Country files
File available soon.
File available soon.
File available soon.
Libye
Depuis que la Libye s’est enfoncée dans la guerre civile en 2014, les journalistes sont devenus des cibles et les médias des armes au service des factions en conflit. En se montrant de plus en plus partisans, les médias sont perçus comme des parties prenantes du conflit.
Les attaques contre les journalistes libyens sont favorisées par le cadre légal de l’ère Kadhafi qui n’a pas été aboli, comme la loi sur la presse de 1972, qui prévoit des peines de prison à perpétuité en cas de publication de nouvelles pouvant « porter atteinte à la réputation du pays et la confiance qui lui est portée à l’étranger ». De nouveaux délits restreignant la liberté d’expression et de la presse ont été ajoutés par les autorités en place après 2011. L’agence anti-terroriste, chapeautée par un groupe armé, a le pouvoir, depuis 2018, de censurer « toute information pouvant menacer la sécurité du pays, la sécurité de la société ou la sécurité nationale ».
La Libye est un pays dont la majorité de la population est de confession musulmane et porte des valeurs conservatrices. Le ministère des médias et les conventions sociales interdisent la diffusion d’images ou productions qui montrent le prophète Mohamed et ses compagnons.
Les sujets sur l’athéisme, la sexualité, les minorités de genre, les revendications féministes sont sensibles et considérés comme des lignes rouges à ne pas franchir par la plupart des médias et acteurs publics. La question de la participation des femmes à la vie politique est en revanche un sujet de plus en plus évoqué dans l’espace public. Comme dans le reste du monde, les femmes journalistes sont néanmoins les cibles privilégiées de cyberharcèlement.Les journalistes ont payé un lourd tribu dans les guerres civiles qui se sont succédées depuis 2011. Dans la décennie qui a suivi la révolution de 2011, plus de 30 journalistes et blogueurs ont été tués en Libye et, dans la plupart des cas, les coupables n’ont pas été traduits en justice. Depuis 2015, 247 journalistes ont été arrêtés ou ont été victimes de violences physiques par des militaires et groupes paramilitaires selon Libya Platform.
Entre mai 2020 et mai 2021, la Libyan Organization for independent Media (LOFIM) a recensé des violences contre 54 journalistes dont 45% à Tripoli, 41% à Benghazi. Ils ont été victimes d’attaques, arrestations, interrogatoires par forces de sécurité ou fouilles de téléphone. En 2021 et 2022, LOFIM a recensé 10 attaques allant d’arrestations à des disparitions forcées de journalistes.
L’implosion du régime kadhafiste en 2011 a permis l’éclosion de dizaines de nouveaux médias, créés par des groupes révolutionnaires, hors de toute régulation. Deux ans plus tard, la parenthèse s’est refermée et la plupart des médias indépendants des nouvelles autorités ou groupes armées ont été attaqués ou fermés.
La déclaration constitutionnelle garantit la liberté de la presse mais aucun décret n’en protège l’exercice. Il existe seulement une circulaire datant du 3 mai 2021, émise par le gouvernement dit d’unité nationale (GUN) interdisant les arrestations et détentions de journalistes. Ce gouvernement formé en 2021, sous l’égide de l’ONU, s’était engagé à restructurer les organes contrôlant les médias. Aucune réforme n’a été engagé à ce jour. A Tripoli, un conseil des droits de l’Homme, rattaché au gouvernement, a été créé mais son activité réelle reste opaque et inconnue des défenseurs des droits humains et journalistes indépendants interviewés pour ce rapport.
Depuis 2014, un nouvel arsenal législatif cible les journalistes. Insulter les autorités, les emblèmes de l’Etat et son drapeau sont des délits passibles de prison. La formulation vague de ces textes offre une large interprétation aux autorités répressives.
Les journalistes, blogueurs et autres personnels de médias sont victimes d’arrestations et ciblés par toutes les parties, tandis que le personnel judiciaire est attaqué pour empêcher le fonctionnement normal de la justice. Les arrestations de journalistes au motif qu’ils ne possèdent pas de permis de travail sont régulières. A l’Est, plusieurs journalistes ont été poursuivis par des tribunaux militaires.
Libye
Depuis que la Libye s’est enfoncée dans la guerre civile en 2014, les journalistes sont devenus des cibles et les médias des armes au service des factions en conflit. En se montrant de plus en plus partisans, les médias sont perçus comme des parties prenantes du conflit.
Les attaques contre les journalistes libyens sont favorisées par le cadre légal de l’ère Kadhafi qui n’a pas été aboli, comme la loi sur la presse de 1972, qui prévoit des peines de prison à perpétuité en cas de publication de nouvelles pouvant « porter atteinte à la réputation du pays et la confiance qui lui est portée à l’étranger ». De nouveaux délits restreignant la liberté d’expression et de la presse ont été ajoutés par les autorités en place après 2011. L’agence anti-terroriste, chapeautée par un groupe armé, a le pouvoir, depuis 2018, de censurer « toute information pouvant menacer la sécurité du pays, la sécurité de la société ou la sécurité nationale ».
La Libye est un pays dont la majorité de la population est de confession musulmane et porte des valeurs conservatrices. Le ministère des médias et les conventions sociales interdisent la diffusion d’images ou productions qui montrent le prophète Mohamed et ses compagnons.
Les sujets sur l’athéisme, la sexualité, les minorités de genre, les revendications féministes sont sensibles et considérés comme des lignes rouges à ne pas franchir par la plupart des médias et acteurs publics. La question de la participation des femmes à la vie politique est en revanche un sujet de plus en plus évoqué dans l’espace public. Comme dans le reste du monde, les femmes journalistes sont néanmoins les cibles privilégiées de cyberharcèlement.Les journalistes ont payé un lourd tribu dans les guerres civiles qui se sont succédées depuis 2011. Dans la décennie qui a suivi la révolution de 2011, plus de 30 journalistes et blogueurs ont été tués en Libye et, dans la plupart des cas, les coupables n’ont pas été traduits en justice. Depuis 2015, 247 journalistes ont été arrêtés ou ont été victimes de violences physiques par des militaires et groupes paramilitaires selon Libya Platform.
Entre mai 2020 et mai 2021, la Libyan Organization for independent Media (LOFIM) a recensé des violences contre 54 journalistes dont 45% à Tripoli, 41% à Benghazi. Ils ont été victimes d’attaques, arrestations, interrogatoires par forces de sécurité ou fouilles de téléphone. En 2021 et 2022, LOFIM a recensé 10 attaques allant d’arrestations à des disparitions forcées de journalistes.
L’implosion du régime kadhafiste en 2011 a permis l’éclosion de dizaines de nouveaux médias, créés par des groupes révolutionnaires, hors de toute régulation. Deux ans plus tard, la parenthèse s’est refermée et la plupart des médias indépendants des nouvelles autorités ou groupes armées ont été attaqués ou fermés.
La déclaration constitutionnelle garantit la liberté de la presse mais aucun décret n’en protège l’exercice. Il existe seulement une circulaire datant du 3 mai 2021, émise par le gouvernement dit d’unité nationale (GUN) interdisant les arrestations et détentions de journalistes. Ce gouvernement formé en 2021, sous l’égide de l’ONU, s’était engagé à restructurer les organes contrôlant les médias. Aucune réforme n’a été engagé à ce jour. A Tripoli, un conseil des droits de l’Homme, rattaché au gouvernement, a été créé mais son activité réelle reste opaque et inconnue des défenseurs des droits humains et journalistes indépendants interviewés pour ce rapport.
Depuis 2014, un nouvel arsenal législatif cible les journalistes. Insulter les autorités, les emblèmes de l’Etat et son drapeau sont des délits passibles de prison. La formulation vague de ces textes offre une large interprétation aux autorités répressives.
Les journalistes, blogueurs et autres personnels de médias sont victimes d’arrestations et ciblés par toutes les parties, tandis que le personnel judiciaire est attaqué pour empêcher le fonctionnement normal de la justice. Les arrestations de journalistes au motif qu’ils ne possèdent pas de permis de travail sont régulières. A l’Est, plusieurs journalistes ont été poursuivis par des tribunaux militaires.
En 2020, l’ONG Libyan Organization For Independent Media (LOFIM) qui fait référence en Libye, a comptabilisé 218 médias pour le public libyen, dont 150 radios locales et 22 chaines de télévision y compris celles émettant depuis l’étranger. Une cinquantaine de station de radios locales auraient donc fermé depuis le recensement de 2014, effectué par Legatum institute Libya Media wiki.
99% des Libyens possèdent une télévision satellitaire et 76% d’entre eux la regarde tous les jours. La télévision est le moyen principal d’information, selon une étude réalisée en 2015 par BBC Media action. Ces statistiques sont à relativiser avec la part croissante de réseaux sociaux dans les usages des internautes libyens. Facebook est le principal site consulté en Libye, devant Youtube et Twitter.
Jusqu’en 2022, les médias basés en Libye et diffusés depuis des pays étrangers (Turquie, Jordanie, Tunisie, Egypte) étaient divisés en deux, recouvrant les deux camps rivaux s’opposant pour le contrôle du pouvoir. A l’Ouest, les chaines de télévision publiques et médias financés par le Qatar et la Turquie soutenait la ligne du gouvernement de Tripoli, tandis qu’à l’Est des chaines de télévisions et sites d’information (financés par les Emirats) défendaient le camp opposé incarné par le maréchal Haftar. Cette polarisation s’est effacée à la faveur des rapprochements entre les deux principaux leaders, (Abdelhamid Dabaiba, l’actuel premier ministre, et le maréchal Haftar) ainsi qu’entre les puissances régionales impliquées dans le conflit libyen. Deux chaines de télévision financées par les Emirats ont ainsi cessé d’émettre en 2022.
Le paysage médiatique est aujourd’hui largement soumis au gouvernement installé à Tripoli. Les médias sont placés sous l’autorité du ministère de la communication et des affaires politiques. Deux « Media Authority » distinctes continuent d’opérer et de maintenir une division entre Tripoli (capitale, à l’Ouest) et Benghazi (à l’Est). A l’Est la Libyan authority détient la Libyan Radio and Television Authority. Les médias publics ont changé de noms, mais leur gouvernance reste similaire à celle de l’ère Kadhafi, leurs équipes de direction ayant peu voire pas changé. Ils sont souvent divisés géographiquement entre l’Est et l’Ouest, suivant la division politique du pays. La Jamahiriya arab news agency (JANA) est devenue à l’Ouest la Libyan Arab News Agency et delivre la communication du gouvernement basé à Tripoli. La Jana news agency, à l’Est, est soutenu par la Russie et affiche des positions pro-Kadhafi.
Aucune disposition n’est prévue pour assurer le pluralisme des médias. Les autorités libyennes ont le pouvoir d’autoriser, dissoudre ou suspendre les activités d’associations et journalistes, qu’ils travaillent pour des médias locaux ou internationaux. Les autorités exploitent le vide constitutionnel pour poursuivre le régime répressif de Kadhafi à l’égard des médias. En juillet 2019, les autorités de l’Est de la Libye ont interdit 11 chaines satellitaires accusées d’opérer sans licences, de soutenir le terrorisme et l’extrémisme ou de menacer le tissu social libyen.
La confiance dans les médias libyens est faible dans la population à cause de leurs biais partisans et leur manque de transparence sur leurs financements. Selon plusieurs rapports sur le sujet et les journalistes interviewés par Journalisme & Citoyenneté, l’opinion majoritaire est que tous les médias suivent un agenda dicté par les intérêts politiques de leur propriétaire (ou principal soutien financier) lui-même affilié à un camp particulier. 82 % des libyens voudraient que les médias privés déclarent la source de leurs revenus. Quelques médias indépendants ont émergé depuis 2011, mais peinent à survivre ;
La propagation de désinformations et propos haineux est liée à la polarisation du paysage médiatique qui empêche de distinguer les faits établis des « fausses informations » diffusées par un camp pour discréditer l’autre. Les médias des deux camps mélangent en effet les informations vérifiées avec d’autres non vérifiées voire haineuses, entretenant ainsi la confusion du public. Internet et les réseaux sociaux sont vus comme des sources secondaires d’information pour vérifier des informations données par la télévision, mais le niveau de méfiance à leur égard est très élevé. Trois quarts des libyens sont favorables à l’existence d’un media financé par l’Etat, couvrant tout le territoire.
Les journalistes, citoyens et analystes de la Libye témoignent tous d’une immense difficulté à obtenir des informations fiables, chiffrées et détaillées sur l’actualité libyenne, la réglementation ou encore les statistiques nationales. Cette situation est en grande partie liée à l’héritage laissé par les 40 années de propagande du régime Kadhafi qui s’est employé à détruire les corps intermédiaires et producteurs d’informations concurrentes à son idéologie. Peu d’institut de sondage indépendant existe.
La loi promue par le gouvernement de l’accord national (GAN remplacé en 2021 par GUN) sur les publications donne à la Media Authority le droit absolu d’accorder des licences aux médias imprimés et en ligne, public et privé. Cette autorité va même parfois plus loin que les conditions fixées par la loi pour restreindre l’accès à ces permis. En 2016, le ministère des médias (du GAN) a demandé à tous les médias de lui fournir leurs sources de revenus et audit interne ainsi que leur permis de diffusion.
Les médias audiovisuels obtiennent leur autorisation de diffusion auprès de l’institution publique pour la radio et la télévision, rattaché au premier ministre ou bien auprès de la la Media authority. Dans les deux cas, la délivrance de ces licences est discrétionnaire. A l’Est de la Libye sous le contrôle des forces de Khalifa Haftar, un organisme similaire existe, avec les mêmes pouvoirs discrétionnaires. Selon les ONG, cet organisme opaque répond directement au commandant Khalifa Haftar.
La Libyan Media Foundation créé par le Gouvernement d’accord national en 2020, et largement critiqué pour son absence d’indépendance, a été supprimée en juin 2021. Les médias publics sont désormais placés sous l’autorité du Premier Ministre, ne garantissant donc toujours pas leur indépendance.
La déclaration constitutionnelle de 2011 stipule (article 15) que l’Etat garantit la liberté de créer des partis politiques, des associations et tout autre organisation de la société civile. Mais il n’y a pas de loi qui régule la formation de syndicats et organisations politiques. Un premier syndicat de journaliste a été créé en 2012, mais est resté inactif jusqu’à ce jour. En juin 2022, un nouveau syndicat indépendant des journalistes libyens s’est formé. Ce nouvel organe semble plus représentatif que le précédent et avoir à cœur de défendre la liberté de la presse.
Dans le même temps, une dizaine d’organisations de journalistes libyens se structurent et ont fondé une alliance en 2022 pour défendre la liberté de la presse, la réforme du secteur des médias et l’adoption d’une loi sur la régulation des médias portée par LOFIM.
Des journalistes indépendants ont par ailleurs créé le Libyan Journalists Independent Syndicate qui œuvre à recenser les attaques contre les journalistes et plaider pour une nouvelle réglementation protégant la liberté de la presse.
Médias comme citoyens pointent le climat d’insécurité et de menace permanentes à l’égard des journalistes. Ils sont conscients qu’il est une des causes principales de la désinformation. Dans une étude de 2014, ils estiment que si les médias rapportent avec crédibilité et équilibre les événements en pointant les groupes armés responsables d’exactions, ils deviennent immédiatement la cible de violences.
Le principal obstacle au développement des médias indépendants des pouvoirs politiques et militaires est le contrôle exercé par les autorités via notamment la commission sur la société civile – elle-même contrôlée par les services de renseignements. Tous les fonds provenant de l’étranger et à destination d’associations sont soumis à son autorisation, selon le décret 286 de mars 2019. Toute rencontre avec des étrangers doit également obtenir en amont son approbation.
Les formations professionnelles et techniques sont rares pour les journalistes en Libye alors que les besoins sont criants. La plupart des media trainings sont organisés à Tunis, ce qui exclue les journalistes ne pouvant pas se rendre en Tunisie, en particulier les femmes pour qui voyager seule est mal vu socialement. Pourtant la moitié voire la majorité des élèves en journalisme sont des femmes.
Il y a douze universités publiques en Libye qui ont des filières media : University of Benghazi, Tripoli University, the Open University of Libya, Misrata University, the University of Zawia, Azzaytuna University, the Omar Mukhtar University in Bayda, Elmergib University, Sirte University, Tobrouk University, Ajdabia University and Sabha University.
Le programme reste essentiellement théorique, sans pratique, car les professeurs ne sont pas des journalistes ou n’ont jamais pratiqué le journalisme. Le contenu des programmes date de l’ère Kadhafi et n’a pas été revu fondamentalement.
File available soon.
Palestine
In both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, currently, there is no independent system for regulating broadcasting in Palestine, the authority to grant TV and radio licenses is entrusted to governmental bodies.
The outdated law, often originating from previous authorities, impose on journalists unwarranted restrictions, which are also defined in a vague manner and without clear definitions of scope. The current legislation treats libel and slander as criminal offenses that are punishable by imprisonment of up to three years.
There were different attempts to draft two media laws; the Higher Media Council Law, and the Audiovisual Law. However, all these attempts have failed so far. Alternatively, and at an incredible speed, a Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime was issued raising criticism among journalists as well as human rights organizations.
Although all laws guarantee freedom of expressions, however, there were cases in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of media outlets including websites that have been shut down or prohibited.
The security situation is high risk. Human rights organizations have recorded a high number of violations against media workers, including arbitrary arrests and detention, physical attacks and raids of media outlets. Journalists feel unsafe to publish about certain topics. Let alone, only few media outlets have produced written editorial godliness or codes of conduct, and so journalists do not have a reference guide on the editorial policy of the outlet they work in, which results on predicting what the policy is, thus leading to self-censorship.
Media development has rapidly grown over the years whereby television is the most popular, whether local or Pan -Arab. Radio comes second and press occupy the third place.
Almost all TV and radio stations, as well as newspapers have a website, additionally a number of online media outlets have been existing for several years. And since there is no regulatory system to regulate the work of online media, and despite the fact that websites are generally not officially censored, but there were few incidents when website were blocked or banned in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Social media has become increasingly important as a platform for Palestinians to access news and contribute their own footage and stories. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have been used.
The Palestinian Broadcast Corporation (PBC) is the public service broadcaster, controlled by the PA. The PBC broadcasts two channels, Palestine General and Palestine Live, and is in the process of launching a sports channel.
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip there are more than 40 privately owned television stations (including local TV channels) and an undetermined number of radio stations. There is also a strong satellite TV presence, with Al Jazeera, Jordanian TV and al-Arabiya being the most popular among the foreign broadcasters. Six satellite channels broadcast from Palestine: three from the West Bank (Palestine, Alfalasteenia and Mix); and three from the Gaza Strip (Hona AlQuds, Al-Aqsa and Al-Kitab)
Apart from law articles that prohibit certain actions, there is no policy of pre-censorship in Palestine. However, journalists in the West Bank and Gaza were subject to harassment after publication, and so authorities practice ‘post censorship’, which leads eventually to ‘self-censorship’. “Palestinian journalists know that they are being watched. As well the authorities “rely on a system of post censorship using means from socialization, harassment, economic sanctions, the revocation of licenses, jail terms against journalists to extreme torture and murder.”
Online censorship of Palestinian content, especially on social media has been witnessed. In the first half of 2022, at least 425 violations and acts of censorship against Palestinian content. According to Sada Social Centre, a Ramallah-based NGO, “the majority of violations against Palestinian content on social media vary from restricting posts and removing or suspending of individual accounts, notably when using terms associated with Israeli occupation, which are classified within the algorithm ban range.”
Although the Palestinian government has declared on several occasions that it is ready to proceed with approving the Right to Information Law according to approved legal bases, and with the existence of international agreements signed in this field as one of the Palestinian requirements, it has not yet been approved as a law.
The influence of social media, activists, and influencers is also great and wide on the work of journalists, which requires the establishment of controls and perhaps international and local laws and legislation, to determine the ethics of publishing through them, and to legalize misleading news and cybercrime in all its forms.
The issue of a syndicate that preserves the rights and defends journalists is among the most prominent issues demanded by journalists, away from political and partisan affiliations.
The Palestinian media in general is responsive to all gender-related programs and training. As well as gender mainstreaming. “The media illustrates gender issues without deep analytical meanings associated with them, and without understanding all the intricacies of gender mainstreaming. Rather, the media has been content with passing on concepts to the public, considering “gender issues” as a purely professional topic.” That said, women are still present in stereotypical topics and are portrayed as housewives, teachers, nurses, etc.
The increase in the number of female workers in the media field, and the increase in the demand of female students for media faculties in Palestinian universities, indicates the development of the participation of Palestinian women in making the media scene in Palestine. “Unofficial statistics indicate that 55% of the students of journalism and media faculties in Palestine are females. This heralds an increase in the percentage of female participation in media jobs in the future, which is currently estimated at 17%.”
Media organizations in Palestine are either affiliated with a political party, or been private and profit-oriented. That said, there are key factors that have an impact of the editorial independence of Palestinian media. First, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is considered one of the most important factors that impact the independence of media, as some media outlets are non-independent of the political affiliation (although hidden) of their owners or sponsors.
Similarly, almost every ordinary Palestinian has his/her political interest in the Palestinian-Palestinian conflict, and so, many of the journalists and outlets are not detached from their own political affiliation, even if trying their best to show independence.
To date, training continues to be an essential part of the media development environment in Palestine. Different international and local media development organizations have been involved in massive training at the beginning, including technical and editorial.
Birzeit University Media Development Center –offers academic programs leading to Bachelor of Arts degrees in Journalism and Radio, as well as professional diplomas and specialized short-term courses in TV, Radio and Print Journalism. As well, The Institute of Modern Media at Al-Quds University has three units: a) Al-Quds Educational Television; b) the Academic Media Department; and c) Community Services.
Al-Quds Open University (Media Production Center, aims to produce high quality audio/video educational material that assists students, based on the Open Education and Open Learning System. The Media Center at An-Najah University – which is the administrative and organizational umbrella under which a group of executive media, technical and cultural departments operate, including Voice of An-Najah (An-Najah Radio Station), An-Najah Educational TV and the Media Training Unit.
UNESCO in Palestine has been working with a number of stakeholders including the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education, the Government Information Office, and the Prime Minister’s Office, on introducing the concept of media literacy, media education curriculum to schools and universities based on the UNESCO Media and Information Literacy Policy Guidelines and Model (MIL).
The ‘scattered’ media literacy initiatives, do not reflect the reality of media literacy in Palestine. To this end, UNESCO Palestine is planning to launch a media literacy mapping project, to identify key players, initiatives, and introduce recommendations.
Palestine
In both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, currently, there is no independent system for regulating broadcasting in Palestine, the authority to grant TV and radio licenses is entrusted to governmental bodies.
The outdated law, often originating from previous authorities, impose on journalists unwarranted restrictions, which are also defined in a vague manner and without clear definitions of scope. The current legislation treats libel and slander as criminal offenses that are punishable by imprisonment of up to three years.
There were different attempts to draft two media laws; the Higher Media Council Law, and the Audiovisual Law. However, all these attempts have failed so far. Alternatively, and at an incredible speed, a Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime was issued raising criticism among journalists as well as human rights organizations.
Although all laws guarantee freedom of expressions, however, there were cases in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of media outlets including websites that have been shut down or prohibited.
The security situation is high risk. Human rights organizations have recorded a high number of violations against media workers, including arbitrary arrests and detention, physical attacks and raids of media outlets. Journalists feel unsafe to publish about certain topics. Let alone, only few media outlets have produced written editorial godliness or codes of conduct, and so journalists do not have a reference guide on the editorial policy of the outlet they work in, which results on predicting what the policy is, thus leading to self-censorship.
Media development has rapidly grown over the years whereby television is the most popular, whether local or Pan -Arab. Radio comes second and press occupy the third place.
Almost all TV and radio stations, as well as newspapers have a website, additionally a number of online media outlets have been existing for several years. And since there is no regulatory system to regulate the work of online media, and despite the fact that websites are generally not officially censored, but there were few incidents when website were blocked or banned in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Social media has become increasingly important as a platform for Palestinians to access news and contribute their own footage and stories. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have been used.
The Palestinian Broadcast Corporation (PBC) is the public service broadcaster, controlled by the PA. The PBC broadcasts two channels, Palestine General and Palestine Live, and is in the process of launching a sports channel.
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip there are more than 40 privately owned television stations (including local TV channels) and an undetermined number of radio stations. There is also a strong satellite TV presence, with Al Jazeera, Jordanian TV and al-Arabiya being the most popular among the foreign broadcasters. Six satellite channels broadcast from Palestine: three from the West Bank (Palestine, Alfalasteenia and Mix); and three from the Gaza Strip (Hona AlQuds, Al-Aqsa and Al-Kitab)
Apart from law articles that prohibit certain actions, there is no policy of pre-censorship in Palestine. However, journalists in the West Bank and Gaza were subject to harassment after publication, and so authorities practice ‘post censorship’, which leads eventually to ‘self-censorship’. “Palestinian journalists know that they are being watched. As well the authorities “rely on a system of post censorship using means from socialization, harassment, economic sanctions, the revocation of licenses, jail terms against journalists to extreme torture and murder.”
Online censorship of Palestinian content, especially on social media has been witnessed. In the first half of 2022, at least 425 violations and acts of censorship against Palestinian content. According to Sada Social Centre, a Ramallah-based NGO, “the majority of violations against Palestinian content on social media vary from restricting posts and removing or suspending of individual accounts, notably when using terms associated with Israeli occupation, which are classified within the algorithm ban range.”
Although the Palestinian government has declared on several occasions that it is ready to proceed with approving the Right to Information Law according to approved legal bases, and with the existence of international agreements signed in this field as one of the Palestinian requirements, it has not yet been approved as a law.
The influence of social media, activists, and influencers is also great and wide on the work of journalists, which requires the establishment of controls and perhaps international and local laws and legislation, to determine the ethics of publishing through them, and to legalize misleading news and cybercrime in all its forms.
The issue of a syndicate that preserves the rights and defends journalists is among the most prominent issues demanded by journalists, away from political and partisan affiliations.
The Palestinian media in general is responsive to all gender-related programs and training. As well as gender mainstreaming. “The media illustrates gender issues without deep analytical meanings associated with them, and without understanding all the intricacies of gender mainstreaming. Rather, the media has been content with passing on concepts to the public, considering “gender issues” as a purely professional topic.” That said, women are still present in stereotypical topics and are portrayed as housewives, teachers, nurses, etc.
The increase in the number of female workers in the media field, and the increase in the demand of female students for media faculties in Palestinian universities, indicates the development of the participation of Palestinian women in making the media scene in Palestine. “Unofficial statistics indicate that 55% of the students of journalism and media faculties in Palestine are females. This heralds an increase in the percentage of female participation in media jobs in the future, which is currently estimated at 17%.”
Media organizations in Palestine are either affiliated with a political party, or been private and profit-oriented. That said, there are key factors that have an impact of the editorial independence of Palestinian media. First, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is considered one of the most important factors that impact the independence of media, as some media outlets are non-independent of the political affiliation (although hidden) of their owners or sponsors.
Similarly, almost every ordinary Palestinian has his/her political interest in the Palestinian-Palestinian conflict, and so, many of the journalists and outlets are not detached from their own political affiliation, even if trying their best to show independence.
To date, training continues to be an essential part of the media development environment in Palestine. Different international and local media development organizations have been involved in massive training at the beginning, including technical and editorial.
Birzeit University Media Development Center –offers academic programs leading to Bachelor of Arts degrees in Journalism and Radio, as well as professional diplomas and specialized short-term courses in TV, Radio and Print Journalism. As well, The Institute of Modern Media at Al-Quds University has three units: a) Al-Quds Educational Television; b) the Academic Media Department; and c) Community Services.
Al-Quds Open University (Media Production Center, aims to produce high quality audio/video educational material that assists students, based on the Open Education and Open Learning System. The Media Center at An-Najah University – which is the administrative and organizational umbrella under which a group of executive media, technical and cultural departments operate, including Voice of An-Najah (An-Najah Radio Station), An-Najah Educational TV and the Media Training Unit.
UNESCO in Palestine has been working with a number of stakeholders including the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education, the Government Information Office, and the Prime Minister’s Office, on introducing the concept of media literacy, media education curriculum to schools and universities based on the UNESCO Media and Information Literacy Policy Guidelines and Model (MIL).
The ‘scattered’ media literacy initiatives, do not reflect the reality of media literacy in Palestine. To this end, UNESCO Palestine is planning to launch a media literacy mapping project, to identify key players, initiatives, and introduce recommendations.
Freedom of the press is enshrined in Article 15 of the Jordanian Constitution. The sector is mainly regulated by the Press and Publications Act and the Broadcasting Act, which covers electronic publications. In the last 10 years, several specific laws have also encroached on the freedom of the press: the law against terrorism, the law on cybercrime (2018)… Today, there are more than 20 laws and regulations governing the exercise of freedom of the press.
The law on the press and publications of 1993 and 1998The law, which has been amended several times, has allowed the emergence of many private media, granted the protection of sources and established the basis for access to public information. But it has also provided for the establishment of a license for any media, printing, bookstore or advertising agency or translation, polling institute or even research centers. In other words, the authorization is limited.
The Jordanian government adopted a National Media Strategy in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring, a strategy designed to establish “an independent Jordanian media rooted in the principles of freedom, pluralism and professionalism ». Yet, shortly thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, two amendments to the press law forced nearly 290 news sites to close because they could not meet the new regulatory requirements for licensing by the Media Commission.
Liberalized twenty years ago in 2002 with the end of the Jordanian Radio Television (JRTV) monopoly, the audiovisual sector is controlled. The broadcast media law combined the regulators (one for print and one for broadcast) into one, the Jordan Media Commission (JMC). The Commission is fully funded by the state (€1.5 million in 2019) and its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for validating – or not – the Commission’s decisions to award broadcasting licenses to radio and television stations. Less exposed, the Commission de Régulation des Télécoms has been determining the available frequencies and the conditions for broadcasting telecom services since 1995. 39 radio stations have a license, 20 of which are governmental (and 6 for universities).
The Ministry of Information has been replaced by government spokespersons who exercise supervision over the sector and the state media, alongside the Ministries of Culture, Information Technology and Finance.
As for access to information, the absence of an independent Access to Information Commission makes it impossible to obtain information on a regular basis or to seek redress when obstacles arise. In addition, the practice of transparency is selective: for example, the police reserve the exclusivity of service information on the traffic situation for their own radio station.
Jordanians are moving away from their traditional media (television and newspapers) and are getting most of their information from social networks: 88% were connected in 2018 compared to 23% in 2012. According to IPSOS (IPSOS 2018 result cited in USAID’s JORDAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT published in June 2021), during the same period (between 2012 and 2018), television consumption dropped from 93% to 80%, radio from 30% to 26%, and daily newspapers from 18% to 6% (with precipitous drops in official newspapers – Al Rai, Al Ghad and Ad Dustour).
The English-language press, which has an extremely marginal audience among the Jordanian population, is generally freer than the Arabic-language press, although monotonous and uniform; it is aimed at a mainly foreign audience, diplomats or members of NGOs.
Among the commercial media, the private television Ro’yaand its website (http://roya.tv) dominate the advertising market. Ro’ya and some private radio stations like Masaj, Dahab and Fun or again Rotana FM, share the audience with Al Ghad and the website in english Jordan News launched in 2021.
Some professional media with an information mission exist under the status of private companies without being commercial: the site 7iber, the radio Al Balad and his website AmmanNet which tries to federate local and community radio stations with an exchange of information programs, or the webTv Aramram which only broadcasts on social networks.
Jordan’s official media actors are organised in the Jordan Press Association (JPA), a single Jordanian affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists.
There is no organization for independent or unofficial media in Jordan. The community radios have grouped together in a federation that brings together the radios Al Balad, Voice of Karak, New Maan radio, Yarmouk FM and Farah Al-Nas, among others, were beneficiaries of the European support programme for Jordanian media in 2015.The Community Media Network joined the coalition of 15 Jordanian civil society organisations HIMAM.
The Jordanian market cannot absorb the large number of graduates from the seven main journalism training institutions every year. Initiated in 1982 at the public university of Yarmouk in Irbid, these trainings remain mainly theoretical and are given by professors who have never been journalists and who have no direct link with the media. The practice of journalism, the concrete phase of the profession, is therefore not part of the training.
Only two of seven universities offer electronic media courses. Six universities have radio and television production studios, and several publish student newspapers. The offer is complemented by master’s degree courses offered by the Jordan Media Institute (JMI) and by the training centers of the national television, the official news agency and the private television Ro’ya.
An independent commission on secularization education is working on the preparation of an educational curriculum to include media literacy, the result of the analysis made by UNESCO in 2015. A national strategy has been adopted until 2023, with training for primary, secondary and university teachers under the auspices of the Jordan Media Institute (JMI).
Freedom of the press is enshrined in Article 15 of the Jordanian Constitution. The sector is mainly regulated by the Press and Publications Act and the Broadcasting Act, which covers electronic publications. In the last 10 years, several specific laws have also encroached on the freedom of the press: the law against terrorism, the law on cybercrime (2018)… Today, there are more than 20 laws and regulations governing the exercise of freedom of the press.
The law on the press and publications of 1993 and 1998The law, which has been amended several times, has allowed the emergence of many private media, granted the protection of sources and established the basis for access to public information. But it has also provided for the establishment of a license for any media, printing, bookstore or advertising agency or translation, polling institute or even research centers. In other words, the authorization is limited.
The Jordanian government adopted a National Media Strategy in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring, a strategy designed to establish “an independent Jordanian media rooted in the principles of freedom, pluralism and professionalism ». Yet, shortly thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, two amendments to the press law forced nearly 290 news sites to close because they could not meet the new regulatory requirements for licensing by the Media Commission.
Liberalized twenty years ago in 2002 with the end of the Jordanian Radio Television (JRTV) monopoly, the audiovisual sector is controlled. The broadcast media law combined the regulators (one for print and one for broadcast) into one, the Jordan Media Commission (JMC). The Commission is fully funded by the state (€1.5 million in 2019) and its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for validating – or not – the Commission’s decisions to award broadcasting licenses to radio and television stations. Less exposed, the Commission de Régulation des Télécoms has been determining the available frequencies and the conditions for broadcasting telecom services since 1995. 39 radio stations have a license, 20 of which are governmental (and 6 for universities).
The Ministry of Information has been replaced by government spokespersons who exercise supervision over the sector and the state media, alongside the Ministries of Culture, Information Technology and Finance.
As for access to information, the absence of an independent Access to Information Commission makes it impossible to obtain information on a regular basis or to seek redress when obstacles arise. In addition, the practice of transparency is selective: for example, the police reserve the exclusivity of service information on the traffic situation for their own radio station.
Jordanians are moving away from their traditional media (television and newspapers) and are getting most of their information from social networks: 88% were connected in 2018 compared to 23% in 2012. According to IPSOS (IPSOS 2018 result cited in USAID’s JORDAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT published in June 2021), during the same period (between 2012 and 2018), television consumption dropped from 93% to 80%, radio from 30% to 26%, and daily newspapers from 18% to 6% (with precipitous drops in official newspapers – Al Rai, Al Ghad and Ad Dustour).
The English-language press, which has an extremely marginal audience among the Jordanian population, is generally freer than the Arabic-language press, although monotonous and uniform; it is aimed at a mainly foreign audience, diplomats or members of NGOs.
Among the commercial media, the private television Ro’yaand its website (http://roya.tv) dominate the advertising market. Ro’ya and some private radio stations like Masaj, Dahab and Fun or again Rotana FM, share the audience with Al Ghad and the website in english Jordan News launched in 2021.
Some professional media with an information mission exist under the status of private companies without being commercial: the site 7iber, the radio Al Balad and his website AmmanNet which tries to federate local and community radio stations with an exchange of information programs, or the webTv Aramram which only broadcasts on social networks.
Jordan’s official media actors are organised in the Jordan Press Association (JPA), a single Jordanian affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists.
There is no organization for independent or unofficial media in Jordan. The community radios have grouped together in a federation that brings together the radios Al Balad, Voice of Karak, New Maan radio, Yarmouk FM and Farah Al-Nas, among others, were beneficiaries of the European support programme for Jordanian media in 2015.The Community Media Network joined the coalition of 15 Jordanian civil society organisations HIMAM.
The Jordanian market cannot absorb the large number of graduates from the seven main journalism training institutions every year. Initiated in 1982 at the public university of Yarmouk in Irbid, these trainings remain mainly theoretical and are given by professors who have never been journalists and who have no direct link with the media. The practice of journalism, the concrete phase of the profession, is therefore not part of the training.
Only two of seven universities offer electronic media courses. Six universities have radio and television production studios, and several publish student newspapers. The offer is complemented by master’s degree courses offered by the Jordan Media Institute (JMI) and by the training centers of the national television, the official news agency and the private television Ro’ya.
An independent commission on secularization education is working on the preparation of an educational curriculum to include media literacy, the result of the analysis made by UNESCO in 2015. A national strategy has been adopted until 2023, with training for primary, secondary and university teachers under the auspices of the Jordan Media Institute (JMI).
Lebanon
Lebanon is governed by a sectarian system that influences all aspects of social and political life, including the media sector. As a result, the country’s competing sectarian forces have utilized various means of telecommunications to communicate with their constituents, invest in journalists, writers, intellectuals, and producers, and most importantly, shape and contribute to the public debate. This contradictory and “plural” reality of the system has allowed for an expanding margin of freedom of expression relative to its authoritarian neighbors in the region. Nevertheless, the active interventions of different political parties in the media sphere have led to issues of editorial independence and financial sustainability, particularly as different outlets have relied on political funding to sustain themselves.
Given the platform provided by these outlets, such practices and conditions interact with and reinforce a variety of societal taboos in the country. These include institutional taboos (e.g., insulting the President), religious taboos, and taboos related to gender and sexuality. Despite the plurality of the Lebanese media, the long-lasting monopoly of different political forces in the country on the media sector has allowed for an entrenched series of local despots, utilizing propaganda to justify a plethora of methods to repress oppositional actors and marginalized groups. In fact, since 2017, the number of violations against journalists, activists, and influencers in the country has dramatically increased.
In Lebanon, the media is officially governed by a system of laws that concern different sectors. Given the increasing presence and influence of news sites and alternative outlets in the online sphere, a new media law which seeks to regulate these new means of communications has also been under discussion for over a decade. Also, past studies which concern the ways in which governments have intervened in the sector have indicated that the execution of these laws and procedures has been inconsistent. Currently, the key and most relevant texts include the 1962 Press Law, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law (Law 382), the 1994 Satellite Broadcast Law (Law 531), and the 1947 Cinema Law.
The issue of pluralism in Lebanon is closely related to the country’s system. The consociational system is prevalent in different aspects of social, political, and economic life. Therefore, Lebanon does not follow the model of state-controlled monopolistic media outlets that are typically found in neighboring authoritarian Arab regimes. This has allowed for a certain degree of pluralism and cultural richness, leading to a rise in the number of newspapers, magazines, and cultural centers historically.
However, state-imposed laws and regulations have put restrictions on launching these outlets. Journalists have to navigate through repressive policies and bureaucratic avenues to operate in the media sector.
Today, social media has become the primary platform for communication in Lebanon, with a vast majority of the population using it. It has made access to information faster, and the ability to create and circulate content is more accessible to new media entrepreneurs. The availability of social media has expanded the country’s pluralistic capacity.
The question of media access also depends on the financial capacity of individuals to start new ventures, especially when the economic and security situation has not been favorable to media projects in recent years.
The absence of monopolistic state ownership does not suggest that problematic and exclusivist forms of ownership which reinforce political intervention do not exist in the sector. In fact, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) project (launched by the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders, then in partnership with the Global Media Registry) clearly demonstrates ways in which members of the influential elite and political class in the country have held shares in a variety of media outlets in the pursuit of influencing coverage and promoting the pertinent interests and frames which suit them.
Censorship in Lebanon occurs in various forms, with two significant categories being cultural censorship and political censorship. The former includes but is not restricted to banning forms of “sexual” expression and a variety of societal taboos that emerge in films, concerts, book events, and other artistic or social occasions. The latter, which is more contentious, ranges from suppressing implicit criticisms targeting key figureheads in the Lebanese political system to prohibiting “offensive” or disruptive imagery regarding the legitimacy of neighboring regimes, and initiating calls to no-platform films whose characters or plot can be linked to Israel, legally classified as an enemy country.
In the Lebanese context, while explicit violations of the principle of free speech are not uncommon, self-censorship is a much more pervasive sentiment. Through acts of intimidation and harassment, along with journalists’ increasing financial dependence on their outlets and various other political considerations, the country’s primary political forces and security institutions can impose indirect restrictions on free speech.
Despite being understudied in the Lebanese context, misinformation is a particular problem that regularly surfaces in the media sphere, especially on the much less regulated social media domain. In Lebanon, platforms such as Facebook or Twitter have their pages flooded by articles and posts riddled with fake news, which is circulated either deliberately for political purposes or unintentionally as supportive constituents are unable to isolate fake news and produce reliable information.
According to the “Access to Information” law (Law No.28) passed in 2017 (the first legal obligation for the state to publish financial and administrative documents originating from different ministries and judicial departments), and later amended in July 2021, journalists have the written right to request any document that concerns the public interest. However, regardless of these formal constraints, the actual bureaucratic process heavily relies on who is requesting the document and how political actors anticipate they will be utilized.
In Lebanon, he vast majority of press associations and syndicates are closely linked to the country’s primary sectarian political parties and figures. Due to this consistent lack of protection, journalists from different regions and domains in the country created the Alternative Media Syndicate in 2019.
All studies, indicators, and reports suggest that the basic security of journalists, media workers, reporters, researchers, and writers is being threatened. There are several dimensions to this quandary: (1) the number of direct, low-level violations constituting physical repression that have occurred in the past few years or so, (2) the continuous cycle of assassinations targeting journalists and writers with similar political patterns, and (3) character assassinations that revolve around the usage of social media to construct narratives aimed at dehumanizing specific persons and damaging their reputation, further providing the context for potential physical violence.
While the country’s economic crisis has made the status of journalists very difficult, the hardships faced by media workers preceded this crisis. This has its roots in the application of the country’s labor law, the reliance of various outlets on informal oral contracts, and the lack of reliable benefits packages, such as health insurance and productive device coverage. A study conducted by Samir Kassir Foundation raises important and crucial insights about the nature of labor rights within the media sector.
When assessing the tone, rhetoric, working conditions, and orientation in traditional media, the treatment of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community presents a clear issue in the way these matters are approached in the public domain. This treatment concerns not only the role and behavior of senior management but also how misogynistic, sexist, and homophobic discourse permeates the media sphere.
Women, the LGBTQ+ community, migrant workers, and refugees are just a few examples of marginalized groups who consistently receive discriminatory and hate speech on the online social media platforms of different television stations and newspaper outlets. Recurrent monthly monitoring-based research conducted by the Samir Kassir Foundation shows that gendered comments and slurs are an instrumental component of this hate speech.
Media training in Lebanon can be divided into two categories: training offered by international organizations, official institutions, and non-government organizations in the country, and formal academic training offered in select universities with a comprehensive curriculum. Any assessment of strengths and weaknesses should consider the progress and performance of both domains. Regarding formal academic training, there is a consensus among stakeholders that journalism and media studies in Lebanon “urgently needed more qualified faculty, locally oriented research, and relevant academic and technical resources”.
In Lebanon, a comprehensive media literacy curriculum was implemented in the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University. A product of the efforts of various foundations and international institutes and initiatives, such as the Salzburg Academy for Media and Global Change and the Open Society Foundations, the curriculum underwent a number of adaptations which made the training process more professional and implementable, but also reduced the foundational and theoretical rigor of the material. Due to the lack of adequate state preparation or intervention in these matters, alongside the fact that the question of media literacy has been confined to the programs of elite educational institutions, civil society initiatives, workshops, and programs have acted as an alternative field to discuss this issue.
Lebanon
Lebanon is governed by a sectarian system that influences all aspects of social and political life, including the media sector. As a result, the country’s competing sectarian forces have utilized various means of telecommunications to communicate with their constituents, invest in journalists, writers, intellectuals, and producers, and most importantly, shape and contribute to the public debate. This contradictory and “plural” reality of the system has allowed for an expanding margin of freedom of expression relative to its authoritarian neighbors in the region. Nevertheless, the active interventions of different political parties in the media sphere have led to issues of editorial independence and financial sustainability, particularly as different outlets have relied on political funding to sustain themselves.
Given the platform provided by these outlets, such practices and conditions interact with and reinforce a variety of societal taboos in the country. These include institutional taboos (e.g., insulting the President), religious taboos, and taboos related to gender and sexuality. Despite the plurality of the Lebanese media, the long-lasting monopoly of different political forces in the country on the media sector has allowed for an entrenched series of local despots, utilizing propaganda to justify a plethora of methods to repress oppositional actors and marginalized groups. In fact, since 2017, the number of violations against journalists, activists, and influencers in the country has dramatically increased.
In Lebanon, the media is officially governed by a system of laws that concern different sectors. Given the increasing presence and influence of news sites and alternative outlets in the online sphere, a new media law which seeks to regulate these new means of communications has also been under discussion for over a decade. Also, past studies which concern the ways in which governments have intervened in the sector have indicated that the execution of these laws and procedures has been inconsistent. Currently, the key and most relevant texts include the 1962 Press Law, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law (Law 382), the 1994 Satellite Broadcast Law (Law 531), and the 1947 Cinema Law.
The issue of pluralism in Lebanon is closely related to the country’s system. The consociational system is prevalent in different aspects of social, political, and economic life. Therefore, Lebanon does not follow the model of state-controlled monopolistic media outlets that are typically found in neighboring authoritarian Arab regimes. This has allowed for a certain degree of pluralism and cultural richness, leading to a rise in the number of newspapers, magazines, and cultural centers historically.
However, state-imposed laws and regulations have put restrictions on launching these outlets. Journalists have to navigate through repressive policies and bureaucratic avenues to operate in the media sector.
Today, social media has become the primary platform for communication in Lebanon, with a vast majority of the population using it. It has made access to information faster, and the ability to create and circulate content is more accessible to new media entrepreneurs. The availability of social media has expanded the country’s pluralistic capacity.
The question of media access also depends on the financial capacity of individuals to start new ventures, especially when the economic and security situation has not been favorable to media projects in recent years.
The absence of monopolistic state ownership does not suggest that problematic and exclusivist forms of ownership which reinforce political intervention do not exist in the sector. In fact, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) project (launched by the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders, then in partnership with the Global Media Registry) clearly demonstrates ways in which members of the influential elite and political class in the country have held shares in a variety of media outlets in the pursuit of influencing coverage and promoting the pertinent interests and frames which suit them.
Censorship in Lebanon occurs in various forms, with two significant categories being cultural censorship and political censorship. The former includes but is not restricted to banning forms of “sexual” expression and a variety of societal taboos that emerge in films, concerts, book events, and other artistic or social occasions. The latter, which is more contentious, ranges from suppressing implicit criticisms targeting key figureheads in the Lebanese political system to prohibiting “offensive” or disruptive imagery regarding the legitimacy of neighboring regimes, and initiating calls to no-platform films whose characters or plot can be linked to Israel, legally classified as an enemy country.
In the Lebanese context, while explicit violations of the principle of free speech are not uncommon, self-censorship is a much more pervasive sentiment. Through acts of intimidation and harassment, along with journalists’ increasing financial dependence on their outlets and various other political considerations, the country’s primary political forces and security institutions can impose indirect restrictions on free speech.
Despite being understudied in the Lebanese context, misinformation is a particular problem that regularly surfaces in the media sphere, especially on the much less regulated social media domain. In Lebanon, platforms such as Facebook or Twitter have their pages flooded by articles and posts riddled with fake news, which is circulated either deliberately for political purposes or unintentionally as supportive constituents are unable to isolate fake news and produce reliable information.
According to the “Access to Information” law (Law No.28) passed in 2017 (the first legal obligation for the state to publish financial and administrative documents originating from different ministries and judicial departments), and later amended in July 2021, journalists have the written right to request any document that concerns the public interest. However, regardless of these formal constraints, the actual bureaucratic process heavily relies on who is requesting the document and how political actors anticipate they will be utilized.
In Lebanon, he vast majority of press associations and syndicates are closely linked to the country’s primary sectarian political parties and figures. Due to this consistent lack of protection, journalists from different regions and domains in the country created the Alternative Media Syndicate in 2019.
All studies, indicators, and reports suggest that the basic security of journalists, media workers, reporters, researchers, and writers is being threatened. There are several dimensions to this quandary: (1) the number of direct, low-level violations constituting physical repression that have occurred in the past few years or so, (2) the continuous cycle of assassinations targeting journalists and writers with similar political patterns, and (3) character assassinations that revolve around the usage of social media to construct narratives aimed at dehumanizing specific persons and damaging their reputation, further providing the context for potential physical violence.
While the country’s economic crisis has made the status of journalists very difficult, the hardships faced by media workers preceded this crisis. This has its roots in the application of the country’s labor law, the reliance of various outlets on informal oral contracts, and the lack of reliable benefits packages, such as health insurance and productive device coverage. A study conducted by Samir Kassir Foundation raises important and crucial insights about the nature of labor rights within the media sector.
When assessing the tone, rhetoric, working conditions, and orientation in traditional media, the treatment of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community presents a clear issue in the way these matters are approached in the public domain. This treatment concerns not only the role and behavior of senior management but also how misogynistic, sexist, and homophobic discourse permeates the media sphere.
Women, the LGBTQ+ community, migrant workers, and refugees are just a few examples of marginalized groups who consistently receive discriminatory and hate speech on the online social media platforms of different television stations and newspaper outlets. Recurrent monthly monitoring-based research conducted by the Samir Kassir Foundation shows that gendered comments and slurs are an instrumental component of this hate speech.
Media training in Lebanon can be divided into two categories: training offered by international organizations, official institutions, and non-government organizations in the country, and formal academic training offered in select universities with a comprehensive curriculum. Any assessment of strengths and weaknesses should consider the progress and performance of both domains. Regarding formal academic training, there is a consensus among stakeholders that journalism and media studies in Lebanon “urgently needed more qualified faculty, locally oriented research, and relevant academic and technical resources”.
In Lebanon, a comprehensive media literacy curriculum was implemented in the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University. A product of the efforts of various foundations and international institutes and initiatives, such as the Salzburg Academy for Media and Global Change and the Open Society Foundations, the curriculum underwent a number of adaptations which made the training process more professional and implementable, but also reduced the foundational and theoretical rigor of the material. Due to the lack of adequate state preparation or intervention in these matters, alongside the fact that the question of media literacy has been confined to the programs of elite educational institutions, civil society initiatives, workshops, and programs have acted as an alternative field to discuss this issue.
Syria
The 2011 uprising has resulted in a radical change in the Syrian media landscape, specifically the reemergence of independent outlets after almost half a century of government suppression. However, due to the ongoing war since 2011, which has resulted in a de facto division of the country into four main areas of control, independent media and journalists struggle with myriad existential challenges, including financial, legal, security, and social difficulties. These challenges are not limited to Syria-based outlets and journalists but extend to those in exile, especially in neighboring countries where most of the independent Syrian media operate.
Except for a short period (1954-1958), Syria, since its independence from France in 1946, has been characterized by a lack of freedom of expression, including media freedom. Consequently, the Syrian media, specifically during Hafez al-Assad’s era (1971-2000), “was one of the most highly censored” media in the Middle East, dominated by state-run newspapers, radio, and television.
Expectedly, taboos for Syrian media include any criticism or discussion of issues linked to the president and his family and inner circle. Also, the taboos include the army and the security apparatuses, religion- and ethnicity-related issues (the Arab-Kurdish relationship and the sectarian question), the economic situation, and the Baath party.
As a result of the wide range of taboos and restrictions and the lack of security and stability, press freedom has deteriorated more in Syria since 2011. Between 2011 and 2022, the country ranked among the worst ten countries in media freedom, according to Reporters without Borders’ Annual Press Freedom Index.
Nonetheless, the 2011 revolution allowed for the mushrooming of Syrian media outlets. By 2016, the opposition-leaning Syrian Prints Archive estimated that “as many as 298 newspapers being circulated in different parts of the country during various periods of the uprising, in addition to 17 state-run or regime-affiliated newspapers.” However, the total number of media outlets established after 2011 could be as high as 600.
According to the latest mapping of the Syrian media, as of November 2019, there were 162 active Syrian media outlets dominated by websites, which accounted for 67, or 41.4% of the Syrian working media. In addition, there were 36 (22.2%) radio stations, 30 (18.5%) newspapers, 13 (8%) television stations, 10 (6.2%) news agencies, and six (3.7%) magazines. Among them, many independent outlets operate in non-regime controlled areas and exile.
Still, while most Syrian media (70.4%) is privately owned, it isn’t necessarily independent. It is well known that some privately owned media receive undeclared funds from regional governments, namely Qatar and UAE, or business people affiliated with governments. Consequently, they have become a tool in the regional media war between different countries or axis.
The regime’s and AANES’s media laws explicitly state (article 6 and article 2, respectively) that media is not subject to censorship. Nonetheless, as Syria-based journalists pointed out, reporting on issues deemed “sensitive” by the different authorities across Syria is subject to prior approval. Moreover, in regime-held territories, photography, shooting videos, and conducting interviews are prohibited without prior permission from the Ministry of Information.
The status of exiled Syrian media is no less complicated in some countries. Generally speaking, media outlets and reporters based in Western countries enjoy working legally and freely. Conversely, the work of media organizations and reporters in Syria’s neighboring countries is generally tolerated according to the “turning a blind eye” policy. Consequently, they practice high self-censorship concerning issues related to the host country to avoid retaliation, including the closure of the outlet and the arrest or deportation of journalists.
From its very first days, the Syrian revolution has been a struggle over the narrative concerning the reality of developments on the ground. Although protesters calling for freedom and dignity adhered to peaceful means over the first few months, the regime has depicted them as terrorists involved in a conspiracy funded by international and regional enemies. As such, Syrian media has become an arena of disinformation and misinformation since then.
Through the so-called Syrian Electronic Army, the Syrian regime is known to be responsible for some well-organized disinformation campaigns targeting its opponents. For example, in November 2021, Meta Incorporation, the parent company of Facebook, revealed that it disabled “Three separate hacking groups from Syria targeted a wide range of people in Syria, including civil society, journalists, humanitarian organizations and the anti-regime military forces. Each of these three hacking groups had links to the Syrian government, including Syria’s Air Force Intelligence.”
On the other hand, political polarization, low professional standards in some cases, and a lack of well-established fact-checking practices have paved the way for spreading misinformation.
Syria has never seen a law concerning the right to access information. The only related attempt was in 2019, but the draft law is yet to be approved by the government and later the parliament. However, this right is addressed and, hypothetically, guaranteed in the Media Law No. 108 of 2011 (articles 9 and 10) and AANES’s Law No. 3 of 2021 (article 10), making it a right for journalists exclusively.
In this context, it is noteworthy that the regime’s Media Law defines a journalist or media person as “Anyone whose profession is authoring, preparing, editing, or analyzing media content, or collecting the related necessary information, for publishing in a media outlet” (Article 1). Nonetheless, per article 10 of the internal statute of the Union of Journalists in the Syrian Arab Republic, “practicing journalism” in Syria is subject to the condition of being a member of the Union, which has the authority to issue press cards.
The availability of international funds during the early period following the 2011 uprising contributed to creating media jobs at the multiple institutions that flourished then. Conversely, the shrinking resources later led to a gap between the high supply of journalists and media workers and low demand on the institutions’ side, especially since the latter are small-sized organizations.
The 2011 uprising constitutes a milestone in Syrian women’s involvement in media work. Per a 2016 survey of several post-2011 emerging Syrian outlets, around 54% of workers in radio stations and 35% of print media staff were women, including part-timers and volunteers. However, only 38% occupied senior positions. Nonetheless, Syrian female journalists have been subject to multi-gender-based constraints while sharing the risk of being killed, arrested, and forcibly disappeared with other journalists. Between March 2011 and May 2022, six female journalists were killed, while six others were detained or forcibly disappeared.
Up until the revolution, Syria had only one media faculty (at the University of Damascus), established on March 1. In addition, the Syrian Virtual University, founded in 2002, has a media program.
Recently, four more media faculties or institutes exist in the newly established universities in the opposition- and HTS-held areas in the north, namely Aleppo University in the Liberated Areas, International University of Science and Renaissance, Başakşehir İslam Akademisi/Aleppo, and Idlib University. But aside from the unsolved accreditation issue of most universities in non-regime areas, the quality of journalism teaching, which is also the case at the Media Faculty at the University of Damascus, is questionable, according to media reports, as a result of the lack of necessary human and material resources.
Despite the official rhetoric about the importance of media literacy, there are no such related programs in Syrian schools (and universities). The only related effort is UNESCO-sponsored workshops and training implemented in cooperation with the Syrian government.
Also, given that Syrian media is extraordinarily controlled and monitored, any future media literacy programs are naturally expected to be ideology-driven and far from encouraging critical thinking, which is the core of media literacy.
Syria
The 2011 uprising has resulted in a radical change in the Syrian media landscape, specifically the reemergence of independent outlets after almost half a century of government suppression. However, due to the ongoing war since 2011, which has resulted in a de facto division of the country into four main areas of control, independent media and journalists struggle with myriad existential challenges, including financial, legal, security, and social difficulties. These challenges are not limited to Syria-based outlets and journalists but extend to those in exile, especially in neighboring countries where most of the independent Syrian media operate.
Except for a short period (1954-1958), Syria, since its independence from France in 1946, has been characterized by a lack of freedom of expression, including media freedom. Consequently, the Syrian media, specifically during Hafez al-Assad’s era (1971-2000), “was one of the most highly censored” media in the Middle East, dominated by state-run newspapers, radio, and television.
Expectedly, taboos for Syrian media include any criticism or discussion of issues linked to the president and his family and inner circle. Also, the taboos include the army and the security apparatuses, religion- and ethnicity-related issues (the Arab-Kurdish relationship and the sectarian question), the economic situation, and the Baath party.
As a result of the wide range of taboos and restrictions and the lack of security and stability, press freedom has deteriorated more in Syria since 2011. Between 2011 and 2022, the country ranked among the worst ten countries in media freedom, according to Reporters without Borders’ Annual Press Freedom Index.
Nonetheless, the 2011 revolution allowed for the mushrooming of Syrian media outlets. By 2016, the opposition-leaning Syrian Prints Archive estimated that “as many as 298 newspapers being circulated in different parts of the country during various periods of the uprising, in addition to 17 state-run or regime-affiliated newspapers.” However, the total number of media outlets established after 2011 could be as high as 600.
According to the latest mapping of the Syrian media, as of November 2019, there were 162 active Syrian media outlets dominated by websites, which accounted for 67, or 41.4% of the Syrian working media. In addition, there were 36 (22.2%) radio stations, 30 (18.5%) newspapers, 13 (8%) television stations, 10 (6.2%) news agencies, and six (3.7%) magazines. Among them, many independent outlets operate in non-regime controlled areas and exile.
Still, while most Syrian media (70.4%) is privately owned, it isn’t necessarily independent. It is well known that some privately owned media receive undeclared funds from regional governments, namely Qatar and UAE, or business people affiliated with governments. Consequently, they have become a tool in the regional media war between different countries or axis.
The regime’s and AANES’s media laws explicitly state (article 6 and article 2, respectively) that media is not subject to censorship. Nonetheless, as Syria-based journalists pointed out, reporting on issues deemed “sensitive” by the different authorities across Syria is subject to prior approval. Moreover, in regime-held territories, photography, shooting videos, and conducting interviews are prohibited without prior permission from the Ministry of Information.
The status of exiled Syrian media is no less complicated in some countries. Generally speaking, media outlets and reporters based in Western countries enjoy working legally and freely. Conversely, the work of media organizations and reporters in Syria’s neighboring countries is generally tolerated according to the “turning a blind eye” policy. Consequently, they practice high self-censorship concerning issues related to the host country to avoid retaliation, including the closure of the outlet and the arrest or deportation of journalists.
From its very first days, the Syrian revolution has been a struggle over the narrative concerning the reality of developments on the ground. Although protesters calling for freedom and dignity adhered to peaceful means over the first few months, the regime has depicted them as terrorists involved in a conspiracy funded by international and regional enemies. As such, Syrian media has become an arena of disinformation and misinformation since then.
Through the so-called Syrian Electronic Army, the Syrian regime is known to be responsible for some well-organized disinformation campaigns targeting its opponents. For example, in November 2021, Meta Incorporation, the parent company of Facebook, revealed that it disabled “Three separate hacking groups from Syria targeted a wide range of people in Syria, including civil society, journalists, humanitarian organizations and the anti-regime military forces. Each of these three hacking groups had links to the Syrian government, including Syria’s Air Force Intelligence.”
On the other hand, political polarization, low professional standards in some cases, and a lack of well-established fact-checking practices have paved the way for spreading misinformation.
Syria has never seen a law concerning the right to access information. The only related attempt was in 2019, but the draft law is yet to be approved by the government and later the parliament. However, this right is addressed and, hypothetically, guaranteed in the Media Law No. 108 of 2011 (articles 9 and 10) and AANES’s Law No. 3 of 2021 (article 10), making it a right for journalists exclusively.
In this context, it is noteworthy that the regime’s Media Law defines a journalist or media person as “Anyone whose profession is authoring, preparing, editing, or analyzing media content, or collecting the related necessary information, for publishing in a media outlet” (Article 1). Nonetheless, per article 10 of the internal statute of the Union of Journalists in the Syrian Arab Republic, “practicing journalism” in Syria is subject to the condition of being a member of the Union, which has the authority to issue press cards.
The availability of international funds during the early period following the 2011 uprising contributed to creating media jobs at the multiple institutions that flourished then. Conversely, the shrinking resources later led to a gap between the high supply of journalists and media workers and low demand on the institutions’ side, especially since the latter are small-sized organizations.
The 2011 uprising constitutes a milestone in Syrian women’s involvement in media work. Per a 2016 survey of several post-2011 emerging Syrian outlets, around 54% of workers in radio stations and 35% of print media staff were women, including part-timers and volunteers. However, only 38% occupied senior positions. Nonetheless, Syrian female journalists have been subject to multi-gender-based constraints while sharing the risk of being killed, arrested, and forcibly disappeared with other journalists. Between March 2011 and May 2022, six female journalists were killed, while six others were detained or forcibly disappeared.
Up until the revolution, Syria had only one media faculty (at the University of Damascus), established on March 1. In addition, the Syrian Virtual University, founded in 2002, has a media program.
Recently, four more media faculties or institutes exist in the newly established universities in the opposition- and HTS-held areas in the north, namely Aleppo University in the Liberated Areas, International University of Science and Renaissance, Başakşehir İslam Akademisi/Aleppo, and Idlib University. But aside from the unsolved accreditation issue of most universities in non-regime areas, the quality of journalism teaching, which is also the case at the Media Faculty at the University of Damascus, is questionable, according to media reports, as a result of the lack of necessary human and material resources.
Despite the official rhetoric about the importance of media literacy, there are no such related programs in Syrian schools (and universities). The only related effort is UNESCO-sponsored workshops and training implemented in cooperation with the Syrian government.
Also, given that Syrian media is extraordinarily controlled and monitored, any future media literacy programs are naturally expected to be ideology-driven and far from encouraging critical thinking, which is the core of media literacy.
