sectarian system that influences all aspects of social and political life, including the media sector. As a result, the country’s competing sectarian forces have utilized various means of telecommunications to communicate with their constituents, invest in journalists, writers, intellectuals, and producers, and most importantly, shape and contribute to the public debate. This contradictory and “plural” reality of the system has allowed for an expanding margin of freedom of expression relative to its authoritarian neighbors in the region. Nevertheless, the active interventions of different political parties in the media sphere have led to issues of editorial independence and financial sustainability, particularly as different outlets have relied on political funding to sustain themselves.
Given the platform provided by these outlets, such practices and conditions interact with and reinforce a variety of societal taboos in the country. These include institutional taboos (e.g., insulting the President), religious taboos, and taboos related to gender and sexuality. Despite the plurality of the Lebanese media, the long-lasting monopoly of different political forces in the country on the media sector has allowed for an entrenched series of local despots, utilizing propaganda to justify a plethora of methods to repress oppositional actors and marginalized groups. In fact, since 2017, the number of violations against journalists, activists, and influencers in the country has dramatically increased.
In Lebanon, the media is officially governed by a system of laws that concern different sectors. Given the increasing presence and influence of news sites and alternative outlets in the online sphere, a new media law which seeks to regulate these new means of communications has also been under discussion for over a decade. Also, past studies which concern the ways in which governments have intervened in the sector have indicated that the execution of these laws and procedures has been inconsistent. Currently, the key and most relevant texts include the 1962 Press Law, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law (Law 382), the 1994 Satellite Broadcast Law (Law 531), and the 1947 Cinema Law.
The issue of pluralism in Lebanon is closely related to the country’s system. The consociational system is prevalent in different aspects of social, political, and economic life. Therefore, Lebanon does not follow the model of state-controlled monopolistic media outlets that are typically found in neighboring authoritarian Arab regimes. This has allowed for a certain degree of pluralism and cultural richness, leading to a rise in the number of newspapers, magazines, and cultural centers historically.
However, state-imposed laws and regulations have put restrictions on launching these outlets. Journalists have to navigate through repressive policies and bureaucratic avenues to operate in the media sector.
Today, social media has become the primary platform for communication in Lebanon, with a vast majority of the population using it. It has made access to information faster, and the ability to create and circulate content is more accessible to new media entrepreneurs. The availability of social media has expanded the country’s pluralistic capacity.
The question of media access also depends on the financial capacity of individuals to start new ventures, especially when the economic and security situation has not been favorable to media projects in recent years.
The absence of monopolistic state ownership does not suggest that problematic and exclusivist forms of ownership which reinforce political intervention do not exist in the sector. In fact, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) project (launched by the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders, then in partnership with the Global Media Registry) clearly demonstrates ways in which members of the influential elite and political class in the country have held shares in a variety of media outlets in the pursuit of influencing coverage and promoting the pertinent interests and frames which suit them.
Censorship in Lebanon occurs in various forms, with two significant categories being cultural censorship and political censorship. The former includes but is not restricted to banning forms of “sexual” expression and a variety of societal taboos that emerge in films, concerts, book events, and other artistic or social occasions. The latter, which is more contentious, ranges from suppressing implicit criticisms targeting key figureheads in the Lebanese political system to prohibiting “offensive” or disruptive imagery regarding the legitimacy of neighboring regimes, and initiating calls to no-platform films whose characters or plot can be linked to Israel, legally classified as an enemy country.
In the Lebanese context, while explicit violations of the principle of free speech are not uncommon, self-censorship is a much more pervasive sentiment. Through acts of intimidation and harassment, along with journalists’ increasing financial dependence on their outlets and various other political considerations, the country’s primary political forces and security institutions can impose indirect restrictions on free speech.
Despite being understudied in the Lebanese context, misinformation is a particular problem that regularly surfaces in the media sphere, especially on the much less regulated social media domain. In Lebanon, platforms such as Facebook or Twitter have their pages flooded by articles and posts riddled with fake news, which is circulated either deliberately for political purposes or unintentionally as supportive constituents are unable to isolate fake news and produce reliable information.
According to the “Access to Information” law (Law No.28) passed in 2017 (the first legal obligation for the state to publish financial and administrative documents originating from different ministries and judicial departments), and later amended in July 2021, journalists have the written right to request any document that concerns the public interest. However, regardless of these formal constraints, the actual bureaucratic process heavily relies on who is requesting the document and how political actors anticipate they will be utilized.
In Lebanon, he vast majority of press associations and syndicates are closely linked to the country’s primary sectarian political parties and figures. Due to this consistent lack of protection, journalists from different regions and domains in the country created the Alternative Media Syndicate in 2019.
All studies, indicators, and reports suggest that the basic security of journalists, media workers, reporters, researchers, and writers is being threatened. There are several dimensions to this quandary: (1) the number of direct, low-level violations constituting physical repression that have occurred in the past few years or so, (2) the continuous cycle of assassinations targeting journalists and writers with similar political patterns, and (3) character assassinations that revolve around the usage of social media to construct narratives aimed at dehumanizing specific persons and damaging their reputation, further providing the context for potential physical violence.
While the country’s economic crisis has made the status of journalists very difficult, the hardships faced by media workers preceded this crisis. This has its roots in the application of the country’s labor law, the reliance of various outlets on informal oral contracts, and the lack of reliable benefits packages, such as health insurance and productive device coverage. A study conducted by Samir Kassir Foundation raises important and crucial insights about the nature of labor rights within the media sector.
When assessing the tone, rhetoric, working conditions, and orientation in traditional media, the treatment of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community presents a clear issue in the way these matters are approached in the public domain. This treatment concerns not only the role and behavior of senior management but also how misogynistic, sexist, and homophobic discourse permeates the media sphere.
Women, the LGBTQ+ community, migrant workers, and refugees are just a few examples of marginalized groups who consistently receive discriminatory and hate speech on the online social media platforms of different television stations and newspaper outlets. Recurrent monthly monitoring-based research conducted by the Samir Kassir Foundation shows that gendered comments and slurs are an instrumental component of this hate speech.
Media training in Lebanon can be divided into two categories: training offered by international organizations, official institutions, and non-government organizations in the country, and formal academic training offered in select universities with a comprehensive curriculum. Any assessment of strengths and weaknesses should consider the progress and performance of both domains. Regarding formal academic training, there is a consensus among stakeholders that journalism and media studies in Lebanon “urgently needed more qualified faculty, locally oriented research, and relevant academic and technical resources”.
In Lebanon, a comprehensive media literacy curriculum was implemented in the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University. A product of the efforts of various foundations and international institutes and initiatives, such as the Salzburg Academy for Media and Global Change and the Open Society Foundations, the curriculum underwent a number of adaptations which made the training process more professional and implementable, but also reduced the foundational and theoretical rigor of the material. Due to the lack of adequate state preparation or intervention in these matters, alongside the fact that the question of media literacy has been confined to the programs of elite educational institutions, civil society initiatives, workshops, and programs have acted as an alternative field to discuss this issue.
Syria
Reporters Without Borders Index: 177 / 180 (2025)
Freedom House Index: 5 / 100 – Not Free (2025)
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): 12 / 100 (2024)
Freedom of Expression
Since overthrowing the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Syria has experienced unprecedented freedom of expression, reflected in rare progress on both Reporters Without Borders’ Freedom of the Press Index (2025) and Freedom House’s Freedom Index (2025). According to the Ministry of Information (MoI), 19,200 work permits have been issued to local journalists over the past year. However, this newfound freedom is not protected by laws or well-established institutions, including independent syndicates.
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
Apart from the Constitutional Declaration (Temporary Constitution) of March 13, 2025, which states that “The State guarantees freedom of opinion, expression, information, publication, and the press” (Article 13), Syrian media remains, at least in theory, governed by largely repressive laws from the Assad regime era since the new parliament has not yet convened.
Pluralism
Syrian media pluralism emerged from the 2011 revolution, enabling the rise of independent outlets, including those in non-Arabic languages like Kurdish. These outlets operated in exile and in regions outside the control of the former Assad regime. Currently, it is safe to say that this pluralism still persists. Since the collapse of the previous regime, 636 registration requests have been submitted by media outlets.
Censorship & self-censorship
The collapse of the Assad regime has, consequently, led to the disappearance of many previous taboos and red lines, especially related to the president, his family, his inner circle, as well as the military, security forces, ethnic issues, and the economic situation. However, the ambiguity surrounding laws and high social tensions compel journalists to practice self-censorship. For example, both local and foreign journalists have expressed fears of being denied a visa or access to officials for criticizing the government. Additionally, journalists worry about facing physical and online threats from the public because of their work.
Disinformation and Misinformation
Since the 2011 revolution, news related to Syria has become a battleground for misinformation. This situation has worsened with the collapse of the Assad regime, as more organized misinformation campaigns—sponsored and promoted regionally—seek to delegitimize the new Syrian government and, more importantly, to incite sectarian and ethnic hostility and violence among Syrians. In response, fact-checking platforms such as Verify-Sy, true_platform, Fareq, and Radar have been established. Many outlets also collaborate with specialized organizations to verify their reports before publishing. Furthermore, the MoI has launched an initiative to develop a code of conduct, including 16 workshops across different governorates, attended by 600 journalists.
Access to Information
Syria has never enacted a law guaranteeing the right to access information. Since the fall of the Assad regime, access to information has significantly improved, allowing journalists to work more freely within the country. However, access to officials remains limited, and Syrian journalists have voiced concerns and frustration about the preferential treatment given to foreign journalists or to Syrian journalists working for international media outlets and news agencies.
Journalists’ Security
Despite significant changes since December 2024, Syrian journalists still face serious threats. According to the France-based Syrian Journalists Association (SJA), three journalists were temporarily arrested by government forces in June 2025. Additionally, the new government’s reactivation of Cybercrime Law No. 20 of 2022 poses a real threat to journalists in particular. This law has been criticized since its enactment for restricting freedom of expression through vague restrictions and harsh penalties, and there has reportedly been a sharp increase in legal complaints over online incitement and sectarianism.
However, the most serious threats originate outside government restrictions, due to security concerns, sectarian violence, longstanding grievances from the war, and regional instability. SJA has documented the killing of three journalists, while two others were injured in May, June, and July 2025, by known perpetrators. Additionally, several journalists survived Israeli attacks in southern Syria or were temporarily detained by Israeli forces.
Media Business Models
Due to decades of authoritarian rule, over ten years of war, and international sanctions, Syrian media now heavily rely—if not entirely—on external funding. While government-affiliated outlets receive official support, independent ones depend on international aid. Additionally, some media organizations are backed by regional powers, such as Syria TV, which is funded by Qatar. However, recent sanctions relief could allow revenue from advertising, especially on social media platforms and apps.
Independent Media: state and challenges
The resurgence of independent media has been one of the most significant outcomes of the 2011 revolution. The most notable among those still operating are Enab Baladi, Al Jumhuriya, Syria Direct, Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism (SIRAJ), Radio Rozana, and Radio Arta. Besides relying on international funds, all these outlets—except for Enab Baladi, which announced in March 2025 that it would resume printing and distribution in Damascus—are only available online, limiting their reach and influence. According to Datareportal, Syria’s internet penetration rate was 35.8 percent of the total population at the start of 2025. More importantly, these outlets face the challenge of navigating and impacting a highly polarized environment without sacrificing their objectivity and other professional standards.
Media literacy: development and challenges
The increase in misinformation and disinformation, along with regime change in Syria, has boosted interest in media literacy. The most recent and notable effort is the Syria Media Literacy Lab project. However, at this early stage, it still seems mainly focused on journalists.
Gender and media
The 2011 uprising marked a pivotal moment in Syrian women’s participation in the media. However, only 38% of them, according to a 2016 study, held “positions of responsibility.” With support from Syrian independent media and international donors, the past year has seen notable efforts to empower female journalists through various training programs and fellowships.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Although Syrian outlets specializing in environmental issues remain scarce or nonexistent, environmental concerns appear to be a priority for the existing media and journalists. This rapidly growing awareness and interest are driven by three main factors: the devastating environmental effects of the recent years’ war, the clear negative impacts of climate change—especially drought—and the increasing donor support for the media’s role in raising awareness and helping find solutions.
Coverage of the migrations topic
Due to years of war, Syria has become a source of refugees rather than a destination. However, there is an immigration-related issue involving Palestinian refugees who arrived in the country after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and have since had all civil rights (but not political rights), similar to their Syrian counterparts. In this context, Syrian media freely and favorably report on any situation involving Syrian-Palestinians.
AI development and use in the media sector
Three clear positions can be identified among Syrian media regarding the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Among exiled, independent outlets, some believe that AI distorts the essence of journalism. Conversely, others are convinced that wisely adopting this technology could improve the quality and reach of media. On the other side, due to numerous technical issues, mainly poor internet connectivity, local outlets seem unable to participate in such a debate.
Syria
Reporters Without Borders Index: 177 / 180 (2025)
Freedom House Index: 5 / 100 – Not Free (2025)
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): 12 / 100 (2024)
Freedom of Expression
Since overthrowing the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Syria has experienced unprecedented freedom of expression, reflected in rare progress on both Reporters Without Borders’ Freedom of the Press Index (2025) and Freedom House’s Freedom Index (2025). According to the Ministry of Information (MoI), 19,200 work permits have been issued to local journalists over the past year. However, this newfound freedom is not protected by laws or well-established institutions, including independent syndicates.
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
Apart from the Constitutional Declaration (Temporary Constitution) of March 13, 2025, which states that “The State guarantees freedom of opinion, expression, information, publication, and the press” (Article 13), Syrian media remains, at least in theory, governed by largely repressive laws from the Assad regime era since the new parliament has not yet convened.
Pluralism
Syrian media pluralism emerged from the 2011 revolution, enabling the rise of independent outlets, including those in non-Arabic languages like Kurdish. These outlets operated in exile and in regions outside the control of the former Assad regime. Currently, it is safe to say that this pluralism still persists. Since the collapse of the previous regime, 636 registration requests have been submitted by media outlets.
Censorship & self-censorship
The collapse of the Assad regime has, consequently, led to the disappearance of many previous taboos and red lines, especially related to the president, his family, his inner circle, as well as the military, security forces, ethnic issues, and the economic situation. However, the ambiguity surrounding laws and high social tensions compel journalists to practice self-censorship. For example, both local and foreign journalists have expressed fears of being denied a visa or access to officials for criticizing the government. Additionally, journalists worry about facing physical and online threats from the public because of their work.
Disinformation and Misinformation
Since the 2011 revolution, news related to Syria has become a battleground for misinformation. This situation has worsened with the collapse of the Assad regime, as more organized misinformation campaigns—sponsored and promoted regionally—seek to delegitimize the new Syrian government and, more importantly, to incite sectarian and ethnic hostility and violence among Syrians. In response, fact-checking platforms such as Verify-Sy, true_platform, Fareq, and Radar have been established. Many outlets also collaborate with specialized organizations to verify their reports before publishing. Furthermore, the MoI has launched an initiative to develop a code of conduct, including 16 workshops across different governorates, attended by 600 journalists.
Access to Information
Syria has never enacted a law guaranteeing the right to access information. Since the fall of the Assad regime, access to information has significantly improved, allowing journalists to work more freely within the country. However, access to officials remains limited, and Syrian journalists have voiced concerns and frustration about the preferential treatment given to foreign journalists or to Syrian journalists working for international media outlets and news agencies.
Journalists’ Security
Despite significant changes since December 2024, Syrian journalists still face serious threats. According to the France-based Syrian Journalists Association (SJA), three journalists were temporarily arrested by government forces in June 2025. Additionally, the new government’s reactivation of Cybercrime Law No. 20 of 2022 poses a real threat to journalists in particular. This law has been criticized since its enactment for restricting freedom of expression through vague restrictions and harsh penalties, and there has reportedly been a sharp increase in legal complaints over online incitement and sectarianism.
However, the most serious threats originate outside government restrictions, due to security concerns, sectarian violence, longstanding grievances from the war, and regional instability. SJA has documented the killing of three journalists, while two others were injured in May, June, and July 2025, by known perpetrators. Additionally, several journalists survived Israeli attacks in southern Syria or were temporarily detained by Israeli forces.
Media Business Models
Due to decades of authoritarian rule, over ten years of war, and international sanctions, Syrian media now heavily rely—if not entirely—on external funding. While government-affiliated outlets receive official support, independent ones depend on international aid. Additionally, some media organizations are backed by regional powers, such as Syria TV, which is funded by Qatar. However, recent sanctions relief could allow revenue from advertising, especially on social media platforms and apps.
Independent Media: state and challenges
The resurgence of independent media has been one of the most significant outcomes of the 2011 revolution. The most notable among those still operating are Enab Baladi, Al Jumhuriya, Syria Direct, Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism (SIRAJ), Radio Rozana, and Radio Arta. Besides relying on international funds, all these outlets—except for Enab Baladi, which announced in March 2025 that it would resume printing and distribution in Damascus—are only available online, limiting their reach and influence. According to Datareportal, Syria’s internet penetration rate was 35.8 percent of the total population at the start of 2025. More importantly, these outlets face the challenge of navigating and impacting a highly polarized environment without sacrificing their objectivity and other professional standards.
Media literacy: development and challenges
The increase in misinformation and disinformation, along with regime change in Syria, has boosted interest in media literacy. The most recent and notable effort is the Syria Media Literacy Lab project. However, at this early stage, it still seems mainly focused on journalists.
Gender and media
The 2011 uprising marked a pivotal moment in Syrian women’s participation in the media. However, only 38% of them, according to a 2016 study, held “positions of responsibility.” With support from Syrian independent media and international donors, the past year has seen notable efforts to empower female journalists through various training programs and fellowships.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Although Syrian outlets specializing in environmental issues remain scarce or nonexistent, environmental concerns appear to be a priority for the existing media and journalists. This rapidly growing awareness and interest are driven by three main factors: the devastating environmental effects of the recent years’ war, the clear negative impacts of climate change—especially drought—and the increasing donor support for the media’s role in raising awareness and helping find solutions.
Coverage of the migrations topic
Due to years of war, Syria has become a source of refugees rather than a destination. However, there is an immigration-related issue involving Palestinian refugees who arrived in the country after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and have since had all civil rights (but not political rights), similar to their Syrian counterparts. In this context, Syrian media freely and favorably report on any situation involving Syrian-Palestinians.
AI development and use in the media sector
Three clear positions can be identified among Syrian media regarding the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Among exiled, independent outlets, some believe that AI distorts the essence of journalism. Conversely, others are convinced that wisely adopting this technology could improve the quality and reach of media. On the other side, due to numerous technical issues, mainly poor internet connectivity, local outlets seem unable to participate in such a debate.
Yemen
Reporters Without Borders Index (latest): Yemen ranks among the lowest globally, placing 154th out of 180 countries.Freedom House Index
: Not Free, with a total score of 10 out of 100, including 1/40 for Political Rights and 9/60 for Civil Liberties.
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International): Yemen ranked 173th out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index.
Freedom of Expression
Since the outbreak of the conflict, freedom of expression in Yemen has sharply deteriorated, and journalistic work has become highly dangerous and effectively criminalized. In areas under Houthi control, hostile rhetoric portraying journalists as security threats has led to the near-total elimination of independent media and the transformation of these areas into closed media environments. In areas controlled by the internationally recognised government and allied forces, violations persist at varying levels, reflecting the absence of an effective national framework to protect freedom of expression.
Between 2015 and the end of 2025, more than 2,629 violations against journalists and media workers were documented, including 69 killings and 531 cases of arrest or enforced disappearance. 2025 stands out as one of the deadliest years, with 15 killings, the highest annual toll since the conflict began.
As of the end of 2025, 11 journalists remain detained due to their journalistic work, including 10 held by the Houthi group and one by the Southern Transitional Council in Aden, with some having spent nearly a decade in detention without fair trials.
Digital repression further compounds these violations. Since 2015, Yemen has experienced repeated internet shutdowns and blocking of news websites and communication platforms, particularly in Houthi-controlled areas. Given the population’s heavy reliance on a single internet provider, even partial shutdowns have nationwide impacts, undermining access to information and other fundamental rights such as education and health.
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
Yemen has witnessed no legislative updates to media or digital laws in recent years, including 2025, due to legislative paralysis caused by conflict and political fragmentation. In practice, de facto authorities—particularly the Houthi group—have imposed restrictive administrative and security measures, including compulsory licensing, unofficial fees, and intrusive requirements to disclose detailed information about funding sources and media staff. These measures are accompanied by explicit threats of closure, confiscation, and banning of non-compliant outlets, further shrinking the space for independent journalism.
Pluralism
Media pluralism in Yemen has undergone severe structural erosion. In Houthi-controlled areas, pluralism is virtually nonexistent, with most non-aligned outlets shut down, confiscated, or blocked. Journalists have been forced to leave the profession, work under pseudonyms, or operate through small, low-visibility platforms, resulting in a form of “hidden pluralism” with minimal public reach.
In areas under the internationally recognised government, a relatively wider but fragile margin of pluralism exists. However, most media outlets remain tied to political or partisan funding, while independent initiatives face security, financial, and professional pressures that limit their sustainability and capacity to represent diverse societal voices.
Censorship & Self-censorship
Censorship in Yemen is largely enforced through informal and coercive practices, particularly at checkpoints. According to the 2025 Media Freedom Observatory (Marsadak) report, 76.2% of journalists experienced searches of their electronic devices, and 51.5% reported direct financial extortion.
These practices have fuelled widespread self-censorship: 69% of journalists reported impaired field coverage, while 12% stopped travelling altogether due to fear of violations. Furthermore, 81.8% of affected journalists did not report abuses, citing fear of retaliation and lack of accountability mechanisms. In practice, the mere possession of journalistic content or professional communication has become a red line.
Disinformation and Misinformation
By 2025, journalists in Yemen operate in an information environment heavily saturated with disinformation and misinformation, which now accompanies daily coverage of political, military, economic, and humanitarian developments.
According to data from the Hakikah fact-checking platform, 169 verification pieces were published in 2025, including 125 classified as misleading content and 37 as false content. This reflects the scale and persistence of disinformation affecting both journalists and the public.
While several local initiatives work to counter disinformation ( 9 key initiatives ), efforts remain largely reactive—focused on debunking content after dissemination—rather than embedded in newsroom policies or pre-publication verification systems, primarily due to limited funding and institutional capacity. Nonetheless, targeted training initiatives have contributed to strengthening journalists’ verification skills.
Access to Information
Journalists in Yemen face severe obstacles in accessing official information despite the existence of the Law on the Right to Access Information (Law No. 13 of 2012). In practice, implementation is absent: information requests are routinely ignored or denied, government institutions lack functional information units, and no independent oversight body exists to enforce compliance. Conflict, institutional fragmentation, security risks, and entrenched secrecy further restrict access, forcing journalists to rely on informal sources and increasing professional and legal risks. The right to information is therefore legally recognised but effectively unenforced.
Journalists’ Security
Journalists face serious security threats, including threats, physical assaults, arbitrary detention, device confiscation, and forced disclosure of sources, particularly while moving between governorates or covering sensitive issues. These risks undermine personal safety, compromise source confidentiality, and reinforce self-censorship, severely restricting independent reporting.
Media Business Models
Mainstream media outlets largely rely on political or partisan funding from conflict parties or affiliated actors, limiting editorial independence and tying sustainability to political loyalty rather than professional performance. Independent media outlets operate under fragile models based on international grants, non-profit support, limited digital advertising, volunteer work, and, in many cases, operations from exile. These outlets adopt low-cost, flexible structures to survive, but long-term financial sustainability remains elusive.
Independent Media: State and Challenges
Independent media in Yemen consists of a small number of digital platforms with limited but highly engaged audiences, primarily on social media. While these outlets often enjoy higher credibility than partisan media, their reach and influence remain constrained by security threats, funding shortages, technical limitations, and ongoing censorship, compelling them to operate with minimal resources and staff.
Media Literacy
Yemen lacks an effective national policy on media and information literacy (MIL), and MIL is largely absent from formal education curricula. Existing efforts are driven by civil society and media organisations through ad hoc training and awareness initiatives. While important, these efforts remain fragmented and insufficient to address widespread exposure to disinformation.
Gender and Media
Female journalists face underrepresentation and compounded challenges, including security threats, social restrictions, and discrimination. Despite this, approximately 19 women-led media initiatives have emerged in recent years, contributing to more rights-based and professional coverage of gender-related issues. These initiatives achieve meaningful qualitative impact but remain constrained by financial insecurity, safety risks, and limited audience reach.
Coverage of Environmental Issues
Environmental issues receive limited and irregular media coverage, often framed around disasters such as floods, drought, and water scarcity rather than as structural development and human rights concerns. Nonetheless, specialised platforms—such as Holm Akhdar, Rif Yemen, Sadd… Climate, the Spirit of the Earth, and the Yemeni Renewable Energy Transition Network—have contributed to sustaining environmental reporting, albeit with limited overall impact relative to the scale of Yemen’s environmental challenges.
Coverage of Migrations
Journalistic coverage of migration and displacement is constrained by insecurity, restricted access to transit areas, lack of official data, and migrants’ fear of speaking out. Limited resources and specialised training further hinder in-depth reporting, resulting in coverage that is often episodic and crisis-driven rather than sustained and analytical.
AI Development and Use in the Media Sector
The use of artificial intelligence in Yemen’s media sector remains limited and gradual, primarily supporting fact-checking, content analysis, translation, transcription, and verification of visual materials. AI tools are used as supportive aids rather than editorial substitutes. Training initiatives have raised awareness of AI’s potential and risks, but broader adoption is constrained by weak digital infrastructure, limited funding, and the absence of ethical and professional regulatory frameworks.