Country files
Morocco
Freedom of the press is guaranteed by Article 28 of the Moroccan Constitution. The sector is regulated by the Press and Publishing Law promulgated in 2016 Press Code. This law repealed the 2002 law, deemed restrictive. Several provisions have been amended. They include the abolition of prison sentences for press offenses, the recognition of freedom of access to information as a constitutional right, and the recognition of online media as media supports in their own right. Another positive adjustment was the creation of the National Press Council, charged with overseeing media performance and protecting the journalistic profession.
However, despite these reforms, the legislative environment relating to press freedom has its limits. While the new press code no longer provides for prison sentences, it retains most of the expressive offences provided for in the old 2002 code. These penalties, introduced by amendment to the penal code in July 2016, can lead a journalist to detention, particularly for writings or public speeches “undermining” the monarchy, the person of the King, Islam and the territorial integrity of Morocco.
In addition, other laws amended or enacted over the last six years have strengthened the judicial arsenal: the anti-terrorism law adopted after the Casablanca bombings in 2003 and the defamation law enacted in 2019, which provides for severe penalties to combat defamation on social networks.
In the field of audiovisual law, despite the end of the state monopoly in 2002 with the creation of the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA) and the various laws aimed at liberalizing the sector adopted in 2005, 2015 and 2016, the field remains tightly controlled. Indeed, although these laws have encouraged the emergence of new private radio stations – There are 19 private radio stations by 2022 – and public TV channels -9 channels-, the panorama of private TV channels has not expanded.
Finally, the law on access to information, which came into force in March 2020, lists thirteen categories of information that can be exempted from the right of access, such as national defense and privacy. However, the scope of these categories is not precisely defined, making access to information inequitable.
Television remains the most popular source of information in Morocco. However, the Moroccan audiovisual sector, whose main news channels are 2M and Al Aoula, is struggling to attract a large audience, who are more inclined to turn to pan-Arab satellite channels, particularly Qatar’s Al Jazeera.
Behind the mass media, the Internet is just as widespread, especially among young Moroccans aged 18 to 35. 87% of them get their news via the Internet and social networks, where information is no longer produced solely by professional journalists, but also by citizen journalists, influencers, bloggers and content creators.
There is still no map to record the number of sites flooding the Moroccan web, with varying estimates fluctuating between 2,000 and 5,000.
Although the traditional press has entered the digital space, it is struggling to establish itself, outstripped by the overwhelming popularity of Arabic-language pure players. These media, many of which cover regional, national and international news, have succeeded in carving out a place for themselves in the media landscape, such as Hespress, which ranks first with 19.3 million daily visits, or ChoufTV, a Web TV with an editorial line focused on sensationalism, which registers over 18 million subscribers on its Facebook page and exceeds one billion views per month for all its videos on YouTube.
Radio’s highest penetration is in urban areas, with 55% of listeners nationwide. Mohamed VI du Saint Coran, a public radio station, remains the most listened-to radio station, followed by Med Radio, the leading commercial radio station. Its programs allow direct listener participation and focus mainly on entertainment and social issues. According to the regulatory body, there are a total of 35 stations, 16 state-owned and 19 privately-owned.
Finally, the print media, already confined to urban areas due to the country’s high illiteracy rate and weakened by a structural crisis over many years, has not withstood the impact of the health crisis.
Behind this apparent pluralism, the media landscape is marked by a high concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few private groups. The study “Radioscopie des propriétaires des médias au Maroc“, carried out in 2017 by the Moroccan news website Le Desk and the NGO Reporters sans frontières (RSF), highlighted a significant concentration of Moroccan media in the hands of a few companies and influential figures in the country’s political and economic life, as well as the Société nationale d’investissement, a holding company owned by the royal family.
The radio sector remains largely state-controlled, but ownership is more diversified, with the presence of small companies. Private radio stations have grown rapidly over the years, with a steadily increasing audience share. However, the coverage of political issues in these media remains very limited. On the whole, stations broadcast entertainment, music and economic topics.
Finally, Moroccan audiovisual law does not allow community radio stations to broadcast over the airwaves, the internet remains the only free media in Morocco able to bypass such restrictions. Numbering 69 community radio stations in 2015, there are now just 15 or so.
The practice of self-censorship is high in Morocco. Journalists deliberately avoid sensitive subjects or modify them for fear of reprisals. Moreover, self-censorship concerns not only political subjects, but also societal issues such as sexuality and religion. According to the Centre for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ), almost 80% of media professionals admit to practicing it, mainly for economic reasons. Censorship remains widespread, but is mainly indirect, through economic pressure.
The exponential growth of online media has exacerbated the lack of ethical rigor that has already been prevalent in some media for several years.
Access to information is often hampered by a lack of transparency and communication on the part of the authorities. Journalists often find it difficult to obtain information and carry out in-depth investigations due to the reluctance of government officials to divulge sensitive or embarrassing information. The legal framework relating to access to information remains insufficient, although Morocco adopted a law on freedom of access to information in 2018, which came into force in March 2019, this law is not often applied and has not ensured easy and transparent access to information, particularly for independent journalists and alternative media.
The pandemic has weakened an already fragile profession. Job losses were significant, with some fifty positions eliminated, in addition to the multiplication of industrial disputes and staff cuts ranging from 20% to 50% during the period of the health crisis.
The rise of online media has led to a significant increase in the number of journalists working in the digital press, who today represent 40% of the Moroccan journalist workforce, or 1,360 information professionals.
Despite legislative advances and policies to promote gender equality in Morocco, women remain under-represented in the media, where almost 72% of journalists are men. Faced with obstacles such as discrimination, harassment and gender prejudice, they also remain under-represented in management positions and decision-making bodies in the Moroccan media. They also have fewer opportunities to cover sensitive topics, which limits their ability to develop professionally… According to the CNP (National Press Council), only 259 of the 1336 journalists working in the digital sector and holding a press card are women (2021).
Independent media are often created and managed by journalists keen to disseminate free and diversified information. However, these media, which tend to focus on sensitive subjects and provide critical coverage of current events, have difficulty reaching a wide audience and lack the financial resources to develop.
Finally, in Morocco, journalism training is provided by some thirty university courses, including 4 private schools and one public school, the Institut Supérieur de l’Information et de la Communication, better known by its acronym ISIC (isic.ac.ma). Founded in 1969, this is the country’s oldest institution, offering courses in Arabic and French. On average, the school welcomes around a hundred new students every year.
As far as media education is concerned, apart from the awareness-raising actions carried out by UNESCO in Morocco since 2012, through “Media Literacy Week”, national players are still slow to give concrete expression to their commitments in this area, notably through the introduction of this subject into national education curricula. For the time being, there are no media education programs in Moroccan school curricula.
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Libya
Legal Framework & Media Reform
Gender & Digital Violence
Migration & Media Coverage
Disinformation & AI
Environment
Local Monitoring
Reporters Without Borders rank : 137/180 (2025)
Index Freedom House : 10/100 (2025)
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International) : 173/180 (2025)
These rankings collectively reflect a media environment characterized by structural fragility, weak institutional safeguards, and high levels of corruption and political interference.
Freedom of Expression
Freedom of expression in Libya remains severely restricted, with journalists facing intimidation, sustained pressure from state authorities and armed actors, and widespread self-censorship. As journalist Intissar Al-Barassi notes, there has been no meaningful expansion of the margin of freedom in recent years; instead, public expression has increasingly receded due to fear and a perception of futility. She argues that since 2014, persistent pressures have reshaped the media into political instruments serving dominant actors.
Similarly, Reda Fhelboom, head of the Libyan Organisation for Independent Media (LOFIM), observes that no significant improvement has occurred compared to the previous year. He highlights the continued detention and military trial of journalist Salhine Zerouali in Benghazi under amendments to military procedures and counterterrorism laws that allow civilians to be tried in military courts, with limited transparency surrounding the proceedings. Although no new arrests were reported, restrictions persist, and cases of defamation and hate speech on television and social media have increased. Despite documented violations by the General Authority for Monitoring Media Content, enforcement remains slow, reinforcing structural weaknesses such as fragmented governance, militia influence, and limited judicial independence that continue to undermine meaningful freedom of expression. While there has been limited progress—reflected in a slight improvement in Libya’s ranking by Reporters Without Borders and ongoing discussions around legal reform—structural challenges persist.
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
No new media laws have been released in 2025. Journalism in Libya continues to be regulated primarily by the Publications Law (Law No. 76 of 1972), legislation that predates modern media forms and fails to address the complexities of radio, television, digital media, or social platforms, leaving journalists without legal protections or clarity on basic issues such as accreditation, work permits, and operational rights.
Pluralism
The Libyan media landscape is pluralistic in appearance, particularly in television, where multiple political currents are represented. Yet this plurality reflects political fragmentation rather than genuine independence. Most channels are either government-funded or aligned with dominant political and military actors, shaping partisan narratives that reinforce polarization. As Al-Barassi notes, many outlets claim independence while remaining structurally tied to power centers, resulting in biased coverage and weak professional standards.
This fragmentation is also geographic. Fhelboom observes that western and eastern media openly criticize each other’s authorities, with Tripoli offering a relatively wider margin of expression than the east or south. However, this variation does not indicate substantive freedom; rather, it reflects a divided media sphere in which outlets function as instruments of competing power structures.
Local municipal radio stations continue to cover citizens’ daily concerns despite aligning with dominant authorities in their areas, while private commercial radio has largely abandoned political reporting in favor of entertainment to protect advertising revenue. Independent media remain scarce, and print journalism has nearly disappeared. The polarized nature of this environment was evident in coverage of the killing of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, where outlets framed the event along factional lines, with only Al-Wasat TV demonstrating comparatively higher professional standards. The Libyan media system reflects characteristics of polarized pluralism within a fragmented state context.
Censorship & self-censorship
Drawing on the writer and journalist Saad Al-Asha’s assertion that “self-censorship lies in its consequences… in avoiding a losing battle with society,” freedom of expression in Libya can be understood as constrained by an interaction between social pressure and state practice. Al-Asha argues that, unlike states that actively safeguard freedom of expression against societal norms, the Libyan state tends to conform to prevailing public opinion under the rubric of “public morality,” thereby reinforcing self-censorship. This dynamic is particularly evident with regard to socially sensitive issues, which successive governments since the fall of the Gaddafi regime have largely avoided addressing. These authorities operate primarily as interim governments lacking coherent long-term projects, prioritizing short-term political goals over public interest or sustained positive social change.
By contrast, political issues are subject to direct and severe repression. Journalists and critics who attempt to expose corruption or express opposition to either of the rival governments face arrest, torture, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, and defamation. The detention and torture of economic journalist Ahmed Al-Senussi, following his publication of documents alleging corruption within the Ministry of Economy of the Tripoli-based government, exemplifies this pattern, as reported by both Human Rights Watch and Al-Quds Al-Arabi. In eastern Libya, repression has been even more extensive, with cases of enforced disappearance affecting not only journalists and media professionals but also members of parliament, according to Human Rights Watch reports.
Disinformation and Misinformation
Libyan media remain heavily affected by disinformation and misinformation, particularly in politically sensitive and high-profile cases. As Fhelboom notes, despite numerous training workshops provided to journalists and the establishment of the General Authority for Monitoring Media Content to combat hate speech and misinformation, many outlets continue to rely on unverified information circulated through social media. This practice has contributed to the widespread dissemination of false or misleading reports, particularly in major political and security incidents, such as the reported killing of Chief of Staff Omar Al-Haddad and the case of blogger Khansa Mujahid, where local and even regional media reproduced unverified claims originating from anonymous or politically motivated sources. According to Fhelboom, such reporting not only misled public opinion but also complicated investigative processes and allowed politically funded outlets to instrumentalize false narratives for strategic messaging.
Similarly, Al-Barassi observes that fact-checking and anti-disinformation initiatives have emerged over the past five years, often funded by international donors. These projects contributed to raising public awareness about manipulation, fake news, and digital deception, and led to the establishment of several fact-checking platforms. However, most initiatives were short-term and lacked financial sustainability, limiting their long-term structural impact.
Recent 2025 reports by international organizations indicate that misinformation in Libya remains closely tied to political polarization, weak editorial standards, and the absence of strong institutional verification mechanisms. Media outlets frequently prioritize speed and political alignment over fact-checking, while digital environments—particularly social media—serve as primary information sources for journalists, amplifying unverified narratives. Although monitoring bodies and civil society organizations have documented violations and issued warnings, enforcement remains slow and fragmented, and no comprehensive national strategy against disinformation has been institutionalized.
Access to Information
There is currently no law guaranteeing the right of access to information in Libya unlike other countries in the region such as Tunisia. Journalists argue that recently formed governmental institutions have failed to introduce meaningful reforms to facilitate access to information or to enact legislation protecting journalism and strengthening media independence. She further notes the absence of regulatory measures addressing publication restrictions, accreditation procedures, or the legal status of independent journalists.
Echoing these concerns, (LOFIM) stresses that effective access to information remains largely nonexistent in practice, despite a governmental circular issued by the Government of National Unity promoting transparency in the publication of official data. In reality, most public institutions continue to withhold information from journalists and media outlets. Only a limited number of bodies—such as the Anti-Corruption Authority and the Financial Crimes Investigation Agency—have demonstrated relative openness and cooperated with civil society organizations by providing data for investigative reporting.
Ongoing political division and institutional uncertainty have intensified journalists’ vulnerability, placing them under suspicion by authorities in both eastern and western Libya. In this context, journalistic practice is marked by caution and constrained by insecurity, while the absence of a unified journalists’ union further weakens collective professional protection.
Journalists’ Security
As of 2025, journalists in Libya continue to face serious security threats, including arbitrary arrest and detention, judicial harassment, threats and intimidation, physical assault, and the confiscation of equipment by both state and non-state actors. Enforced disappearances remain a significant concern, particularly in eastern Libya, alongside widespread impunity for violations against media workers. These risks are exacerbated by political fragmentation, the presence of armed groups, and restrictive legal frameworks that enable authorities to suppress critical reporting. International monitoring organizations have consistently documented these abuses, noting that the absence of accountability and effective legal protections has created a climate of fear that severely undermines independent journalism and freedom of expression (Reporters Without Borders, 2024; Human Rights Watch, 2025; ARTICLE 19, 2024).
Media Business Models
In Libya, the business models of mainstream and independent media diverge significantly and are strongly shaped by political fragmentation, insecurity, and weak market structures. Mainstream television channels and major media outlets typically operate through opaque funding arrangements linked to political actors, armed groups, or affiliated business elites. Their revenues derive largely from politically aligned advertising, patronage networks, or direct government support, rather than from audience-based or market-driven income. As a result, these outlets prioritize political influence and narrative control over commercial sustainability, which severely limits editorial independence.
By contrast, independent media outlets—many of which operate digitally or from the diaspora—function largely outside conventional commercial frameworks. They rely primarily on donor funding, grants from international organizations, project-based support, and limited digital advertising. While this funding structure affords greater editorial autonomy, it also renders these outlets financially fragile and highly vulnerable to disruption or closure. Civil society–based media organizations, such as the Libyan Organisation for Independent Media, generally operate as non-profit entities focused on advocacy, training, and the protection of press freedom rather than profit generation. Similar funding patterns characterize online and expatriate-hosted news platforms such as Libya Herald and Local Libya, which depend on donor support, civil society partnerships, and collaboration with international NGOs to sustain their operations. International monitoring organizations consistently emphasize that the absence of a stable advertising market, combined with legal uncertainty and persistent security risks, continues to obstruct the development of sustainable and independent media business models in Libya.
Media literacy : development and challenges
Efforts to enhance media literacy in Libya have been led mainly through projects funded by international organizations, which, despite producing useful materials and training initiatives, have struggled to achieve sustained progress. These programs often repeat similar activities year after year and have faced obstacles such as limited cooperation from governmental institutions, which undermines their ability to engage formal education systems and broaden civil society effectively. At a more professional level, Libyan civil society organizations such as the Libyan Organization for Independent Media and the Libyan Center for Freedom of the Press have undertaken monitoring and capacity-building initiatives aimed at improving journalistic quality and promoting ethical standards in media practice. For example, these groups have documented professional violations, advocated for dialogue on establishing a media code of ethics, and raised awareness of ethical reporting principles, as part of broader campaigns for media reform (ARTICLE 19, 2025). However, these efforts have frequently stalled due to a lack of sustainable funding or increasing political and security pressures that restrict civil society activity. The absence of a robust media literacy framework further compounds the challenges faced by journalists and citizens seeking to navigate an environment marked by weak press freedom, entrenched legal limitations, and persistent threats to free expression in Libya.
Gender and media
Female journalists in Libya operate within a highly constrained professional environment shaped by insecurity, political polarization, and entrenched social norms. While women remain present in newsrooms and media platforms, their participation is often precarious, and their professional advancement is limited by harassment, threats—both online and offline—and the absence of effective institutional protection. As Al-Barassi argues, the marginalization of women from meaningful political participation has directly affected media agendas. Despite the existence of formal gender quotas, women’s representation remains largely symbolic and is frequently determined by regional or tribal power-sharing rather than merit, resulting in limited influence and visibility. This marginal role is reflected in media coverage, where issues related to women’s rights and gender equality are rarely prioritized. In particular, coverage of gender-based and domestic violence—despite numerous cases involving women and children, including fatal incidents reported in 2025—has been sporadic and superficial. The failure of media institutions to address these issues critically mirrors broader structural constraints, including weak legal protections, social stigma, and political disincentives, which together marginalize both female journalists and gender-related issues within Libya’s public sphere.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Environmental issues remain peripheral within Libyan media, with no specialized environmental outlets and few formally trained environmental journalists. According to Fhelboom, topics such as pollution, oil-related environmental damage, groundwater contamination, and climate change receive limited sustained coverage, contributing to weak public pressure on state institutions.
Intissar Al-Barassi notes that until recently, environmental reporting remained largely awareness-based and avoided investigative depth. However, when journalists began examining environmental violations involving influential actors, coverage encountered pressure and attempts at restriction. Journalist Hindia Al-Oshaibi similarly describes earlier difficulties accessing official environmental data, often relying instead on local associations and informal sources. While international interest in climate issues has recently encouraged more investigative approaches, engagement remains fragile and inconsistent.
From an international perspective, this situation contrasts with frameworks promoted by UNESCO and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which emphasize environmental journalism as central to accountability, transparency, and public participation in environmental governance.
Coverage of the migrations topic
Journalists in Libya face significant structural, political, and professional challenges when covering migration issues, resulting in limited, selective, and often distorted reporting. As Al-Barassi notes, state and pro-government media tend to frame migration from the perspective of dominant authorities, privileging security narratives and at times justifying harsh practices as part of “state duty.” Migration is rarely prioritized within editorial policies, and in-depth humanitarian or rights-based reporting remains marginal.
Journalist Hind Al-Oshaibi further observes that coverage is generally weak and shaped by stereotypical portrayals of migrants as criminals, threats to sovereignty, or a societal burden. Issues affecting migrant women and children—particularly their living conditions, vulnerabilities, and integration challenges—are largely neglected. Practical reporting barriers compound these biases: access to detention centers or informal migrant settlements is highly restricted, and journalists face difficulties obtaining permissions, safe access, or reliable documentation, sometimes encountering financial demands for basic access to sources or locations.
One of the well-known journalists and activists emphasizes the political sensitivity of migration due to the involvement of both governmental and non-governmental actors. He argues that the issue is genuinely burdensome for the country, affecting multiple aspects of daily life, yet local journalists face significant risks when attempting comprehensive coverage. While international media often highlight documented abuses and violations—which are real and serious—such reporting may overlook the broader structural and socioeconomic dimensions of the crisis. The cessation of donor-funded independent projects that previously enabled more balanced reporting has further narrowed the space for nuanced coverage. Within a polarized and securitized media environment, migration reporting thus remains constrained by political interests, public hostility, limited institutional transparency, and safety risks for journalists.
AI development and use in the media sector
Although still emerging, AI is beginning to reshape the disinformation ecosystem. The dynamics described above regarding disinformation are increasingly intertwined with the unregulated use of artificial intelligence (AI) in Libyan newsrooms. As journalist Al-Barassi notes, AI has not been formally integrated into editorial workflows, despite its growing informal presence in journalistic practice. This has created a fragmented environment in which lower-level journalists rely on AI tools without consistent oversight, while senior editorial structures often lack the capacity to assess AI-assisted content.
While Fhelboom argues that AI use in practice remains largely instrumental and politically driven. It is frequently employed to generate content or images deployed in partisan attacks, or to create fictitious accounts through which politically aligned narratives are disseminated as part of ongoing media warfare. In the absence of regulatory frameworks or structured professional training, AI becomes embedded within the same polarized information ecosystem described earlier.
Consequently, rather than mitigating misinformation, AI tools are often absorbed into existing patterns of political contestation, amplifying manipulated or synthetic content—including fabricated images and coordinated narrative campaigns—and reinforcing the broader disinformation dynamics that characterize Libya’s fragmented media landscape.
Libya
Depuis que la Libye s’est enfoncée dans la guerre civile en 2014, les journalistes sont devenus des cibles et les médias des armes au service des factions en conflit. En se montrant de plus en plus partisans, les médias sont perçus comme des parties prenantes du conflit.
Les attaques contre les journalistes libyens sont favorisées par le cadre légal de l’ère Kadhafi qui n’a pas été aboli, comme la loi sur la presse de 1972, qui prévoit des peines de prison à perpétuité en cas de publication de nouvelles pouvant « porter atteinte à la réputation du pays et la confiance qui lui est portée à l’étranger ». De nouveaux délits restreignant la liberté d’expression et de la presse ont été ajoutés par les autorités en place après 2011. L’agence anti-terroriste, chapeautée par un groupe armé, a le pouvoir, depuis 2018, de censurer « toute information pouvant menacer la sécurité du pays, la sécurité de la société ou la sécurité nationale ».
La Libye est un pays dont la majorité de la population est de confession musulmane et porte des valeurs conservatrices. Le ministère des médias et les conventions sociales interdisent la diffusion d’images ou productions qui montrent le prophète Mohamed et ses compagnons.
Les sujets sur l’athéisme, la sexualité, les minorités de genre, les revendications féministes sont sensibles et considérés comme des lignes rouges à ne pas franchir par la plupart des médias et acteurs publics. La question de la participation des femmes à la vie politique est en revanche un sujet de plus en plus évoqué dans l’espace public. Comme dans le reste du monde, les femmes journalistes sont néanmoins les cibles privilégiées de cyberharcèlement.Les journalistes ont payé un lourd tribu dans les guerres civiles qui se sont succédées depuis 2011. Dans la décennie qui a suivi la révolution de 2011, plus de 30 journalistes et blogueurs ont été tués en Libye et, dans la plupart des cas, les coupables n’ont pas été traduits en justice. Depuis 2015, 247 journalistes ont été arrêtés ou ont été victimes de violences physiques par des militaires et groupes paramilitaires selon Libya Platform.
Entre mai 2020 et mai 2021, la Libyan Organization for independent Media (LOFIM) a recensé des violences contre 54 journalistes dont 45% à Tripoli, 41% à Benghazi. Ils ont été victimes d’attaques, arrestations, interrogatoires par forces de sécurité ou fouilles de téléphone. En 2021 et 2022, LOFIM a recensé 10 attaques allant d’arrestations à des disparitions forcées de journalistes.
L’implosion du régime kadhafiste en 2011 a permis l’éclosion de dizaines de nouveaux médias, créés par des groupes révolutionnaires, hors de toute régulation. Deux ans plus tard, la parenthèse s’est refermée et la plupart des médias indépendants des nouvelles autorités ou groupes armées ont été attaqués ou fermés.
La déclaration constitutionnelle garantit la liberté de la presse mais aucun décret n’en protège l’exercice. Il existe seulement une circulaire datant du 3 mai 2021, émise par le gouvernement dit d’unité nationale (GUN) interdisant les arrestations et détentions de journalistes. Ce gouvernement formé en 2021, sous l’égide de l’ONU, s’était engagé à restructurer les organes contrôlant les médias. Aucune réforme n’a été engagé à ce jour. A Tripoli, un conseil des droits de l’Homme, rattaché au gouvernement, a été créé mais son activité réelle reste opaque et inconnue des défenseurs des droits humains et journalistes indépendants interviewés pour ce rapport.
Depuis 2014, un nouvel arsenal législatif cible les journalistes. Insulter les autorités, les emblèmes de l’Etat et son drapeau sont des délits passibles de prison. La formulation vague de ces textes offre une large interprétation aux autorités répressives.
Les journalistes, blogueurs et autres personnels de médias sont victimes d’arrestations et ciblés par toutes les parties, tandis que le personnel judiciaire est attaqué pour empêcher le fonctionnement normal de la justice. Les arrestations de journalistes au motif qu’ils ne possèdent pas de permis de travail sont régulières. A l’Est, plusieurs journalistes ont été poursuivis par des tribunaux militaires.
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Palestine
Reporters without Borders Index (most recent): 163
Freedom House Index: Gaza Strip 2/100. West Bank 22/100
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): N/A
Freedom of Expression
The war in Gaza and the ongoing Israeli escalation in the West Bank have impacted the freedom expression not only through the deliberate targeting of journalists but also with the wider freedom of expression. The main concerning issue regarding freedom of expression is the polarizations between those who believe that the events of October 7th resulted in a catastrophe for Palestinians, and those who say that Israel did not want an excuse to destroy the Gaza Strip or continue commenting crimes in the West Bank. This also applies to the critics of Hamas who have been portrayed as “traitors” or “betrayals” or even accused of being “collaborators” with Israel. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA), defamation was one of the most common patterns faced by journalists, with 55.6% of journalists being subjected to organized campaigns across digital platforms to defame them, followed by hacking and data theft at 48.1%, and electronic surveillance at 46.3%, in addition to other forms of digital violence such as digital harassment, threats, bullying, hate speech and identity theft.
Social media companies are still playing a vital role is viloating the Freedom of expression in Palestine. According to 7amleh’s Deceomber 2025 report “A total of 7 violations were documented involving account restrictions, along with 6 cases of content removal, 3 cases of account suspensions, and 2 instances of shadow banning, while 5 additional cases were distributed across various other types of digital sanctions.”
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
There have been no fundamental changes to media laws in Palestine. The Cybercrime Law continues to be a major concern for policymakers, journalists, and civil society organizations. Following numerous objections, the Palestinian Cabinet decided on April 30, 2025, to form a national committee to amend Decree-Law No. (10) of 2018 concerning cybercrimes, communications crimes, and information technology, and its amendments. The committee includes representatives from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Public Prosecution, the Ministry of Communications and Digital Economy, the General Secretariat of the Cabinet, and civil society organizations. The committee’s objective is to review the objections and submit recommendations to the government.
As for the Right to Information Law, the Ministry of Justice published a draft decree-law on November 4, 2025, which reignited the debate surrounding it. Some considered the latest version an improvement over previous drafts, but still requires addressing several fundamental issues, most notably the expansion of security and economic exceptions and the absence of clear provisions to ensure the harmonization of legislation, making the Right to Information Law the supreme reference in case of any conflict. Supporters of the law, however, considered it a fundamental pillar for promoting integrity and preventing corruption, given that the exceptions are precisely defined.
Pluralism
Despite the large number of media outlets in Palestine, however, the media still suffers from a superficial and artificial diversity due to limited variety, innovation, and renewal in content and programming. Most of the programming in TV and radio, for example, follow the same pattern, they have become elitist, featuring mainly analysts, politicians and academics to discuss public matters, while ordinary citizens are rarely represented. Many local Palestinian media outlets have been transformed into propaganda tools for political parties, especially with the war on Gaza. In addition to the lack of diversity in presentation, particularly evident is the absence of investigative journalism, except for a few rare attempts. Furthermore, the Palestinian media has failed to fulfil its oversight role over political power. Print journalism has failed to engage with technological advancements in the new digital media landscape and has been unable to adapt to the evolving organizational structure and its relationship with young audiences. This has contributed to a decline in readership among Palestinian youth. Furthermore, print media suffers from a profound structural crisis across all levels, from distribution to editorial boards. This context has enabled the prominence of social media, mainly Facebook, the fact that generated a disillusion among the Palestinian public with democracy and media diversity.
Censorship & self-censorship
In Palestine, there is no pre-censorship on publications but post-censorship, mainly by Isreal, in addition to the Palestinian political system in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as social censorship, companies and advertisers. This has led media outlets and journalists to set their own self-censorship or ‘pre-censorship’ for subjects that may include controversial taboo topics, political criticism or corruption-related topics. In addition to the traditional forms of censorship, Palestinian journalists and activists are subject to digital threats and violations. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA) the Israeli occupation and the authorities in the West Bank and Gaza employ digital tools to monitor content, block accounts, or summon journalists based on their online activity.
Disinformation and Misinformation
A study published by the Palestinian Observatory for Fact-Checking and Media Literacy (Tahaqaq) revealed that misleading content (47.25%) dominated the Palestinian digital landscape during February and March 2025, followed by false content at 44.44%, and harmful content at 8.31%. The high percentage of false content reflects the significant overlap in the Palestinian information landscape, where errors are prevalent in contexts that can be misinterpreted or exploited. This type of content is often attributed to the recirculation of old material, ack of knowledge, or poor editing skills, rather than necessarily to direct manipulation. The study also reveals that there is a clear dominance of individual sources over the information landscape, as the pages of individuals and ordinary users contributed the largest share of misleading and false content. This is attributed to the limited information awareness among the public, in addition to the great emotional impact during crises, which leads to the circulation of information without verification. As for news platforms, their danger is doubled, as they give misleading information an appearance of formal credibility, which contributes to its wider spread, especially when it is quoted or republished through other platforms linked to entities with political orientations.
Disinformation and misinformation are also part of the war on Gaza. Much of this content was widely disseminated online, with tens of millions of posts circulating on social media. A variety of sources, including government officials, media outlets, and social media influencers in various countries, contributed to the spread of this misinformation and disinformation. Several Palestinian institutions play a central role in combating misinformation and disinformation. The most prominent are 7amleh, Tahaqaq and Kashif. Additionally, some outlets play a major role in challenging misleading narratives through investigative journalism by providing documented reporting that helps counter widespread misinformation about Palestine.
Access to Information
The absence of a right to information law in Palestine creates a fertile ground for the spread of rumours, fabricated news, and misinformation. Those seeking information who cannot find it through official channels and legal means will resort to alternative methods, which may yield accurate information, rumours, distorted information, or outright fabrication. The national debate surrounding the right to information law has resurfaced following the publication of the draft law for 2025, which was first proposed over twenty years ago but never passed. The most significant problem with the 2025 draft lies in its vague exceptions related to broad concepts such as “national security,” “national economy,” and “public interest.” These terms could be used to deny citizens access to information if left undefined. Furthermore, the draft prioritizes other laws of a confidential or security nature in cases of conflict, potentially rendering the new law ineffective. (Please see section 2 Media Laws)
Journalists Security
Despite the ceasefire in Gaza, Isreal continues to target journalists. On 21 January 2026, an Israeli drone strike on a vehicle in central Gaza killed freelance photographer Abed Shaat, a regular contributor to Agence France-Presse (AFP), Mohammad Qeshta, a spokesperson for the Egyptian Committee who reported news to his Telegram, and Anas Ghnaim, a freelance photographer and drone operator who worked for Smart Media. The attack came while the three journalists were on assignment for the Egyptian Committee.
The West Bank continues to be a hostile environment for journalists. Attacks against journalists are not limited to Israeli soldiers but also to Israeli settlers. Video images showed, on many occasions, the direct and deliberate targeting of journalists by Israeli soldiers, whether in the form of physical attacks or by firing teargas and stun grenades at them, in some cases live ammunition was used.
Israeli settlers, often guarded by soldiers, have also been attacking journalists. Most prominent was the attack on Reuters photojournalist Raneen Sawafta, who escaped death after being severely beaten by settlers in the village of Beita north of the West Bank. Sawafta was accompanied by Reuters security adviser Grant Bowden who was beaten as he tried to protect her.
Media Business Models
Within the complexity of the political, economic and social context, the media business models in Palestine remain the same. The most significant is the donor-funded one, depending on projects supported by international donors. However, this source of funding is no longer as used to be due to the lack of funding at origin. The other model is advertisingbased which is limited and inconsistent due to the small market size, political and economic constrains, as well as competition with social media adverting. Most of the media outlets adopt a hybrid Nonprofit–Commercial Models combining donor funding, advertising, and commercial services.
Independent Media: state and challenges
Independent media in Palestine represent a rare space for free expression amidst a complex political environment and immense security and economic pressures. Independent journalists operate under exceptional circumstances, facing restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation, including arrests, harassment, and bans on coverage, as well as internal challenges related to political division and political polarization. Among the most prominent are Ma’an News Agency, Watan Media Network, Palestine Media Network, Nisaa FM Radio, Ajyal Network, 24 FM and Youth Radio Shabab FM, among others. However, these media outlets face significant challenges. In addition to political and security pressures, they suffer from weak funding and, more recently, a near-complete absence of advertising revenue due to the political situation and competition from social media.
Independent media attracts a broad audience seeking reliable information that is not subject to political authority or Palestinian factions. This audience comprises diverse groups, including young people, who constitute the largest segment of society, activists and those interested in public affairs, as well as the general public seeking an independent narrative.
Media literacy: development and challenges
Palestine is witnessing increasing activity in media and information literacy (MIL) to promote critical thinking and fact-checking, especially in light of the spread of misinformation. Institutions such as the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, UNESCO Palestine, PYALARA, Al-Quds Open University, and the Ministry of Education, to name a few, are leading comprehensive training programs and initiatives targeting students and teachers, focusing on digital literacy, countering hate speech and cyberbullying, and fact-checking, as part of efforts to protect social and national awareness.
Despite this, there are still a number of challenges to MIL in Palestine; the lack of institutional awareness of the importance of media and information literacy, the weakness of qualified personnel to implement media and information literacy, the lack of necessary material and technological resources, and the impact of political and economic conditions on the development of education in the field of media and information literacy.
Gender and media
Gender is an essential part of the Palestinian media landscape, both in terms of female representation in newsrooms and the nature of media discourse itself. Palestinian media provides extensive coverage of women’s issues, but it does so within a highly complex socio-political context, where gender issues are intertwined with the occupation, war, and economic and social pressures. This coverage is not uniform; it ranges from highlighting women’s role in the struggle and society to focusing on their daily suffering and offering limited criticism of social structures. In addition to issues related to the occupation, Palestinian media covers women’s issues related to domestic violence, discrimination in the labour market, early marriage, and women’s role in politics and society. However, these issues often recede in the face of political coverage. That said, some media coverage is influenced by stereotypes that often portray women as victims or secondary figures, rather than highlighting their essential role in political and social life.
Recent years have witnessed the rise of Palestinian media initiatives that seek to promote gender equality, whether through producing content that sheds light on women’s issues or by training and empowering young female journalists in the digital sphere. Social media platforms have also played a significant role in giving women a wider space to express their opinions and challenge traditional narratives. However, achieving a more gender-sensitive Palestinian media remains contingent on institutional reforms, the development of equitable editorial policies, and a deeper cultural shift within society.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Environmental issues in Palestine generally receive little media attention unless directly linked to the conflict with Israel. For example, there have been numerous reports on the environmental impacts of chemical waste from West Bank settlements that flows into Palestinian agricultural land, or on the effects of Israel’s construction of the separation wall in the West Bank. During the war in Gaza, some reports were published on the war’s environmental impacts. This lack of attention to environmental issues stems from the Palestinian media’s preoccupation with rapidly unfolding events and its focus on breaking news and issues related to the occupation. Discussions of environmental issues in the media are usually conducted by specialized civil society organizations such as the Applied Research Institute or the Ma’an Development Centre, as well as by the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority. In addition, there were some initiatives. In 2022, the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority and the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University launched a training program for young environmental journalists, implemented by Revolve Mediterraneo with funding from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, whereby 25 male and female students from 6 universities in the West Bank and Gaza participated: Palestine, Birzeit, Al-Aqsa, Hebron, An-Najah, and Al-Quds Open University. They presented visual and written journalistic materials addressing various environmental topics.
Coverage of the migration topic
Coverage of migration and displacement in Palestinian media is directly linked to the political, social, and economic realities experienced by Palestinians both within Palestine and in the diaspora. The issue of migration is an integral part of the conflict itself. Therefore, Palestinian media addresses it on three levels: internal displacement resulting from wars and Israeli aggression; external migration due to economic and political circumstances; and historical displacement since 1948, along with its associated narratives and rights.
Palestinian media focuses on the humanitarian dimension, highlighting the suffering of displaced families, the loss of homes and livelihoods, homelessness, and giving particular attention to children, women, and the elderly. On the political front, it emphasizes the connection between displacement and Israeli policies such as forced displacement and collective punishment. It also highlights the role of the international community and human rights organizations, presenting the Palestinian narrative in contrast to the Israeli narrative. On the economic and social front, Palestinian media focuses on issues such as poverty, the labour market, unemployment, and the lack of services and infrastructure in refugee camps, whether in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or in the Palestinian diaspora, especially the situation of refugees in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Sometimes, the Palestinian media highlights stories of success and integration in Europe, America, Canada and other countries of refuge.
AI development and use in the media sector
Palestine is still moving slowly towards using AI in media, due to the lack of a clear strategy for ethical guidelines, and the shortage of qualified personnel and expertise in AI-related technologies. Among the initiatives seeking to introduce AI into newsrooms is a study prepared by the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, funded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), entitled “How to Integrate Artificial Intelligence into Journalism and Media Education?”, given its growing necessity in the media industry.
In October 2025, the World Association of Publishers and News Makers (WAN IFRA) held a meeting with editors-in-chief of Palestinian media outlets to discuss ways to integrate AI into newsrooms, ensuring it serves as a partner rather than a replacement for journalists.
While content production with the use of AI may be relatively little, Palestinian media institutions use AI in several areas, such as big data analysis, deepfake detection, and faster translation and content production. It also helps monitoring global media discourse on the Palestinian issue and understanding its trends. However, the greatest challenge remains the potential bias in algorithms and the lack of technical resources, making the development of independent Palestinian tools a crucial step in strengthening the presence of the Palestinian narrative in the digital sphere.
Palestine
Reporters without Borders Index (most recent): 163
Freedom House Index: Gaza Strip 2/100. West Bank 22/100
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): N/A
Freedom of Expression
The war in Gaza and the ongoing Israeli escalation in the West Bank have impacted the freedom expression not only through the deliberate targeting of journalists but also with the wider freedom of expression. The main concerning issue regarding freedom of expression is the polarizations between those who believe that the events of October 7th resulted in a catastrophe for Palestinians, and those who say that Israel did not want an excuse to destroy the Gaza Strip or continue commenting crimes in the West Bank. This also applies to the critics of Hamas who have been portrayed as “traitors” or “betrayals” or even accused of being “collaborators” with Israel. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA), defamation was one of the most common patterns faced by journalists, with 55.6% of journalists being subjected to organized campaigns across digital platforms to defame them, followed by hacking and data theft at 48.1%, and electronic surveillance at 46.3%, in addition to other forms of digital violence such as digital harassment, threats, bullying, hate speech and identity theft.
Social media companies are still playing a vital role is viloating the Freedom of expression in Palestine. According to 7amleh’s Deceomber 2025 report “A total of 7 violations were documented involving account restrictions, along with 6 cases of content removal, 3 cases of account suspensions, and 2 instances of shadow banning, while 5 additional cases were distributed across various other types of digital sanctions.”
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
There have been no fundamental changes to media laws in Palestine. The Cybercrime Law continues to be a major concern for policymakers, journalists, and civil society organizations. Following numerous objections, the Palestinian Cabinet decided on April 30, 2025, to form a national committee to amend Decree-Law No. (10) of 2018 concerning cybercrimes, communications crimes, and information technology, and its amendments. The committee includes representatives from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Public Prosecution, the Ministry of Communications and Digital Economy, the General Secretariat of the Cabinet, and civil society organizations. The committee’s objective is to review the objections and submit recommendations to the government.
As for the Right to Information Law, the Ministry of Justice published a draft decree-law on November 4, 2025, which reignited the debate surrounding it. Some considered the latest version an improvement over previous drafts, but still requires addressing several fundamental issues, most notably the expansion of security and economic exceptions and the absence of clear provisions to ensure the harmonization of legislation, making the Right to Information Law the supreme reference in case of any conflict. Supporters of the law, however, considered it a fundamental pillar for promoting integrity and preventing corruption, given that the exceptions are precisely defined.
Pluralism
Despite the large number of media outlets in Palestine, however, the media still suffers from a superficial and artificial diversity due to limited variety, innovation, and renewal in content and programming. Most of the programming in TV and radio, for example, follow the same pattern, they have become elitist, featuring mainly analysts, politicians and academics to discuss public matters, while ordinary citizens are rarely represented. Many local Palestinian media outlets have been transformed into propaganda tools for political parties, especially with the war on Gaza. In addition to the lack of diversity in presentation, particularly evident is the absence of investigative journalism, except for a few rare attempts. Furthermore, the Palestinian media has failed to fulfil its oversight role over political power. Print journalism has failed to engage with technological advancements in the new digital media landscape and has been unable to adapt to the evolving organizational structure and its relationship with young audiences. This has contributed to a decline in readership among Palestinian youth. Furthermore, print media suffers from a profound structural crisis across all levels, from distribution to editorial boards. This context has enabled the prominence of social media, mainly Facebook, the fact that generated a disillusion among the Palestinian public with democracy and media diversity.
Censorship & self-censorship
In Palestine, there is no pre-censorship on publications but post-censorship, mainly by Isreal, in addition to the Palestinian political system in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as social censorship, companies and advertisers. This has led media outlets and journalists to set their own self-censorship or ‘pre-censorship’ for subjects that may include controversial taboo topics, political criticism or corruption-related topics. In addition to the traditional forms of censorship, Palestinian journalists and activists are subject to digital threats and violations. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA) the Israeli occupation and the authorities in the West Bank and Gaza employ digital tools to monitor content, block accounts, or summon journalists based on their online activity.
Disinformation and Misinformation
A study published by the Palestinian Observatory for Fact-Checking and Media Literacy (Tahaqaq) revealed that misleading content (47.25%) dominated the Palestinian digital landscape during February and March 2025, followed by false content at 44.44%, and harmful content at 8.31%. The high percentage of false content reflects the significant overlap in the Palestinian information landscape, where errors are prevalent in contexts that can be misinterpreted or exploited. This type of content is often attributed to the recirculation of old material, ack of knowledge, or poor editing skills, rather than necessarily to direct manipulation. The study also reveals that there is a clear dominance of individual sources over the information landscape, as the pages of individuals and ordinary users contributed the largest share of misleading and false content. This is attributed to the limited information awareness among the public, in addition to the great emotional impact during crises, which leads to the circulation of information without verification. As for news platforms, their danger is doubled, as they give misleading information an appearance of formal credibility, which contributes to its wider spread, especially when it is quoted or republished through other platforms linked to entities with political orientations.
Disinformation and misinformation are also part of the war on Gaza. Much of this content was widely disseminated online, with tens of millions of posts circulating on social media. A variety of sources, including government officials, media outlets, and social media influencers in various countries, contributed to the spread of this misinformation and disinformation. Several Palestinian institutions play a central role in combating misinformation and disinformation. The most prominent are 7amleh, Tahaqaq and Kashif. Additionally, some outlets play a major role in challenging misleading narratives through investigative journalism by providing documented reporting that helps counter widespread misinformation about Palestine.
Access to Information
The absence of a right to information law in Palestine creates a fertile ground for the spread of rumours, fabricated news, and misinformation. Those seeking information who cannot find it through official channels and legal means will resort to alternative methods, which may yield accurate information, rumours, distorted information, or outright fabrication. The national debate surrounding the right to information law has resurfaced following the publication of the draft law for 2025, which was first proposed over twenty years ago but never passed. The most significant problem with the 2025 draft lies in its vague exceptions related to broad concepts such as “national security,” “national economy,” and “public interest.” These terms could be used to deny citizens access to information if left undefined. Furthermore, the draft prioritizes other laws of a confidential or security nature in cases of conflict, potentially rendering the new law ineffective. (Please see section 2 Media Laws)
Journalists Security
Despite the ceasefire in Gaza, Isreal continues to target journalists. On 21 January 2026, an Israeli drone strike on a vehicle in central Gaza killed freelance photographer Abed Shaat, a regular contributor to Agence France-Presse (AFP), Mohammad Qeshta, a spokesperson for the Egyptian Committee who reported news to his Telegram, and Anas Ghnaim, a freelance photographer and drone operator who worked for Smart Media. The attack came while the three journalists were on assignment for the Egyptian Committee.
The West Bank continues to be a hostile environment for journalists. Attacks against journalists are not limited to Israeli soldiers but also to Israeli settlers. Video images showed, on many occasions, the direct and deliberate targeting of journalists by Israeli soldiers, whether in the form of physical attacks or by firing teargas and stun grenades at them, in some cases live ammunition was used.
Israeli settlers, often guarded by soldiers, have also been attacking journalists. Most prominent was the attack on Reuters photojournalist Raneen Sawafta, who escaped death after being severely beaten by settlers in the village of Beita north of the West Bank. Sawafta was accompanied by Reuters security adviser Grant Bowden who was beaten as he tried to protect her.
Media Business Models
Within the complexity of the political, economic and social context, the media business models in Palestine remain the same. The most significant is the donor-funded one, depending on projects supported by international donors. However, this source of funding is no longer as used to be due to the lack of funding at origin. The other model is advertisingbased which is limited and inconsistent due to the small market size, political and economic constrains, as well as competition with social media adverting. Most of the media outlets adopt a hybrid Nonprofit–Commercial Models combining donor funding, advertising, and commercial services.
Independent Media: state and challenges
Independent media in Palestine represent a rare space for free expression amidst a complex political environment and immense security and economic pressures. Independent journalists operate under exceptional circumstances, facing restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation, including arrests, harassment, and bans on coverage, as well as internal challenges related to political division and political polarization. Among the most prominent are Ma’an News Agency, Watan Media Network, Palestine Media Network, Nisaa FM Radio, Ajyal Network, 24 FM and Youth Radio Shabab FM, among others. However, these media outlets face significant challenges. In addition to political and security pressures, they suffer from weak funding and, more recently, a near-complete absence of advertising revenue due to the political situation and competition from social media.
Independent media attracts a broad audience seeking reliable information that is not subject to political authority or Palestinian factions. This audience comprises diverse groups, including young people, who constitute the largest segment of society, activists and those interested in public affairs, as well as the general public seeking an independent narrative.
Media literacy: development and challenges
Palestine is witnessing increasing activity in media and information literacy (MIL) to promote critical thinking and fact-checking, especially in light of the spread of misinformation. Institutions such as the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, UNESCO Palestine, PYALARA, Al-Quds Open University, and the Ministry of Education, to name a few, are leading comprehensive training programs and initiatives targeting students and teachers, focusing on digital literacy, countering hate speech and cyberbullying, and fact-checking, as part of efforts to protect social and national awareness.
Despite this, there are still a number of challenges to MIL in Palestine; the lack of institutional awareness of the importance of media and information literacy, the weakness of qualified personnel to implement media and information literacy, the lack of necessary material and technological resources, and the impact of political and economic conditions on the development of education in the field of media and information literacy.
Gender and media
Gender is an essential part of the Palestinian media landscape, both in terms of female representation in newsrooms and the nature of media discourse itself. Palestinian media provides extensive coverage of women’s issues, but it does so within a highly complex socio-political context, where gender issues are intertwined with the occupation, war, and economic and social pressures. This coverage is not uniform; it ranges from highlighting women’s role in the struggle and society to focusing on their daily suffering and offering limited criticism of social structures. In addition to issues related to the occupation, Palestinian media covers women’s issues related to domestic violence, discrimination in the labour market, early marriage, and women’s role in politics and society. However, these issues often recede in the face of political coverage. That said, some media coverage is influenced by stereotypes that often portray women as victims or secondary figures, rather than highlighting their essential role in political and social life.
Recent years have witnessed the rise of Palestinian media initiatives that seek to promote gender equality, whether through producing content that sheds light on women’s issues or by training and empowering young female journalists in the digital sphere. Social media platforms have also played a significant role in giving women a wider space to express their opinions and challenge traditional narratives. However, achieving a more gender-sensitive Palestinian media remains contingent on institutional reforms, the development of equitable editorial policies, and a deeper cultural shift within society.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Environmental issues in Palestine generally receive little media attention unless directly linked to the conflict with Israel. For example, there have been numerous reports on the environmental impacts of chemical waste from West Bank settlements that flows into Palestinian agricultural land, or on the effects of Israel’s construction of the separation wall in the West Bank. During the war in Gaza, some reports were published on the war’s environmental impacts. This lack of attention to environmental issues stems from the Palestinian media’s preoccupation with rapidly unfolding events and its focus on breaking news and issues related to the occupation. Discussions of environmental issues in the media are usually conducted by specialized civil society organizations such as the Applied Research Institute or the Ma’an Development Centre, as well as by the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority. In addition, there were some initiatives. In 2022, the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority and the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University launched a training program for young environmental journalists, implemented by Revolve Mediterraneo with funding from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, whereby 25 male and female students from 6 universities in the West Bank and Gaza participated: Palestine, Birzeit, Al-Aqsa, Hebron, An-Najah, and Al-Quds Open University. They presented visual and written journalistic materials addressing various environmental topics.
Coverage of the migration topic
Coverage of migration and displacement in Palestinian media is directly linked to the political, social, and economic realities experienced by Palestinians both within Palestine and in the diaspora. The issue of migration is an integral part of the conflict itself. Therefore, Palestinian media addresses it on three levels: internal displacement resulting from wars and Israeli aggression; external migration due to economic and political circumstances; and historical displacement since 1948, along with its associated narratives and rights.
Palestinian media focuses on the humanitarian dimension, highlighting the suffering of displaced families, the loss of homes and livelihoods, homelessness, and giving particular attention to children, women, and the elderly. On the political front, it emphasizes the connection between displacement and Israeli policies such as forced displacement and collective punishment. It also highlights the role of the international community and human rights organizations, presenting the Palestinian narrative in contrast to the Israeli narrative. On the economic and social front, Palestinian media focuses on issues such as poverty, the labour market, unemployment, and the lack of services and infrastructure in refugee camps, whether in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or in the Palestinian diaspora, especially the situation of refugees in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Sometimes, the Palestinian media highlights stories of success and integration in Europe, America, Canada and other countries of refuge.
AI development and use in the media sector
Palestine is still moving slowly towards using AI in media, due to the lack of a clear strategy for ethical guidelines, and the shortage of qualified personnel and expertise in AI-related technologies. Among the initiatives seeking to introduce AI into newsrooms is a study prepared by the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, funded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), entitled “How to Integrate Artificial Intelligence into Journalism and Media Education?”, given its growing necessity in the media industry.
In October 2025, the World Association of Publishers and News Makers (WAN IFRA) held a meeting with editors-in-chief of Palestinian media outlets to discuss ways to integrate AI into newsrooms, ensuring it serves as a partner rather than a replacement for journalists.
While content production with the use of AI may be relatively little, Palestinian media institutions use AI in several areas, such as big data analysis, deepfake detection, and faster translation and content production. It also helps monitoring global media discourse on the Palestinian issue and understanding its trends. However, the greatest challenge remains the potential bias in algorithms and the lack of technical resources, making the development of independent Palestinian tools a crucial step in strengthening the presence of the Palestinian narrative in the digital sphere.
Freedom of the press is enshrined in Article 15 of the Jordanian Constitution. The sector is mainly regulated by the Press and Publications Act and the Broadcasting Act, which covers electronic publications. In the last 10 years, several specific laws have also encroached on the freedom of the press: the law against terrorism, the law on cybercrime (2018)… Today, there are more than 20 laws and regulations governing the exercise of freedom of the press.
The law on the press and publications of 1993 and 1998The law, which has been amended several times, has allowed the emergence of many private media, granted the protection of sources and established the basis for access to public information. But it has also provided for the establishment of a license for any media, printing, bookstore or advertising agency or translation, polling institute or even research centers. In other words, the authorization is limited.
The Jordanian government adopted a National Media Strategy in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring, a strategy designed to establish “an independent Jordanian media rooted in the principles of freedom, pluralism and professionalism ». Yet, shortly thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, two amendments to the press law forced nearly 290 news sites to close because they could not meet the new regulatory requirements for licensing by the Media Commission.
Liberalized twenty years ago in 2002 with the end of the Jordanian Radio Television (JRTV) monopoly, the audiovisual sector is controlled. The broadcast media law combined the regulators (one for print and one for broadcast) into one, the Jordan Media Commission (JMC). The Commission is fully funded by the state (€1.5 million in 2019) and its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for validating – or not – the Commission’s decisions to award broadcasting licenses to radio and television stations. Less exposed, the Commission de Régulation des Télécoms has been determining the available frequencies and the conditions for broadcasting telecom services since 1995. 39 radio stations have a license, 20 of which are governmental (and 6 for universities).
The Ministry of Information has been replaced by government spokespersons who exercise supervision over the sector and the state media, alongside the Ministries of Culture, Information Technology and Finance.
As for access to information, the absence of an independent Access to Information Commission makes it impossible to obtain information on a regular basis or to seek redress when obstacles arise. In addition, the practice of transparency is selective: for example, the police reserve the exclusivity of service information on the traffic situation for their own radio station.
Jordanians are moving away from their traditional media (television and newspapers) and are getting most of their information from social networks: 88% were connected in 2018 compared to 23% in 2012. According to IPSOS (IPSOS 2018 result cited in USAID’s JORDAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT published in June 2021), during the same period (between 2012 and 2018), television consumption dropped from 93% to 80%, radio from 30% to 26%, and daily newspapers from 18% to 6% (with precipitous drops in official newspapers – Al Rai, Al Ghad and Ad Dustour).
The English-language press, which has an extremely marginal audience among the Jordanian population, is generally freer than the Arabic-language press, although monotonous and uniform; it is aimed at a mainly foreign audience, diplomats or members of NGOs.
Among the commercial media, the private television Ro’yaand its website (http://roya.tv) dominate the advertising market. Ro’ya and some private radio stations like Masaj, Dahab and Fun or again Rotana FM, share the audience with Al Ghad and the website in english Jordan News launched in 2021.
Some professional media with an information mission exist under the status of private companies without being commercial: the site 7iber, the radio Al Balad and his website AmmanNet which tries to federate local and community radio stations with an exchange of information programs, or the webTv Aramram which only broadcasts on social networks.
Jordan’s official media actors are organised in the Jordan Press Association (JPA), a single Jordanian affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists.
There is no organization for independent or unofficial media in Jordan. The community radios have grouped together in a federation that brings together the radios Al Balad, Voice of Karak, New Maan radio, Yarmouk FM and Farah Al-Nas, among others, were beneficiaries of the European support programme for Jordanian media in 2015.The Community Media Network joined the coalition of 15 Jordanian civil society organisations HIMAM.
The Jordanian market cannot absorb the large number of graduates from the seven main journalism training institutions every year. Initiated in 1982 at the public university of Yarmouk in Irbid, these trainings remain mainly theoretical and are given by professors who have never been journalists and who have no direct link with the media. The practice of journalism, the concrete phase of the profession, is therefore not part of the training.
Only two of seven universities offer electronic media courses. Six universities have radio and television production studios, and several publish student newspapers. The offer is complemented by master’s degree courses offered by the Jordan Media Institute (JMI) and by the training centers of the national television, the official news agency and the private television Ro’ya.
An independent commission on secularization education is working on the preparation of an educational curriculum to include media literacy, the result of the analysis made by UNESCO in 2015. A national strategy has been adopted until 2023, with training for primary, secondary and university teachers under the auspices of the Jordan Media Institute (JMI).
Freedom of the press is enshrined in Article 15 of the Jordanian Constitution. The sector is mainly regulated by the Press and Publications Act and the Broadcasting Act, which covers electronic publications. In the last 10 years, several specific laws have also encroached on the freedom of the press: the law against terrorism, the law on cybercrime (2018)… Today, there are more than 20 laws and regulations governing the exercise of freedom of the press.
The law on the press and publications of 1993 and 1998The law, which has been amended several times, has allowed the emergence of many private media, granted the protection of sources and established the basis for access to public information. But it has also provided for the establishment of a license for any media, printing, bookstore or advertising agency or translation, polling institute or even research centers. In other words, the authorization is limited.
The Jordanian government adopted a National Media Strategy in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring, a strategy designed to establish “an independent Jordanian media rooted in the principles of freedom, pluralism and professionalism ». Yet, shortly thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, two amendments to the press law forced nearly 290 news sites to close because they could not meet the new regulatory requirements for licensing by the Media Commission.
Liberalized twenty years ago in 2002 with the end of the Jordanian Radio Television (JRTV) monopoly, the audiovisual sector is controlled. The broadcast media law combined the regulators (one for print and one for broadcast) into one, the Jordan Media Commission (JMC). The Commission is fully funded by the state (€1.5 million in 2019) and its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for validating – or not – the Commission’s decisions to award broadcasting licenses to radio and television stations. Less exposed, the Commission de Régulation des Télécoms has been determining the available frequencies and the conditions for broadcasting telecom services since 1995. 39 radio stations have a license, 20 of which are governmental (and 6 for universities).
The Ministry of Information has been replaced by government spokespersons who exercise supervision over the sector and the state media, alongside the Ministries of Culture, Information Technology and Finance.
As for access to information, the absence of an independent Access to Information Commission makes it impossible to obtain information on a regular basis or to seek redress when obstacles arise. In addition, the practice of transparency is selective: for example, the police reserve the exclusivity of service information on the traffic situation for their own radio station.
Jordanians are moving away from their traditional media (television and newspapers) and are getting most of their information from social networks: 88% were connected in 2018 compared to 23% in 2012. According to IPSOS (IPSOS 2018 result cited in USAID’s JORDAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT published in June 2021), during the same period (between 2012 and 2018), television consumption dropped from 93% to 80%, radio from 30% to 26%, and daily newspapers from 18% to 6% (with precipitous drops in official newspapers – Al Rai, Al Ghad and Ad Dustour).
The English-language press, which has an extremely marginal audience among the Jordanian population, is generally freer than the Arabic-language press, although monotonous and uniform; it is aimed at a mainly foreign audience, diplomats or members of NGOs.
Among the commercial media, the private television Ro’yaand its website (http://roya.tv) dominate the advertising market. Ro’ya and some private radio stations like Masaj, Dahab and Fun or again Rotana FM, share the audience with Al Ghad and the website in english Jordan News launched in 2021.
Some professional media with an information mission exist under the status of private companies without being commercial: the site 7iber, the radio Al Balad and his website AmmanNet which tries to federate local and community radio stations with an exchange of information programs, or the webTv Aramram which only broadcasts on social networks.
Jordan’s official media actors are organised in the Jordan Press Association (JPA), a single Jordanian affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists.
There is no organization for independent or unofficial media in Jordan. The community radios have grouped together in a federation that brings together the radios Al Balad, Voice of Karak, New Maan radio, Yarmouk FM and Farah Al-Nas, among others, were beneficiaries of the European support programme for Jordanian media in 2015.The Community Media Network joined the coalition of 15 Jordanian civil society organisations HIMAM.
The Jordanian market cannot absorb the large number of graduates from the seven main journalism training institutions every year. Initiated in 1982 at the public university of Yarmouk in Irbid, these trainings remain mainly theoretical and are given by professors who have never been journalists and who have no direct link with the media. The practice of journalism, the concrete phase of the profession, is therefore not part of the training.
Only two of seven universities offer electronic media courses. Six universities have radio and television production studios, and several publish student newspapers. The offer is complemented by master’s degree courses offered by the Jordan Media Institute (JMI) and by the training centers of the national television, the official news agency and the private television Ro’ya.
An independent commission on secularization education is working on the preparation of an educational curriculum to include media literacy, the result of the analysis made by UNESCO in 2015. A national strategy has been adopted until 2023, with training for primary, secondary and university teachers under the auspices of the Jordan Media Institute (JMI).
Lebanon
Lebanon is governed by a sectarian system that influences all aspects of social and political life, including the media sector. As a result, the country’s competing sectarian forces have utilized various means of telecommunications to communicate with their constituents, invest in journalists, writers, intellectuals, and producers, and most importantly, shape and contribute to the public debate. This contradictory and “plural” reality of the system has allowed for an expanding margin of freedom of expression relative to its authoritarian neighbors in the region. Nevertheless, the active interventions of different political parties in the media sphere have led to issues of editorial independence and financial sustainability, particularly as different outlets have relied on political funding to sustain themselves.
Given the platform provided by these outlets, such practices and conditions interact with and reinforce a variety of societal taboos in the country. These include institutional taboos (e.g., insulting the President), religious taboos, and taboos related to gender and sexuality. Despite the plurality of the Lebanese media, the long-lasting monopoly of different political forces in the country on the media sector has allowed for an entrenched series of local despots, utilizing propaganda to justify a plethora of methods to repress oppositional actors and marginalized groups. In fact, since 2017, the number of violations against journalists, activists, and influencers in the country has dramatically increased.
In Lebanon, the media is officially governed by a system of laws that concern different sectors. Given the increasing presence and influence of news sites and alternative outlets in the online sphere, a new media law which seeks to regulate these new means of communications has also been under discussion for over a decade. Also, past studies which concern the ways in which governments have intervened in the sector have indicated that the execution of these laws and procedures has been inconsistent. Currently, the key and most relevant texts include the 1962 Press Law, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law (Law 382), the 1994 Satellite Broadcast Law (Law 531), and the 1947 Cinema Law.
The issue of pluralism in Lebanon is closely related to the country’s system. The consociational system is prevalent in different aspects of social, political, and economic life. Therefore, Lebanon does not follow the model of state-controlled monopolistic media outlets that are typically found in neighboring authoritarian Arab regimes. This has allowed for a certain degree of pluralism and cultural richness, leading to a rise in the number of newspapers, magazines, and cultural centers historically.
However, state-imposed laws and regulations have put restrictions on launching these outlets. Journalists have to navigate through repressive policies and bureaucratic avenues to operate in the media sector.
Today, social media has become the primary platform for communication in Lebanon, with a vast majority of the population using it. It has made access to information faster, and the ability to create and circulate content is more accessible to new media entrepreneurs. The availability of social media has expanded the country’s pluralistic capacity.
The question of media access also depends on the financial capacity of individuals to start new ventures, especially when the economic and security situation has not been favorable to media projects in recent years.
The absence of monopolistic state ownership does not suggest that problematic and exclusivist forms of ownership which reinforce political intervention do not exist in the sector. In fact, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) project (launched by the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders, then in partnership with the Global Media Registry) clearly demonstrates ways in which members of the influential elite and political class in the country have held shares in a variety of media outlets in the pursuit of influencing coverage and promoting the pertinent interests and frames which suit them.
Censorship in Lebanon occurs in various forms, with two significant categories being cultural censorship and political censorship. The former includes but is not restricted to banning forms of “sexual” expression and a variety of societal taboos that emerge in films, concerts, book events, and other artistic or social occasions. The latter, which is more contentious, ranges from suppressing implicit criticisms targeting key figureheads in the Lebanese political system to prohibiting “offensive” or disruptive imagery regarding the legitimacy of neighboring regimes, and initiating calls to no-platform films whose characters or plot can be linked to Israel, legally classified as an enemy country.
In the Lebanese context, while explicit violations of the principle of free speech are not uncommon, self-censorship is a much more pervasive sentiment. Through acts of intimidation and harassment, along with journalists’ increasing financial dependence on their outlets and various other political considerations, the country’s primary political forces and security institutions can impose indirect restrictions on free speech.
Despite being understudied in the Lebanese context, misinformation is a particular problem that regularly surfaces in the media sphere, especially on the much less regulated social media domain. In Lebanon, platforms such as Facebook or Twitter have their pages flooded by articles and posts riddled with fake news, which is circulated either deliberately for political purposes or unintentionally as supportive constituents are unable to isolate fake news and produce reliable information.
According to the “Access to Information” law (Law No.28) passed in 2017 (the first legal obligation for the state to publish financial and administrative documents originating from different ministries and judicial departments), and later amended in July 2021, journalists have the written right to request any document that concerns the public interest. However, regardless of these formal constraints, the actual bureaucratic process heavily relies on who is requesting the document and how political actors anticipate they will be utilized.
In Lebanon, he vast majority of press associations and syndicates are closely linked to the country’s primary sectarian political parties and figures. Due to this consistent lack of protection, journalists from different regions and domains in the country created the Alternative Media Syndicate in 2019.
All studies, indicators, and reports suggest that the basic security of journalists, media workers, reporters, researchers, and writers is being threatened. There are several dimensions to this quandary: (1) the number of direct, low-level violations constituting physical repression that have occurred in the past few years or so, (2) the continuous cycle of assassinations targeting journalists and writers with similar political patterns, and (3) character assassinations that revolve around the usage of social media to construct narratives aimed at dehumanizing specific persons and damaging their reputation, further providing the context for potential physical violence.
While the country’s economic crisis has made the status of journalists very difficult, the hardships faced by media workers preceded this crisis. This has its roots in the application of the country’s labor law, the reliance of various outlets on informal oral contracts, and the lack of reliable benefits packages, such as health insurance and productive device coverage. A study conducted by Samir Kassir Foundation raises important and crucial insights about the nature of labor rights within the media sector.
When assessing the tone, rhetoric, working conditions, and orientation in traditional media, the treatment of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community presents a clear issue in the way these matters are approached in the public domain. This treatment concerns not only the role and behavior of senior management but also how misogynistic, sexist, and homophobic discourse permeates the media sphere.
Women, the LGBTQ+ community, migrant workers, and refugees are just a few examples of marginalized groups who consistently receive discriminatory and hate speech on the online social media platforms of different television stations and newspaper outlets. Recurrent monthly monitoring-based research conducted by the Samir Kassir Foundation shows that gendered comments and slurs are an instrumental component of this hate speech.
Media training in Lebanon can be divided into two categories: training offered by international organizations, official institutions, and non-government organizations in the country, and formal academic training offered in select universities with a comprehensive curriculum. Any assessment of strengths and weaknesses should consider the progress and performance of both domains. Regarding formal academic training, there is a consensus among stakeholders that journalism and media studies in Lebanon “urgently needed more qualified faculty, locally oriented research, and relevant academic and technical resources”.
In Lebanon, a comprehensive media literacy curriculum was implemented in the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University. A product of the efforts of various foundations and international institutes and initiatives, such as the Salzburg Academy for Media and Global Change and the Open Society Foundations, the curriculum underwent a number of adaptations which made the training process more professional and implementable, but also reduced the foundational and theoretical rigor of the material. Due to the lack of adequate state preparation or intervention in these matters, alongside the fact that the question of media literacy has been confined to the programs of elite educational institutions, civil society initiatives, workshops, and programs have acted as an alternative field to discuss this issue.
Lebanon
Lebanon is governed by a sectarian system that influences all aspects of social and political life, including the media sector. As a result, the country’s competing sectarian forces have utilized various means of telecommunications to communicate with their constituents, invest in journalists, writers, intellectuals, and producers, and most importantly, shape and contribute to the public debate. This contradictory and “plural” reality of the system has allowed for an expanding margin of freedom of expression relative to its authoritarian neighbors in the region. Nevertheless, the active interventions of different political parties in the media sphere have led to issues of editorial independence and financial sustainability, particularly as different outlets have relied on political funding to sustain themselves.
Given the platform provided by these outlets, such practices and conditions interact with and reinforce a variety of societal taboos in the country. These include institutional taboos (e.g., insulting the President), religious taboos, and taboos related to gender and sexuality. Despite the plurality of the Lebanese media, the long-lasting monopoly of different political forces in the country on the media sector has allowed for an entrenched series of local despots, utilizing propaganda to justify a plethora of methods to repress oppositional actors and marginalized groups. In fact, since 2017, the number of violations against journalists, activists, and influencers in the country has dramatically increased.
In Lebanon, the media is officially governed by a system of laws that concern different sectors. Given the increasing presence and influence of news sites and alternative outlets in the online sphere, a new media law which seeks to regulate these new means of communications has also been under discussion for over a decade. Also, past studies which concern the ways in which governments have intervened in the sector have indicated that the execution of these laws and procedures has been inconsistent. Currently, the key and most relevant texts include the 1962 Press Law, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law (Law 382), the 1994 Satellite Broadcast Law (Law 531), and the 1947 Cinema Law.
The issue of pluralism in Lebanon is closely related to the country’s system. The consociational system is prevalent in different aspects of social, political, and economic life. Therefore, Lebanon does not follow the model of state-controlled monopolistic media outlets that are typically found in neighboring authoritarian Arab regimes. This has allowed for a certain degree of pluralism and cultural richness, leading to a rise in the number of newspapers, magazines, and cultural centers historically.
However, state-imposed laws and regulations have put restrictions on launching these outlets. Journalists have to navigate through repressive policies and bureaucratic avenues to operate in the media sector.
Today, social media has become the primary platform for communication in Lebanon, with a vast majority of the population using it. It has made access to information faster, and the ability to create and circulate content is more accessible to new media entrepreneurs. The availability of social media has expanded the country’s pluralistic capacity.
The question of media access also depends on the financial capacity of individuals to start new ventures, especially when the economic and security situation has not been favorable to media projects in recent years.
The absence of monopolistic state ownership does not suggest that problematic and exclusivist forms of ownership which reinforce political intervention do not exist in the sector. In fact, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) project (launched by the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders, then in partnership with the Global Media Registry) clearly demonstrates ways in which members of the influential elite and political class in the country have held shares in a variety of media outlets in the pursuit of influencing coverage and promoting the pertinent interests and frames which suit them.
Censorship in Lebanon occurs in various forms, with two significant categories being cultural censorship and political censorship. The former includes but is not restricted to banning forms of “sexual” expression and a variety of societal taboos that emerge in films, concerts, book events, and other artistic or social occasions. The latter, which is more contentious, ranges from suppressing implicit criticisms targeting key figureheads in the Lebanese political system to prohibiting “offensive” or disruptive imagery regarding the legitimacy of neighboring regimes, and initiating calls to no-platform films whose characters or plot can be linked to Israel, legally classified as an enemy country.
In the Lebanese context, while explicit violations of the principle of free speech are not uncommon, self-censorship is a much more pervasive sentiment. Through acts of intimidation and harassment, along with journalists’ increasing financial dependence on their outlets and various other political considerations, the country’s primary political forces and security institutions can impose indirect restrictions on free speech.
Despite being understudied in the Lebanese context, misinformation is a particular problem that regularly surfaces in the media sphere, especially on the much less regulated social media domain. In Lebanon, platforms such as Facebook or Twitter have their pages flooded by articles and posts riddled with fake news, which is circulated either deliberately for political purposes or unintentionally as supportive constituents are unable to isolate fake news and produce reliable information.
According to the “Access to Information” law (Law No.28) passed in 2017 (the first legal obligation for the state to publish financial and administrative documents originating from different ministries and judicial departments), and later amended in July 2021, journalists have the written right to request any document that concerns the public interest. However, regardless of these formal constraints, the actual bureaucratic process heavily relies on who is requesting the document and how political actors anticipate they will be utilized.
In Lebanon, he vast majority of press associations and syndicates are closely linked to the country’s primary sectarian political parties and figures. Due to this consistent lack of protection, journalists from different regions and domains in the country created the Alternative Media Syndicate in 2019.
All studies, indicators, and reports suggest that the basic security of journalists, media workers, reporters, researchers, and writers is being threatened. There are several dimensions to this quandary: (1) the number of direct, low-level violations constituting physical repression that have occurred in the past few years or so, (2) the continuous cycle of assassinations targeting journalists and writers with similar political patterns, and (3) character assassinations that revolve around the usage of social media to construct narratives aimed at dehumanizing specific persons and damaging their reputation, further providing the context for potential physical violence.
While the country’s economic crisis has made the status of journalists very difficult, the hardships faced by media workers preceded this crisis. This has its roots in the application of the country’s labor law, the reliance of various outlets on informal oral contracts, and the lack of reliable benefits packages, such as health insurance and productive device coverage. A study conducted by Samir Kassir Foundation raises important and crucial insights about the nature of labor rights within the media sector.
When assessing the tone, rhetoric, working conditions, and orientation in traditional media, the treatment of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community presents a clear issue in the way these matters are approached in the public domain. This treatment concerns not only the role and behavior of senior management but also how misogynistic, sexist, and homophobic discourse permeates the media sphere.
Women, the LGBTQ+ community, migrant workers, and refugees are just a few examples of marginalized groups who consistently receive discriminatory and hate speech on the online social media platforms of different television stations and newspaper outlets. Recurrent monthly monitoring-based research conducted by the Samir Kassir Foundation shows that gendered comments and slurs are an instrumental component of this hate speech.
Media training in Lebanon can be divided into two categories: training offered by international organizations, official institutions, and non-government organizations in the country, and formal academic training offered in select universities with a comprehensive curriculum. Any assessment of strengths and weaknesses should consider the progress and performance of both domains. Regarding formal academic training, there is a consensus among stakeholders that journalism and media studies in Lebanon “urgently needed more qualified faculty, locally oriented research, and relevant academic and technical resources”.
In Lebanon, a comprehensive media literacy curriculum was implemented in the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University. A product of the efforts of various foundations and international institutes and initiatives, such as the Salzburg Academy for Media and Global Change and the Open Society Foundations, the curriculum underwent a number of adaptations which made the training process more professional and implementable, but also reduced the foundational and theoretical rigor of the material. Due to the lack of adequate state preparation or intervention in these matters, alongside the fact that the question of media literacy has been confined to the programs of elite educational institutions, civil society initiatives, workshops, and programs have acted as an alternative field to discuss this issue.
Syria
Reporters Without Borders Index: 177 / 180 (2025)
Freedom House Index: 5 / 100 – Not Free (2025)
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): 12 / 100 (2024)
Freedom of Expression
Since overthrowing the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Syria has experienced unprecedented freedom of expression, reflected in rare progress on both Reporters Without Borders’ Freedom of the Press Index (2025) and Freedom House’s Freedom Index (2025). According to the Ministry of Information (MoI), 19,200 work permits have been issued to local journalists over the past year. However, this newfound freedom is not protected by laws or well-established institutions, including independent syndicates.
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
Apart from the Constitutional Declaration (Temporary Constitution) of March 13, 2025, which states that “The State guarantees freedom of opinion, expression, information, publication, and the press” (Article 13), Syrian media remains, at least in theory, governed by largely repressive laws from the Assad regime era since the new parliament has not yet convened.
Pluralism
Syrian media pluralism emerged from the 2011 revolution, enabling the rise of independent outlets, including those in non-Arabic languages like Kurdish. These outlets operated in exile and in regions outside the control of the former Assad regime. Currently, it is safe to say that this pluralism still persists. Since the collapse of the previous regime, 636 registration requests have been submitted by media outlets.
Censorship & self-censorship
The collapse of the Assad regime has, consequently, led to the disappearance of many previous taboos and red lines, especially related to the president, his family, his inner circle, as well as the military, security forces, ethnic issues, and the economic situation. However, the ambiguity surrounding laws and high social tensions compel journalists to practice self-censorship. For example, both local and foreign journalists have expressed fears of being denied a visa or access to officials for criticizing the government. Additionally, journalists worry about facing physical and online threats from the public because of their work.
Disinformation and Misinformation
Since the 2011 revolution, news related to Syria has become a battleground for misinformation. This situation has worsened with the collapse of the Assad regime, as more organized misinformation campaigns—sponsored and promoted regionally—seek to delegitimize the new Syrian government and, more importantly, to incite sectarian and ethnic hostility and violence among Syrians. In response, fact-checking platforms such as Verify-Sy, true_platform, Fareq, and Radar have been established. Many outlets also collaborate with specialized organizations to verify their reports before publishing. Furthermore, the MoI has launched an initiative to develop a code of conduct, including 16 workshops across different governorates, attended by 600 journalists.
Access to Information
Syria has never enacted a law guaranteeing the right to access information. Since the fall of the Assad regime, access to information has significantly improved, allowing journalists to work more freely within the country. However, access to officials remains limited, and Syrian journalists have voiced concerns and frustration about the preferential treatment given to foreign journalists or to Syrian journalists working for international media outlets and news agencies.
Journalists’ Security
Despite significant changes since December 2024, Syrian journalists still face serious threats. According to the France-based Syrian Journalists Association (SJA), three journalists were temporarily arrested by government forces in June 2025. Additionally, the new government’s reactivation of Cybercrime Law No. 20 of 2022 poses a real threat to journalists in particular. This law has been criticized since its enactment for restricting freedom of expression through vague restrictions and harsh penalties, and there has reportedly been a sharp increase in legal complaints over online incitement and sectarianism.
However, the most serious threats originate outside government restrictions, due to security concerns, sectarian violence, longstanding grievances from the war, and regional instability. SJA has documented the killing of three journalists, while two others were injured in May, June, and July 2025, by known perpetrators. Additionally, several journalists survived Israeli attacks in southern Syria or were temporarily detained by Israeli forces.
Media Business Models
Due to decades of authoritarian rule, over ten years of war, and international sanctions, Syrian media now heavily rely—if not entirely—on external funding. While government-affiliated outlets receive official support, independent ones depend on international aid. Additionally, some media organizations are backed by regional powers, such as Syria TV, which is funded by Qatar. However, recent sanctions relief could allow revenue from advertising, especially on social media platforms and apps.
Independent Media: state and challenges
The resurgence of independent media has been one of the most significant outcomes of the 2011 revolution. The most notable among those still operating are Enab Baladi, Al Jumhuriya, Syria Direct, Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism (SIRAJ), Radio Rozana, and Radio Arta. Besides relying on international funds, all these outlets—except for Enab Baladi, which announced in March 2025 that it would resume printing and distribution in Damascus—are only available online, limiting their reach and influence. According to Datareportal, Syria’s internet penetration rate was 35.8 percent of the total population at the start of 2025. More importantly, these outlets face the challenge of navigating and impacting a highly polarized environment without sacrificing their objectivity and other professional standards.
Media literacy: development and challenges
The increase in misinformation and disinformation, along with regime change in Syria, has boosted interest in media literacy. The most recent and notable effort is the Syria Media Literacy Lab project. However, at this early stage, it still seems mainly focused on journalists.
Gender and media
The 2011 uprising marked a pivotal moment in Syrian women’s participation in the media. However, only 38% of them, according to a 2016 study, held “positions of responsibility.” With support from Syrian independent media and international donors, the past year has seen notable efforts to empower female journalists through various training programs and fellowships.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Although Syrian outlets specializing in environmental issues remain scarce or nonexistent, environmental concerns appear to be a priority for the existing media and journalists. This rapidly growing awareness and interest are driven by three main factors: the devastating environmental effects of the recent years’ war, the clear negative impacts of climate change—especially drought—and the increasing donor support for the media’s role in raising awareness and helping find solutions.
Coverage of the migrations topic
Due to years of war, Syria has become a source of refugees rather than a destination. However, there is an immigration-related issue involving Palestinian refugees who arrived in the country after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and have since had all civil rights (but not political rights), similar to their Syrian counterparts. In this context, Syrian media freely and favorably report on any situation involving Syrian-Palestinians.
AI development and use in the media sector
Three clear positions can be identified among Syrian media regarding the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Among exiled, independent outlets, some believe that AI distorts the essence of journalism. Conversely, others are convinced that wisely adopting this technology could improve the quality and reach of media. On the other side, due to numerous technical issues, mainly poor internet connectivity, local outlets seem unable to participate in such a debate.
Syria
Reporters Without Borders Index: 177 / 180 (2025)
Freedom House Index: 5 / 100 – Not Free (2025)
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): 12 / 100 (2024)
Freedom of Expression
Since overthrowing the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Syria has experienced unprecedented freedom of expression, reflected in rare progress on both Reporters Without Borders’ Freedom of the Press Index (2025) and Freedom House’s Freedom Index (2025). According to the Ministry of Information (MoI), 19,200 work permits have been issued to local journalists over the past year. However, this newfound freedom is not protected by laws or well-established institutions, including independent syndicates.
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
Apart from the Constitutional Declaration (Temporary Constitution) of March 13, 2025, which states that “The State guarantees freedom of opinion, expression, information, publication, and the press” (Article 13), Syrian media remains, at least in theory, governed by largely repressive laws from the Assad regime era since the new parliament has not yet convened.
Pluralism
Syrian media pluralism emerged from the 2011 revolution, enabling the rise of independent outlets, including those in non-Arabic languages like Kurdish. These outlets operated in exile and in regions outside the control of the former Assad regime. Currently, it is safe to say that this pluralism still persists. Since the collapse of the previous regime, 636 registration requests have been submitted by media outlets.
Censorship & self-censorship
The collapse of the Assad regime has, consequently, led to the disappearance of many previous taboos and red lines, especially related to the president, his family, his inner circle, as well as the military, security forces, ethnic issues, and the economic situation. However, the ambiguity surrounding laws and high social tensions compel journalists to practice self-censorship. For example, both local and foreign journalists have expressed fears of being denied a visa or access to officials for criticizing the government. Additionally, journalists worry about facing physical and online threats from the public because of their work.
Disinformation and Misinformation
Since the 2011 revolution, news related to Syria has become a battleground for misinformation. This situation has worsened with the collapse of the Assad regime, as more organized misinformation campaigns—sponsored and promoted regionally—seek to delegitimize the new Syrian government and, more importantly, to incite sectarian and ethnic hostility and violence among Syrians. In response, fact-checking platforms such as Verify-Sy, true_platform, Fareq, and Radar have been established. Many outlets also collaborate with specialized organizations to verify their reports before publishing. Furthermore, the MoI has launched an initiative to develop a code of conduct, including 16 workshops across different governorates, attended by 600 journalists.
Access to Information
Syria has never enacted a law guaranteeing the right to access information. Since the fall of the Assad regime, access to information has significantly improved, allowing journalists to work more freely within the country. However, access to officials remains limited, and Syrian journalists have voiced concerns and frustration about the preferential treatment given to foreign journalists or to Syrian journalists working for international media outlets and news agencies.
Journalists’ Security
Despite significant changes since December 2024, Syrian journalists still face serious threats. According to the France-based Syrian Journalists Association (SJA), three journalists were temporarily arrested by government forces in June 2025. Additionally, the new government’s reactivation of Cybercrime Law No. 20 of 2022 poses a real threat to journalists in particular. This law has been criticized since its enactment for restricting freedom of expression through vague restrictions and harsh penalties, and there has reportedly been a sharp increase in legal complaints over online incitement and sectarianism.
However, the most serious threats originate outside government restrictions, due to security concerns, sectarian violence, longstanding grievances from the war, and regional instability. SJA has documented the killing of three journalists, while two others were injured in May, June, and July 2025, by known perpetrators. Additionally, several journalists survived Israeli attacks in southern Syria or were temporarily detained by Israeli forces.
Media Business Models
Due to decades of authoritarian rule, over ten years of war, and international sanctions, Syrian media now heavily rely—if not entirely—on external funding. While government-affiliated outlets receive official support, independent ones depend on international aid. Additionally, some media organizations are backed by regional powers, such as Syria TV, which is funded by Qatar. However, recent sanctions relief could allow revenue from advertising, especially on social media platforms and apps.
Independent Media: state and challenges
The resurgence of independent media has been one of the most significant outcomes of the 2011 revolution. The most notable among those still operating are Enab Baladi, Al Jumhuriya, Syria Direct, Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism (SIRAJ), Radio Rozana, and Radio Arta. Besides relying on international funds, all these outlets—except for Enab Baladi, which announced in March 2025 that it would resume printing and distribution in Damascus—are only available online, limiting their reach and influence. According to Datareportal, Syria’s internet penetration rate was 35.8 percent of the total population at the start of 2025. More importantly, these outlets face the challenge of navigating and impacting a highly polarized environment without sacrificing their objectivity and other professional standards.
Media literacy: development and challenges
The increase in misinformation and disinformation, along with regime change in Syria, has boosted interest in media literacy. The most recent and notable effort is the Syria Media Literacy Lab project. However, at this early stage, it still seems mainly focused on journalists.
Gender and media
The 2011 uprising marked a pivotal moment in Syrian women’s participation in the media. However, only 38% of them, according to a 2016 study, held “positions of responsibility.” With support from Syrian independent media and international donors, the past year has seen notable efforts to empower female journalists through various training programs and fellowships.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Although Syrian outlets specializing in environmental issues remain scarce or nonexistent, environmental concerns appear to be a priority for the existing media and journalists. This rapidly growing awareness and interest are driven by three main factors: the devastating environmental effects of the recent years’ war, the clear negative impacts of climate change—especially drought—and the increasing donor support for the media’s role in raising awareness and helping find solutions.
Coverage of the migrations topic
Due to years of war, Syria has become a source of refugees rather than a destination. However, there is an immigration-related issue involving Palestinian refugees who arrived in the country after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and have since had all civil rights (but not political rights), similar to their Syrian counterparts. In this context, Syrian media freely and favorably report on any situation involving Syrian-Palestinians.
AI development and use in the media sector
Three clear positions can be identified among Syrian media regarding the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Among exiled, independent outlets, some believe that AI distorts the essence of journalism. Conversely, others are convinced that wisely adopting this technology could improve the quality and reach of media. On the other side, due to numerous technical issues, mainly poor internet connectivity, local outlets seem unable to participate in such a debate.
Yemen
Reporters Without Borders Index (latest): Yemen ranks among the lowest globally, placing 154th out of 180 countries.Freedom House Index
: Not Free, with a total score of 10 out of 100, including 1/40 for Political Rights and 9/60 for Civil Liberties.
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International): Yemen ranked 173th out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index.
Freedom of Expression
Since the outbreak of the conflict, freedom of expression in Yemen has sharply deteriorated, and journalistic work has become highly dangerous and effectively criminalized. In areas under Houthi control, hostile rhetoric portraying journalists as security threats has led to the near-total elimination of independent media and the transformation of these areas into closed media environments. In areas controlled by the internationally recognised government and allied forces, violations persist at varying levels, reflecting the absence of an effective national framework to protect freedom of expression.
Between 2015 and the end of 2025, more than 2,629 violations against journalists and media workers were documented, including 69 killings and 531 cases of arrest or enforced disappearance. 2025 stands out as one of the deadliest years, with 15 killings, the highest annual toll since the conflict began.
As of the end of 2025, 11 journalists remain detained due to their journalistic work, including 10 held by the Houthi group and one by the Southern Transitional Council in Aden, with some having spent nearly a decade in detention without fair trials.
Digital repression further compounds these violations. Since 2015, Yemen has experienced repeated internet shutdowns and blocking of news websites and communication platforms, particularly in Houthi-controlled areas. Given the population’s heavy reliance on a single internet provider, even partial shutdowns have nationwide impacts, undermining access to information and other fundamental rights such as education and health.
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
Yemen has witnessed no legislative updates to media or digital laws in recent years, including 2025, due to legislative paralysis caused by conflict and political fragmentation. In practice, de facto authorities—particularly the Houthi group—have imposed restrictive administrative and security measures, including compulsory licensing, unofficial fees, and intrusive requirements to disclose detailed information about funding sources and media staff. These measures are accompanied by explicit threats of closure, confiscation, and banning of non-compliant outlets, further shrinking the space for independent journalism.
Pluralism
Media pluralism in Yemen has undergone severe structural erosion. In Houthi-controlled areas, pluralism is virtually nonexistent, with most non-aligned outlets shut down, confiscated, or blocked. Journalists have been forced to leave the profession, work under pseudonyms, or operate through small, low-visibility platforms, resulting in a form of “hidden pluralism” with minimal public reach.
In areas under the internationally recognised government, a relatively wider but fragile margin of pluralism exists. However, most media outlets remain tied to political or partisan funding, while independent initiatives face security, financial, and professional pressures that limit their sustainability and capacity to represent diverse societal voices.
Censorship & Self-censorship
Censorship in Yemen is largely enforced through informal and coercive practices, particularly at checkpoints. According to the 2025 Media Freedom Observatory (Marsadak) report, 76.2% of journalists experienced searches of their electronic devices, and 51.5% reported direct financial extortion.
These practices have fuelled widespread self-censorship: 69% of journalists reported impaired field coverage, while 12% stopped travelling altogether due to fear of violations. Furthermore, 81.8% of affected journalists did not report abuses, citing fear of retaliation and lack of accountability mechanisms. In practice, the mere possession of journalistic content or professional communication has become a red line.
Disinformation and Misinformation
By 2025, journalists in Yemen operate in an information environment heavily saturated with disinformation and misinformation, which now accompanies daily coverage of political, military, economic, and humanitarian developments.
According to data from the Hakikah fact-checking platform, 169 verification pieces were published in 2025, including 125 classified as misleading content and 37 as false content. This reflects the scale and persistence of disinformation affecting both journalists and the public.
While several local initiatives work to counter disinformation ( 9 key initiatives ), efforts remain largely reactive—focused on debunking content after dissemination—rather than embedded in newsroom policies or pre-publication verification systems, primarily due to limited funding and institutional capacity. Nonetheless, targeted training initiatives have contributed to strengthening journalists’ verification skills.
Access to Information
Journalists in Yemen face severe obstacles in accessing official information despite the existence of the Law on the Right to Access Information (Law No. 13 of 2012). In practice, implementation is absent: information requests are routinely ignored or denied, government institutions lack functional information units, and no independent oversight body exists to enforce compliance. Conflict, institutional fragmentation, security risks, and entrenched secrecy further restrict access, forcing journalists to rely on informal sources and increasing professional and legal risks. The right to information is therefore legally recognised but effectively unenforced.
Journalists’ Security
Journalists face serious security threats, including threats, physical assaults, arbitrary detention, device confiscation, and forced disclosure of sources, particularly while moving between governorates or covering sensitive issues. These risks undermine personal safety, compromise source confidentiality, and reinforce self-censorship, severely restricting independent reporting.
Media Business Models
Mainstream media outlets largely rely on political or partisan funding from conflict parties or affiliated actors, limiting editorial independence and tying sustainability to political loyalty rather than professional performance. Independent media outlets operate under fragile models based on international grants, non-profit support, limited digital advertising, volunteer work, and, in many cases, operations from exile. These outlets adopt low-cost, flexible structures to survive, but long-term financial sustainability remains elusive.
Independent Media: State and Challenges
Independent media in Yemen consists of a small number of digital platforms with limited but highly engaged audiences, primarily on social media. While these outlets often enjoy higher credibility than partisan media, their reach and influence remain constrained by security threats, funding shortages, technical limitations, and ongoing censorship, compelling them to operate with minimal resources and staff.
Media Literacy
Yemen lacks an effective national policy on media and information literacy (MIL), and MIL is largely absent from formal education curricula. Existing efforts are driven by civil society and media organisations through ad hoc training and awareness initiatives. While important, these efforts remain fragmented and insufficient to address widespread exposure to disinformation.
Gender and Media
Female journalists face underrepresentation and compounded challenges, including security threats, social restrictions, and discrimination. Despite this, approximately 19 women-led media initiatives have emerged in recent years, contributing to more rights-based and professional coverage of gender-related issues. These initiatives achieve meaningful qualitative impact but remain constrained by financial insecurity, safety risks, and limited audience reach.
Coverage of Environmental Issues
Environmental issues receive limited and irregular media coverage, often framed around disasters such as floods, drought, and water scarcity rather than as structural development and human rights concerns. Nonetheless, specialised platforms—such as Holm Akhdar, Rif Yemen, Sadd… Climate, the Spirit of the Earth, and the Yemeni Renewable Energy Transition Network—have contributed to sustaining environmental reporting, albeit with limited overall impact relative to the scale of Yemen’s environmental challenges.
Coverage of Migrations
Journalistic coverage of migration and displacement is constrained by insecurity, restricted access to transit areas, lack of official data, and migrants’ fear of speaking out. Limited resources and specialised training further hinder in-depth reporting, resulting in coverage that is often episodic and crisis-driven rather than sustained and analytical.
AI Development and Use in the Media Sector
The use of artificial intelligence in Yemen’s media sector remains limited and gradual, primarily supporting fact-checking, content analysis, translation, transcription, and verification of visual materials. AI tools are used as supportive aids rather than editorial substitutes. Training initiatives have raised awareness of AI’s potential and risks, but broader adoption is constrained by weak digital infrastructure, limited funding, and the absence of ethical and professional regulatory frameworks.
