Country files
Morocco
Freedom of the press is guaranteed by Article 28 of the Moroccan Constitution. The sector is regulated by the Press and Publishing Law promulgated in 2016 Press Code. This law repealed the 2002 law, deemed restrictive. Several provisions have been amended. They include the abolition of prison sentences for press offenses, the recognition of freedom of access to information as a constitutional right, and the recognition of online media as media supports in their own right. Another positive adjustment was the creation of the National Press Council, charged with overseeing media performance and protecting the journalistic profession.
However, despite these reforms, the legislative environment relating to press freedom has its limits. While the new press code no longer provides for prison sentences, it retains most of the expressive offences provided for in the old 2002 code. These penalties, introduced by amendment to the penal code in July 2016, can lead a journalist to detention, particularly for writings or public speeches “undermining” the monarchy, the person of the King, Islam and the territorial integrity of Morocco.
In addition, other laws amended or enacted over the last six years have strengthened the judicial arsenal: the anti-terrorism law adopted after the Casablanca bombings in 2003 and the defamation law enacted in 2019, which provides for severe penalties to combat defamation on social networks.
In the field of audiovisual law, despite the end of the state monopoly in 2002 with the creation of the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA) and the various laws aimed at liberalizing the sector adopted in 2005, 2015 and 2016, the field remains tightly controlled. Indeed, although these laws have encouraged the emergence of new private radio stations – There are 19 private radio stations by 2022 – and public TV channels -9 channels-, the panorama of private TV channels has not expanded.
Finally, the law on access to information, which came into force in March 2020, lists thirteen categories of information that can be exempted from the right of access, such as national defense and privacy. However, the scope of these categories is not precisely defined, making access to information inequitable.
Television remains the most popular source of information in Morocco. However, the Moroccan audiovisual sector, whose main news channels are 2M and Al Aoula, is struggling to attract a large audience, who are more inclined to turn to pan-Arab satellite channels, particularly Qatar’s Al Jazeera.
Behind the mass media, the Internet is just as widespread, especially among young Moroccans aged 18 to 35. 87% of them get their news via the Internet and social networks, where information is no longer produced solely by professional journalists, but also by citizen journalists, influencers, bloggers and content creators.
There is still no map to record the number of sites flooding the Moroccan web, with varying estimates fluctuating between 2,000 and 5,000.
Although the traditional press has entered the digital space, it is struggling to establish itself, outstripped by the overwhelming popularity of Arabic-language pure players. These media, many of which cover regional, national and international news, have succeeded in carving out a place for themselves in the media landscape, such as Hespress, which ranks first with 19.3 million daily visits, or ChoufTV, a Web TV with an editorial line focused on sensationalism, which registers over 18 million subscribers on its Facebook page and exceeds one billion views per month for all its videos on YouTube.
Radio’s highest penetration is in urban areas, with 55% of listeners nationwide. Mohamed VI du Saint Coran, a public radio station, remains the most listened-to radio station, followed by Med Radio, the leading commercial radio station. Its programs allow direct listener participation and focus mainly on entertainment and social issues. According to the regulatory body, there are a total of 35 stations, 16 state-owned and 19 privately-owned.
Finally, the print media, already confined to urban areas due to the country’s high illiteracy rate and weakened by a structural crisis over many years, has not withstood the impact of the health crisis.
Behind this apparent pluralism, the media landscape is marked by a high concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few private groups. The study “Radioscopie des propriétaires des médias au Maroc“, carried out in 2017 by the Moroccan news website Le Desk and the NGO Reporters sans frontières (RSF), highlighted a significant concentration of Moroccan media in the hands of a few companies and influential figures in the country’s political and economic life, as well as the Société nationale d’investissement, a holding company owned by the royal family.
The radio sector remains largely state-controlled, but ownership is more diversified, with the presence of small companies. Private radio stations have grown rapidly over the years, with a steadily increasing audience share. However, the coverage of political issues in these media remains very limited. On the whole, stations broadcast entertainment, music and economic topics.
Finally, Moroccan audiovisual law does not allow community radio stations to broadcast over the airwaves, the internet remains the only free media in Morocco able to bypass such restrictions. Numbering 69 community radio stations in 2015, there are now just 15 or so.
The practice of self-censorship is high in Morocco. Journalists deliberately avoid sensitive subjects or modify them for fear of reprisals. Moreover, self-censorship concerns not only political subjects, but also societal issues such as sexuality and religion. According to the Centre for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ), almost 80% of media professionals admit to practicing it, mainly for economic reasons. Censorship remains widespread, but is mainly indirect, through economic pressure.
The exponential growth of online media has exacerbated the lack of ethical rigor that has already been prevalent in some media for several years.
Access to information is often hampered by a lack of transparency and communication on the part of the authorities. Journalists often find it difficult to obtain information and carry out in-depth investigations due to the reluctance of government officials to divulge sensitive or embarrassing information. The legal framework relating to access to information remains insufficient, although Morocco adopted a law on freedom of access to information in 2018, which came into force in March 2019, this law is not often applied and has not ensured easy and transparent access to information, particularly for independent journalists and alternative media.
The pandemic has weakened an already fragile profession. Job losses were significant, with some fifty positions eliminated, in addition to the multiplication of industrial disputes and staff cuts ranging from 20% to 50% during the period of the health crisis.
The rise of online media has led to a significant increase in the number of journalists working in the digital press, who today represent 40% of the Moroccan journalist workforce, or 1,360 information professionals.
Despite legislative advances and policies to promote gender equality in Morocco, women remain under-represented in the media, where almost 72% of journalists are men. Faced with obstacles such as discrimination, harassment and gender prejudice, they also remain under-represented in management positions and decision-making bodies in the Moroccan media. They also have fewer opportunities to cover sensitive topics, which limits their ability to develop professionally… According to the CNP (National Press Council), only 259 of the 1336 journalists working in the digital sector and holding a press card are women (2021).
Independent media are often created and managed by journalists keen to disseminate free and diversified information. However, these media, which tend to focus on sensitive subjects and provide critical coverage of current events, have difficulty reaching a wide audience and lack the financial resources to develop.
Finally, in Morocco, journalism training is provided by some thirty university courses, including 4 private schools and one public school, the Institut Supérieur de l’Information et de la Communication, better known by its acronym ISIC (isic.ac.ma). Founded in 1969, this is the country’s oldest institution, offering courses in Arabic and French. On average, the school welcomes around a hundred new students every year.
As far as media education is concerned, apart from the awareness-raising actions carried out by UNESCO in Morocco since 2012, through “Media Literacy Week”, national players are still slow to give concrete expression to their commitments in this area, notably through the introduction of this subject into national education curricula. For the time being, there are no media education programs in Moroccan school curricula.
File available soon.
File available soon.
Libya
Since the begging of the Libyan civil war in 2014, journalists have become targets and the media weapons in the service of the warring factions. By becoming increasingly partisan, the media are perceived as stakeholders in the conflict.
Attacks on Libyan journalists are encouraged by the legal framework of the Gaddafi era, which has not been abolished, such as the 1972 press law, which provides for life imprisonment for the publication of news that could “damage the country’s reputation and the trust placed in it abroad”. New offences restricting freedom of expression and of the press were added by the authorities in power after 2011. Since 2018, the anti-terrorist agency, headed by an armed group, has had the power to censor “any information that could threaten the country’s security, the security of society or national security”.
Libya is a country where the majority of the population is Muslim and holds conservative values. The Media Ministry and social conventions prohibit the broadcasting of images or productions depicting the Prophet Mohamed and his companions.
Topics such as atheism, sexuality, gender minorities and feminist demands are sensitive and considered red lines not to be crossed by most media and public players. On the other hand, the question of women’s participation in political life is increasingly raised in the public arena. As in the rest of the world, women journalists are nevertheless prime targets for cyber harassment.
In terms of security, Libyan journalists have paid a heavy price in the civil wars that have followed one another since 2011. In the decade since the 2011 revolution, more than 30 journalists and bloggers have been killed in Libya, and in most cases the culprits have not been brought to justice. Since 2015, 247 journalists have been arrested or physically abused by military and paramilitary groups, according to Libya Platform.
Between May 2020 and May 2021, the Libyan Organization for independent Media (LOFIM) recorded violence against 54 journalists, 45% of them in Tripoli and 41% in Benghazi. They were victims of attacks, arrests, interrogations by security forces or telephone searches. In 2021 and 2022, LOFIM recorded 10 attacks, ranging from arrests to forced disappearances of journalists.
The implosion of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 led to the emergence of dozens of new media outlets, created by revolutionary groups and operating outside any form of regulation. Two years later, the parenthesis has closed and most of the media independent of the new authorities or armed groups have been attacked or closed down.
Despite the constitutional declaration guarantees freedom of the press, no decree protects its exercise. There is only a circular dated May 3, 2021, issued by the so-called Government of National Unity (GUN) prohibiting the arrest and detention of journalists. This government, formed in 2021 under the aegis of the UN, had pledged to restructure the bodies controlling the media. To date, no reforms have been undertaken. In Tripoli, a human rights council, attached to the government, has been created, but its actual activity remains opaque and unknown to the human rights defenders and independent journalists interviewed for this report.
Since 2014, a new legislative arsenal has targeted journalists. Insulting the authorities, state emblems and its flag are offenses punishable by imprisonment. The vague wording of these texts offers a broad interpretation to repressive authorities.
Journalists, bloggers and other media personnel are arrested and targeted by all sides, while judicial personnel are attacked to prevent the normal functioning of justice. Journalists are regularly arrested for not having work permits. In the Eastern part of Libya, several journalists have been prosecuted by military courts.
Libya
Depuis que la Libye s’est enfoncée dans la guerre civile en 2014, les journalistes sont devenus des cibles et les médias des armes au service des factions en conflit. En se montrant de plus en plus partisans, les médias sont perçus comme des parties prenantes du conflit.
Les attaques contre les journalistes libyens sont favorisées par le cadre légal de l’ère Kadhafi qui n’a pas été aboli, comme la loi sur la presse de 1972, qui prévoit des peines de prison à perpétuité en cas de publication de nouvelles pouvant « porter atteinte à la réputation du pays et la confiance qui lui est portée à l’étranger ». De nouveaux délits restreignant la liberté d’expression et de la presse ont été ajoutés par les autorités en place après 2011. L’agence anti-terroriste, chapeautée par un groupe armé, a le pouvoir, depuis 2018, de censurer « toute information pouvant menacer la sécurité du pays, la sécurité de la société ou la sécurité nationale ».
La Libye est un pays dont la majorité de la population est de confession musulmane et porte des valeurs conservatrices. Le ministère des médias et les conventions sociales interdisent la diffusion d’images ou productions qui montrent le prophète Mohamed et ses compagnons.
Les sujets sur l’athéisme, la sexualité, les minorités de genre, les revendications féministes sont sensibles et considérés comme des lignes rouges à ne pas franchir par la plupart des médias et acteurs publics. La question de la participation des femmes à la vie politique est en revanche un sujet de plus en plus évoqué dans l’espace public. Comme dans le reste du monde, les femmes journalistes sont néanmoins les cibles privilégiées de cyberharcèlement.Les journalistes ont payé un lourd tribu dans les guerres civiles qui se sont succédées depuis 2011. Dans la décennie qui a suivi la révolution de 2011, plus de 30 journalistes et blogueurs ont été tués en Libye et, dans la plupart des cas, les coupables n’ont pas été traduits en justice. Depuis 2015, 247 journalistes ont été arrêtés ou ont été victimes de violences physiques par des militaires et groupes paramilitaires selon Libya Platform.
Entre mai 2020 et mai 2021, la Libyan Organization for independent Media (LOFIM) a recensé des violences contre 54 journalistes dont 45% à Tripoli, 41% à Benghazi. Ils ont été victimes d’attaques, arrestations, interrogatoires par forces de sécurité ou fouilles de téléphone. En 2021 et 2022, LOFIM a recensé 10 attaques allant d’arrestations à des disparitions forcées de journalistes.
L’implosion du régime kadhafiste en 2011 a permis l’éclosion de dizaines de nouveaux médias, créés par des groupes révolutionnaires, hors de toute régulation. Deux ans plus tard, la parenthèse s’est refermée et la plupart des médias indépendants des nouvelles autorités ou groupes armées ont été attaqués ou fermés.
La déclaration constitutionnelle garantit la liberté de la presse mais aucun décret n’en protège l’exercice. Il existe seulement une circulaire datant du 3 mai 2021, émise par le gouvernement dit d’unité nationale (GUN) interdisant les arrestations et détentions de journalistes. Ce gouvernement formé en 2021, sous l’égide de l’ONU, s’était engagé à restructurer les organes contrôlant les médias. Aucune réforme n’a été engagé à ce jour. A Tripoli, un conseil des droits de l’Homme, rattaché au gouvernement, a été créé mais son activité réelle reste opaque et inconnue des défenseurs des droits humains et journalistes indépendants interviewés pour ce rapport.
Depuis 2014, un nouvel arsenal législatif cible les journalistes. Insulter les autorités, les emblèmes de l’Etat et son drapeau sont des délits passibles de prison. La formulation vague de ces textes offre une large interprétation aux autorités répressives.
Les journalistes, blogueurs et autres personnels de médias sont victimes d’arrestations et ciblés par toutes les parties, tandis que le personnel judiciaire est attaqué pour empêcher le fonctionnement normal de la justice. Les arrestations de journalistes au motif qu’ils ne possèdent pas de permis de travail sont régulières. A l’Est, plusieurs journalistes ont été poursuivis par des tribunaux militaires.
In 2020, the Libyan Organization For Independent Media (LOFIM), a leading NGO in Libya, counted 218 media outlets for the Libyan public, including 150 local radio stations and 22 TV channels, including those broadcasting from abroad. Around 50 local radio stations are said to have closed since the 2014 census, carried out by Legatum institute Libya Media wiki.
99% of Libyans own a satellite TV, and 76% of them watch it every day. Television is the main source of information, according to a 2015 study by BBC Media action. These statistics need to be put into perspective with the growing share of social media among Libyan Internet users. Facebook is the main platform used in Libya, ahead of Youtube and Twitter.
Until 2022, the media based in Libya and broadcasting from foreign countries (Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt) were divided in two, covering the two rival camps vying for control of power. In the West, public TV channels and media financed by Qatar and Turkey supported the Tripoli government’s line, while in the East, TV channels and news websites (funded by the United Arab Emirates) defended the opposing camp embodied by Marshal Haftar. This polarization has faded with the rapprochement between the two main leaders (Abdelhamid Dabaiba, the current Prime Minister, and Marshal Haftar) and between the regional powers involved in the Libyan conflict. Two Emirates-funded TV channels went off the air in 2022.
Today, the media landscape is largely controlled by the government in Tripoli. The media are under the authority of the Ministry of Communication and Political Affairs. Two separate Media Authorities continue to operate, maintaining a division between Tripoli (the capital, in the west) and Benghazi (in the east). In the east, the Libyan Authority holds the Libyan Radio and Television Authority. The public media have changed their names, but their governance remains similar to that of the Gaddafi era, with little or no change to their management teams. They are often divided geographically between East and West, following the political division of the country. In the west, the Jamahiriya Arab News Agency (JANA) has become the Libyan Arab News Agency, delivering government communications based in Tripoli. The Jana News Agency, in the east, is supported by Russia and takes a pro-Gaddafi stance.
There is no provision for media pluralism. The Libyan authorities have the power to authorize, dissolve or suspend the activities of associations and journalists, whether they work for local or international media. The authorities are exploiting the constitutional vacuum to continue Gaddafi’s repressive media regime. In July 2019, authorities in eastern Libya banned 11 satellite channels accused of operating without licenses, supporting terrorism and extremism, or threatening Libya’s social fabric.
Confidence in the Libyan media is low among the population due to their partisan bias and lack of transparency regarding their funding. According to several reports on the subject and journalists interviewed by Journalisme & Citoyenneté, the majority opinion is that all media follow an agenda dictated by the political interests of their owner (or main financial backer), who is himself affiliated to a particular camp. 82% of Libyans would like private media to declare the source of their income. A few independent media outlets have emerged since 2011, but are struggling to survive;
The spread of misinformation and hate speech is linked to the polarization of the media landscape, which makes it difficult to distinguish established facts from “false information” disseminated by one camp to discredit the other. The media on both sides mix verified information with unverified or even hateful information, confusing the public. The Internet and social networks are seen as secondary sources of information for verifying information given by television, but the level of mistrust towards them is very high. Three quarters of Libyans are in favor of the existence of a state-funded media covering the whole country.
Libyan journalists, citizens and analysts all report to the huge challenge of obtaining reliable, quantified and detailed information on Libyan news, regulations and national statistics. This situation is largely due to the legacy of the Gaddafi regime’s 40 years of propaganda, which set out to destroy intermediary bodies and producers of information competing with its ideology. Few independent polling organizations exist.
The law promoted by the Government of National Accord (GAN replaced in 2021 by GUN) on publications gives the Media Authority the absolute right to license print and online media, both public and private. This authority sometimes even goes beyond the conditions set by law to restrict access to these licenses. In 2016, the Ministry of Media (of the GAN) asked all media to provide it with their sources of income and internal audit as well as their broadcasting license.
Audiovisual media obtain their broadcasting licenses from the Public Institution for Radio and Television, which reports to the Prime Minister, or from the Media Authority. In both cases, the issuing of these licenses is discretionary. In eastern Libya, under the control of Khalifa Haftar’s forces, a similar body exists, with the same discretionary powers. According to NGOs, this opaque body answers directly to Commander Khalifa Haftar.
The Libyan Media Foundation created by the Government of National Accord in 2020, and widely criticized for its lack of independence, was abolished in June 2021. The public media are now placed under the authority of the Prime Minister, thus still not guaranteeing their independence.
The 2011 constitutional declaration stipulates (article 15) that the State guarantees the freedom to create political parties, associations and any other civil society organization. But there is no law governing the formation of trade unions and political organizations. A first journalists’ union was created in 2012, but has remained inactive to this day. In June 2022, a new independent union of Libyan journalists was formed. This new body appears to be more representative than the previous one, and is keen to defend press freedom.
At the same time, a dozen Libyan journalists’ organizations have formed an alliance in 2022 to defend press freedom, reform of the media sector and the adoption of a media regulation law supported by LOFIM.
Independent journalists have also created the Libyan Journalists Independent Syndicate, which works to identify attacks on journalists and advocate new regulations to protect press freedom.
Media and citizens alike point to the climate of insecurity and constant threats to journalists. They are aware that this is one of the main causes of misinformation. In a 2014 study, they estimate that if the media report events with credibility and balance, pointing the finger at armed groups responsible for exactions, they immediately become the target of violence.
The main obstacle to the development of media independent of political and military powers is the control exercised by the authorities, via the commission in particular, over civil society – itself controlled by the intelligence services. According to decree 286 of March 2019, all funds from abroad destined for associations are subject to its authorization. Any meetings with foreigners also require prior approval.
Professional and technical training for journalists is rare in Libya, despite the needs for it. Most media trainings are organized in Tunis, which excludes journalists who cannot travel to Tunisia, especially women for whom traveling alone is socially frowned upon. Yet half, if not the majority, of journalism students are women.
There are twelve public universities in Libya with media programs : University of Benghazi, Tripoli University, the Open University of Libya, Misrata University, the University of Zawia, Azzaytuna University, the Omar Mukhtar University in Bayda, Elmergib University, Sirte University, Tobrouk University, Ajdabia University and Sabha University.
Their program remains essentially theoretical, with no practical application, as the professors are not journalists or have never or rarely practiced journalism. The content of the curricula dates back to the Gaddafi era and has not been fundamentally revised.
File available soon.
Palestine
In both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, currently, there is no independent system for regulating broadcasting in Palestine, the authority to grant TV and radio licenses is entrusted to governmental bodies.
The outdated law, often originating from previous authorities, impose on journalists unwarranted restrictions, which are also defined in a vague manner and without clear definitions of scope. The current legislation treats libel and slander as criminal offenses that are punishable by imprisonment of up to three years.
There were different attempts to draft two media laws; the Higher Media Council Law, and the Audiovisual Law. However, all these attempts have failed so far. Alternatively, and at an incredible speed, a Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime was issued raising criticism among journalists as well as human rights organizations.
Although all laws guarantee freedom of expressions, however, there were cases in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of media outlets including websites that have been shut down or prohibited.
The security situation is high risk. Human rights organizations have recorded a high number of violations against media workers, including arbitrary arrests and detention, physical attacks and raids of media outlets. Journalists feel unsafe to publish about certain topics. Let alone, only few media outlets have produced written editorial godliness or codes of conduct, and so journalists do not have a reference guide on the editorial policy of the outlet they work in, which results on predicting what the policy is, thus leading to self-censorship.
Media development has rapidly grown over the years whereby television is the most popular, whether local or Pan -Arab. Radio comes second and press occupy the third place.
Almost all TV and radio stations, as well as newspapers have a website, additionally a number of online media outlets have been existing for several years. And since there is no regulatory system to regulate the work of online media, and despite the fact that websites are generally not officially censored, but there were few incidents when website were blocked or banned in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Social media has become increasingly important as a platform for Palestinians to access news and contribute their own footage and stories. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have been used.
The Palestinian Broadcast Corporation (PBC) is the public service broadcaster, controlled by the PA. The PBC broadcasts two channels, Palestine General and Palestine Live, and is in the process of launching a sports channel.
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip there are more than 40 privately owned television stations (including local TV channels) and an undetermined number of radio stations. There is also a strong satellite TV presence, with Al Jazeera, Jordanian TV and al-Arabiya being the most popular among the foreign broadcasters. Six satellite channels broadcast from Palestine: three from the West Bank (Palestine, Alfalasteenia and Mix); and three from the Gaza Strip (Hona AlQuds, Al-Aqsa and Al-Kitab)
Apart from law articles that prohibit certain actions, there is no policy of pre-censorship in Palestine. However, journalists in the West Bank and Gaza were subject to harassment after publication, and so authorities practice ‘post censorship’, which leads eventually to ‘self-censorship’. “Palestinian journalists know that they are being watched. As well the authorities “rely on a system of post censorship using means from socialization, harassment, economic sanctions, the revocation of licenses, jail terms against journalists to extreme torture and murder.”
Online censorship of Palestinian content, especially on social media has been witnessed. In the first half of 2022, at least 425 violations and acts of censorship against Palestinian content. According to Sada Social Centre, a Ramallah-based NGO, “the majority of violations against Palestinian content on social media vary from restricting posts and removing or suspending of individual accounts, notably when using terms associated with Israeli occupation, which are classified within the algorithm ban range.”
Although the Palestinian government has declared on several occasions that it is ready to proceed with approving the Right to Information Law according to approved legal bases, and with the existence of international agreements signed in this field as one of the Palestinian requirements, it has not yet been approved as a law.
The influence of social media, activists, and influencers is also great and wide on the work of journalists, which requires the establishment of controls and perhaps international and local laws and legislation, to determine the ethics of publishing through them, and to legalize misleading news and cybercrime in all its forms.
The issue of a syndicate that preserves the rights and defends journalists is among the most prominent issues demanded by journalists, away from political and partisan affiliations.
The Palestinian media in general is responsive to all gender-related programs and training. As well as gender mainstreaming. “The media illustrates gender issues without deep analytical meanings associated with them, and without understanding all the intricacies of gender mainstreaming. Rather, the media has been content with passing on concepts to the public, considering “gender issues” as a purely professional topic.” That said, women are still present in stereotypical topics and are portrayed as housewives, teachers, nurses, etc.
The increase in the number of female workers in the media field, and the increase in the demand of female students for media faculties in Palestinian universities, indicates the development of the participation of Palestinian women in making the media scene in Palestine. “Unofficial statistics indicate that 55% of the students of journalism and media faculties in Palestine are females. This heralds an increase in the percentage of female participation in media jobs in the future, which is currently estimated at 17%.”
Media organizations in Palestine are either affiliated with a political party, or been private and profit-oriented. That said, there are key factors that have an impact of the editorial independence of Palestinian media. First, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is considered one of the most important factors that impact the independence of media, as some media outlets are non-independent of the political affiliation (although hidden) of their owners or sponsors.
Similarly, almost every ordinary Palestinian has his/her political interest in the Palestinian-Palestinian conflict, and so, many of the journalists and outlets are not detached from their own political affiliation, even if trying their best to show independence.
To date, training continues to be an essential part of the media development environment in Palestine. Different international and local media development organizations have been involved in massive training at the beginning, including technical and editorial.
Birzeit University Media Development Center –offers academic programs leading to Bachelor of Arts degrees in Journalism and Radio, as well as professional diplomas and specialized short-term courses in TV, Radio and Print Journalism. As well, The Institute of Modern Media at Al-Quds University has three units: a) Al-Quds Educational Television; b) the Academic Media Department; and c) Community Services.
Al-Quds Open University (Media Production Center, aims to produce high quality audio/video educational material that assists students, based on the Open Education and Open Learning System. The Media Center at An-Najah University – which is the administrative and organizational umbrella under which a group of executive media, technical and cultural departments operate, including Voice of An-Najah (An-Najah Radio Station), An-Najah Educational TV and the Media Training Unit.
UNESCO in Palestine has been working with a number of stakeholders including the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education, the Government Information Office, and the Prime Minister’s Office, on introducing the concept of media literacy, media education curriculum to schools and universities based on the UNESCO Media and Information Literacy Policy Guidelines and Model (MIL).
The ‘scattered’ media literacy initiatives, do not reflect the reality of media literacy in Palestine. To this end, UNESCO Palestine is planning to launch a media literacy mapping project, to identify key players, initiatives, and introduce recommendations.
Palestine
In both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, currently, there is no independent system for regulating broadcasting in Palestine, the authority to grant TV and radio licenses is entrusted to governmental bodies.
The outdated law, often originating from previous authorities, impose on journalists unwarranted restrictions, which are also defined in a vague manner and without clear definitions of scope. The current legislation treats libel and slander as criminal offenses that are punishable by imprisonment of up to three years.
There were different attempts to draft two media laws; the Higher Media Council Law, and the Audiovisual Law. However, all these attempts have failed so far. Alternatively, and at an incredible speed, a Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime was issued raising criticism among journalists as well as human rights organizations.
Although all laws guarantee freedom of expressions, however, there were cases in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of media outlets including websites that have been shut down or prohibited.
The security situation is high risk. Human rights organizations have recorded a high number of violations against media workers, including arbitrary arrests and detention, physical attacks and raids of media outlets. Journalists feel unsafe to publish about certain topics. Let alone, only few media outlets have produced written editorial godliness or codes of conduct, and so journalists do not have a reference guide on the editorial policy of the outlet they work in, which results on predicting what the policy is, thus leading to self-censorship.
Media development has rapidly grown over the years whereby television is the most popular, whether local or Pan -Arab. Radio comes second and press occupy the third place.
Almost all TV and radio stations, as well as newspapers have a website, additionally a number of online media outlets have been existing for several years. And since there is no regulatory system to regulate the work of online media, and despite the fact that websites are generally not officially censored, but there were few incidents when website were blocked or banned in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Social media has become increasingly important as a platform for Palestinians to access news and contribute their own footage and stories. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have been used.
The Palestinian Broadcast Corporation (PBC) is the public service broadcaster, controlled by the PA. The PBC broadcasts two channels, Palestine General and Palestine Live, and is in the process of launching a sports channel.
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip there are more than 40 privately owned television stations (including local TV channels) and an undetermined number of radio stations. There is also a strong satellite TV presence, with Al Jazeera, Jordanian TV and al-Arabiya being the most popular among the foreign broadcasters. Six satellite channels broadcast from Palestine: three from the West Bank (Palestine, Alfalasteenia and Mix); and three from the Gaza Strip (Hona AlQuds, Al-Aqsa and Al-Kitab)
Apart from law articles that prohibit certain actions, there is no policy of pre-censorship in Palestine. However, journalists in the West Bank and Gaza were subject to harassment after publication, and so authorities practice ‘post censorship’, which leads eventually to ‘self-censorship’. “Palestinian journalists know that they are being watched. As well the authorities “rely on a system of post censorship using means from socialization, harassment, economic sanctions, the revocation of licenses, jail terms against journalists to extreme torture and murder.”
Online censorship of Palestinian content, especially on social media has been witnessed. In the first half of 2022, at least 425 violations and acts of censorship against Palestinian content. According to Sada Social Centre, a Ramallah-based NGO, “the majority of violations against Palestinian content on social media vary from restricting posts and removing or suspending of individual accounts, notably when using terms associated with Israeli occupation, which are classified within the algorithm ban range.”
Although the Palestinian government has declared on several occasions that it is ready to proceed with approving the Right to Information Law according to approved legal bases, and with the existence of international agreements signed in this field as one of the Palestinian requirements, it has not yet been approved as a law.
The influence of social media, activists, and influencers is also great and wide on the work of journalists, which requires the establishment of controls and perhaps international and local laws and legislation, to determine the ethics of publishing through them, and to legalize misleading news and cybercrime in all its forms.
The issue of a syndicate that preserves the rights and defends journalists is among the most prominent issues demanded by journalists, away from political and partisan affiliations.
The Palestinian media in general is responsive to all gender-related programs and training. As well as gender mainstreaming. “The media illustrates gender issues without deep analytical meanings associated with them, and without understanding all the intricacies of gender mainstreaming. Rather, the media has been content with passing on concepts to the public, considering “gender issues” as a purely professional topic.” That said, women are still present in stereotypical topics and are portrayed as housewives, teachers, nurses, etc.
The increase in the number of female workers in the media field, and the increase in the demand of female students for media faculties in Palestinian universities, indicates the development of the participation of Palestinian women in making the media scene in Palestine. “Unofficial statistics indicate that 55% of the students of journalism and media faculties in Palestine are females. This heralds an increase in the percentage of female participation in media jobs in the future, which is currently estimated at 17%.”
Media organizations in Palestine are either affiliated with a political party, or been private and profit-oriented. That said, there are key factors that have an impact of the editorial independence of Palestinian media. First, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is considered one of the most important factors that impact the independence of media, as some media outlets are non-independent of the political affiliation (although hidden) of their owners or sponsors.
Similarly, almost every ordinary Palestinian has his/her political interest in the Palestinian-Palestinian conflict, and so, many of the journalists and outlets are not detached from their own political affiliation, even if trying their best to show independence.
To date, training continues to be an essential part of the media development environment in Palestine. Different international and local media development organizations have been involved in massive training at the beginning, including technical and editorial.
Birzeit University Media Development Center –offers academic programs leading to Bachelor of Arts degrees in Journalism and Radio, as well as professional diplomas and specialized short-term courses in TV, Radio and Print Journalism. As well, The Institute of Modern Media at Al-Quds University has three units: a) Al-Quds Educational Television; b) the Academic Media Department; and c) Community Services.
Al-Quds Open University (Media Production Center, aims to produce high quality audio/video educational material that assists students, based on the Open Education and Open Learning System. The Media Center at An-Najah University – which is the administrative and organizational umbrella under which a group of executive media, technical and cultural departments operate, including Voice of An-Najah (An-Najah Radio Station), An-Najah Educational TV and the Media Training Unit.
UNESCO in Palestine has been working with a number of stakeholders including the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education, the Government Information Office, and the Prime Minister’s Office, on introducing the concept of media literacy, media education curriculum to schools and universities based on the UNESCO Media and Information Literacy Policy Guidelines and Model (MIL).
The ‘scattered’ media literacy initiatives, do not reflect the reality of media literacy in Palestine. To this end, UNESCO Palestine is planning to launch a media literacy mapping project, to identify key players, initiatives, and introduce recommendations.
Freedom of the press is enshrined in Article 15 of the Jordanian Constitution. The sector is mainly regulated by the Press and Publications Act and the Broadcasting Act, which covers electronic publications. In the last 10 years, several specific laws have also encroached on the freedom of the press: the law against terrorism, the law on cybercrime (2018)… Today, there are more than 20 laws and regulations governing the exercise of freedom of the press.
The law on the press and publications of 1993 and 1998The law, which has been amended several times, has allowed the emergence of many private media, granted the protection of sources and established the basis for access to public information. But it has also provided for the establishment of a license for any media, printing, bookstore or advertising agency or translation, polling institute or even research centers. In other words, the authorization is limited.
The Jordanian government adopted a National Media Strategy in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring, a strategy designed to establish “an independent Jordanian media rooted in the principles of freedom, pluralism and professionalism ». Yet, shortly thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, two amendments to the press law forced nearly 290 news sites to close because they could not meet the new regulatory requirements for licensing by the Media Commission.
Liberalized twenty years ago in 2002 with the end of the Jordanian Radio Television (JRTV) monopoly, the audiovisual sector is controlled. The broadcast media law combined the regulators (one for print and one for broadcast) into one, the Jordan Media Commission (JMC). The Commission is fully funded by the state (€1.5 million in 2019) and its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for validating – or not – the Commission’s decisions to award broadcasting licenses to radio and television stations. Less exposed, the Commission de Régulation des Télécoms has been determining the available frequencies and the conditions for broadcasting telecom services since 1995. 39 radio stations have a license, 20 of which are governmental (and 6 for universities).
The Ministry of Information has been replaced by government spokespersons who exercise supervision over the sector and the state media, alongside the Ministries of Culture, Information Technology and Finance.
As for access to information, the absence of an independent Access to Information Commission makes it impossible to obtain information on a regular basis or to seek redress when obstacles arise. In addition, the practice of transparency is selective: for example, the police reserve the exclusivity of service information on the traffic situation for their own radio station.
Jordanians are moving away from their traditional media (television and newspapers) and are getting most of their information from social networks: 88% were connected in 2018 compared to 23% in 2012. According to IPSOS (IPSOS 2018 result cited in USAID’s JORDAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT published in June 2021), during the same period (between 2012 and 2018), television consumption dropped from 93% to 80%, radio from 30% to 26%, and daily newspapers from 18% to 6% (with precipitous drops in official newspapers – Al Rai, Al Ghad and Ad Dustour).
The English-language press, which has an extremely marginal audience among the Jordanian population, is generally freer than the Arabic-language press, although monotonous and uniform; it is aimed at a mainly foreign audience, diplomats or members of NGOs.
Among the commercial media, the private television Ro’yaand its website (http://roya.tv) dominate the advertising market. Ro’ya and some private radio stations like Masaj, Dahab and Fun or again Rotana FM, share the audience with Al Ghad and the website in english Jordan News launched in 2021.
Some professional media with an information mission exist under the status of private companies without being commercial: the site 7iber, the radio Al Balad and his website AmmanNet which tries to federate local and community radio stations with an exchange of information programs, or the webTv Aramram which only broadcasts on social networks.
Jordan’s official media actors are organised in the Jordan Press Association (JPA), a single Jordanian affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists.
There is no organization for independent or unofficial media in Jordan. The community radios have grouped together in a federation that brings together the radios Al Balad, Voice of Karak, New Maan radio, Yarmouk FM and Farah Al-Nas, among others, were beneficiaries of the European support programme for Jordanian media in 2015.The Community Media Network joined the coalition of 15 Jordanian civil society organisations HIMAM.
The Jordanian market cannot absorb the large number of graduates from the seven main journalism training institutions every year. Initiated in 1982 at the public university of Yarmouk in Irbid, these trainings remain mainly theoretical and are given by professors who have never been journalists and who have no direct link with the media. The practice of journalism, the concrete phase of the profession, is therefore not part of the training.
Only two of seven universities offer electronic media courses. Six universities have radio and television production studios, and several publish student newspapers. The offer is complemented by master’s degree courses offered by the Jordan Media Institute (JMI) and by the training centers of the national television, the official news agency and the private television Ro’ya.
An independent commission on secularization education is working on the preparation of an educational curriculum to include media literacy, the result of the analysis made by UNESCO in 2015. A national strategy has been adopted until 2023, with training for primary, secondary and university teachers under the auspices of the Jordan Media Institute (JMI).
Freedom of the press is enshrined in Article 15 of the Jordanian Constitution. The sector is mainly regulated by the Press and Publications Act and the Broadcasting Act, which covers electronic publications. In the last 10 years, several specific laws have also encroached on the freedom of the press: the law against terrorism, the law on cybercrime (2018)… Today, there are more than 20 laws and regulations governing the exercise of freedom of the press.
The law on the press and publications of 1993 and 1998The law, which has been amended several times, has allowed the emergence of many private media, granted the protection of sources and established the basis for access to public information. But it has also provided for the establishment of a license for any media, printing, bookstore or advertising agency or translation, polling institute or even research centers. In other words, the authorization is limited.
The Jordanian government adopted a National Media Strategy in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring, a strategy designed to establish “an independent Jordanian media rooted in the principles of freedom, pluralism and professionalism ». Yet, shortly thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, two amendments to the press law forced nearly 290 news sites to close because they could not meet the new regulatory requirements for licensing by the Media Commission.
Liberalized twenty years ago in 2002 with the end of the Jordanian Radio Television (JRTV) monopoly, the audiovisual sector is controlled. The broadcast media law combined the regulators (one for print and one for broadcast) into one, the Jordan Media Commission (JMC). The Commission is fully funded by the state (€1.5 million in 2019) and its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for validating – or not – the Commission’s decisions to award broadcasting licenses to radio and television stations. Less exposed, the Commission de Régulation des Télécoms has been determining the available frequencies and the conditions for broadcasting telecom services since 1995. 39 radio stations have a license, 20 of which are governmental (and 6 for universities).
The Ministry of Information has been replaced by government spokespersons who exercise supervision over the sector and the state media, alongside the Ministries of Culture, Information Technology and Finance.
As for access to information, the absence of an independent Access to Information Commission makes it impossible to obtain information on a regular basis or to seek redress when obstacles arise. In addition, the practice of transparency is selective: for example, the police reserve the exclusivity of service information on the traffic situation for their own radio station.
Jordanians are moving away from their traditional media (television and newspapers) and are getting most of their information from social networks: 88% were connected in 2018 compared to 23% in 2012. According to IPSOS (IPSOS 2018 result cited in USAID’s JORDAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT published in June 2021), during the same period (between 2012 and 2018), television consumption dropped from 93% to 80%, radio from 30% to 26%, and daily newspapers from 18% to 6% (with precipitous drops in official newspapers – Al Rai, Al Ghad and Ad Dustour).
The English-language press, which has an extremely marginal audience among the Jordanian population, is generally freer than the Arabic-language press, although monotonous and uniform; it is aimed at a mainly foreign audience, diplomats or members of NGOs.
Among the commercial media, the private television Ro’yaand its website (http://roya.tv) dominate the advertising market. Ro’ya and some private radio stations like Masaj, Dahab and Fun or again Rotana FM, share the audience with Al Ghad and the website in english Jordan News launched in 2021.
Some professional media with an information mission exist under the status of private companies without being commercial: the site 7iber, the radio Al Balad and his website AmmanNet which tries to federate local and community radio stations with an exchange of information programs, or the webTv Aramram which only broadcasts on social networks.
Jordan’s official media actors are organised in the Jordan Press Association (JPA), a single Jordanian affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists.
There is no organization for independent or unofficial media in Jordan. The community radios have grouped together in a federation that brings together the radios Al Balad, Voice of Karak, New Maan radio, Yarmouk FM and Farah Al-Nas, among others, were beneficiaries of the European support programme for Jordanian media in 2015.The Community Media Network joined the coalition of 15 Jordanian civil society organisations HIMAM.
The Jordanian market cannot absorb the large number of graduates from the seven main journalism training institutions every year. Initiated in 1982 at the public university of Yarmouk in Irbid, these trainings remain mainly theoretical and are given by professors who have never been journalists and who have no direct link with the media. The practice of journalism, the concrete phase of the profession, is therefore not part of the training.
Only two of seven universities offer electronic media courses. Six universities have radio and television production studios, and several publish student newspapers. The offer is complemented by master’s degree courses offered by the Jordan Media Institute (JMI) and by the training centers of the national television, the official news agency and the private television Ro’ya.
An independent commission on secularization education is working on the preparation of an educational curriculum to include media literacy, the result of the analysis made by UNESCO in 2015. A national strategy has been adopted until 2023, with training for primary, secondary and university teachers under the auspices of the Jordan Media Institute (JMI).
Lebanon
Lebanon is governed by a sectarian system that influences all aspects of social and political life, including the media sector. As a result, the country’s competing sectarian forces have utilized various means of telecommunications to communicate with their constituents, invest in journalists, writers, intellectuals, and producers, and most importantly, shape and contribute to the public debate. This contradictory and “plural” reality of the system has allowed for an expanding margin of freedom of expression relative to its authoritarian neighbors in the region. Nevertheless, the active interventions of different political parties in the media sphere have led to issues of editorial independence and financial sustainability, particularly as different outlets have relied on political funding to sustain themselves.
Given the platform provided by these outlets, such practices and conditions interact with and reinforce a variety of societal taboos in the country. These include institutional taboos (e.g., insulting the President), religious taboos, and taboos related to gender and sexuality. Despite the plurality of the Lebanese media, the long-lasting monopoly of different political forces in the country on the media sector has allowed for an entrenched series of local despots, utilizing propaganda to justify a plethora of methods to repress oppositional actors and marginalized groups. In fact, since 2017, the number of violations against journalists, activists, and influencers in the country has dramatically increased.
In Lebanon, the media is officially governed by a system of laws that concern different sectors. Given the increasing presence and influence of news sites and alternative outlets in the online sphere, a new media law which seeks to regulate these new means of communications has also been under discussion for over a decade. Also, past studies which concern the ways in which governments have intervened in the sector have indicated that the execution of these laws and procedures has been inconsistent. Currently, the key and most relevant texts include the 1962 Press Law, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law (Law 382), the 1994 Satellite Broadcast Law (Law 531), and the 1947 Cinema Law.
The issue of pluralism in Lebanon is closely related to the country’s system. The consociational system is prevalent in different aspects of social, political, and economic life. Therefore, Lebanon does not follow the model of state-controlled monopolistic media outlets that are typically found in neighboring authoritarian Arab regimes. This has allowed for a certain degree of pluralism and cultural richness, leading to a rise in the number of newspapers, magazines, and cultural centers historically.
However, state-imposed laws and regulations have put restrictions on launching these outlets. Journalists have to navigate through repressive policies and bureaucratic avenues to operate in the media sector.
Today, social media has become the primary platform for communication in Lebanon, with a vast majority of the population using it. It has made access to information faster, and the ability to create and circulate content is more accessible to new media entrepreneurs. The availability of social media has expanded the country’s pluralistic capacity.
The question of media access also depends on the financial capacity of individuals to start new ventures, especially when the economic and security situation has not been favorable to media projects in recent years.
The absence of monopolistic state ownership does not suggest that problematic and exclusivist forms of ownership which reinforce political intervention do not exist in the sector. In fact, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) project (launched by the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders, then in partnership with the Global Media Registry) clearly demonstrates ways in which members of the influential elite and political class in the country have held shares in a variety of media outlets in the pursuit of influencing coverage and promoting the pertinent interests and frames which suit them.
Censorship in Lebanon occurs in various forms, with two significant categories being cultural censorship and political censorship. The former includes but is not restricted to banning forms of “sexual” expression and a variety of societal taboos that emerge in films, concerts, book events, and other artistic or social occasions. The latter, which is more contentious, ranges from suppressing implicit criticisms targeting key figureheads in the Lebanese political system to prohibiting “offensive” or disruptive imagery regarding the legitimacy of neighboring regimes, and initiating calls to no-platform films whose characters or plot can be linked to Israel, legally classified as an enemy country.
In the Lebanese context, while explicit violations of the principle of free speech are not uncommon, self-censorship is a much more pervasive sentiment. Through acts of intimidation and harassment, along with journalists’ increasing financial dependence on their outlets and various other political considerations, the country’s primary political forces and security institutions can impose indirect restrictions on free speech.
Despite being understudied in the Lebanese context, misinformation is a particular problem that regularly surfaces in the media sphere, especially on the much less regulated social media domain. In Lebanon, platforms such as Facebook or Twitter have their pages flooded by articles and posts riddled with fake news, which is circulated either deliberately for political purposes or unintentionally as supportive constituents are unable to isolate fake news and produce reliable information.
According to the “Access to Information” law (Law No.28) passed in 2017 (the first legal obligation for the state to publish financial and administrative documents originating from different ministries and judicial departments), and later amended in July 2021, journalists have the written right to request any document that concerns the public interest. However, regardless of these formal constraints, the actual bureaucratic process heavily relies on who is requesting the document and how political actors anticipate they will be utilized.
In Lebanon, he vast majority of press associations and syndicates are closely linked to the country’s primary sectarian political parties and figures. Due to this consistent lack of protection, journalists from different regions and domains in the country created the Alternative Media Syndicate in 2019.
All studies, indicators, and reports suggest that the basic security of journalists, media workers, reporters, researchers, and writers is being threatened. There are several dimensions to this quandary: (1) the number of direct, low-level violations constituting physical repression that have occurred in the past few years or so, (2) the continuous cycle of assassinations targeting journalists and writers with similar political patterns, and (3) character assassinations that revolve around the usage of social media to construct narratives aimed at dehumanizing specific persons and damaging their reputation, further providing the context for potential physical violence.
While the country’s economic crisis has made the status of journalists very difficult, the hardships faced by media workers preceded this crisis. This has its roots in the application of the country’s labor law, the reliance of various outlets on informal oral contracts, and the lack of reliable benefits packages, such as health insurance and productive device coverage. A study conducted by Samir Kassir Foundation raises important and crucial insights about the nature of labor rights within the media sector.
When assessing the tone, rhetoric, working conditions, and orientation in traditional media, the treatment of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community presents a clear issue in the way these matters are approached in the public domain. This treatment concerns not only the role and behavior of senior management but also how misogynistic, sexist, and homophobic discourse permeates the media sphere.
Women, the LGBTQ+ community, migrant workers, and refugees are just a few examples of marginalized groups who consistently receive discriminatory and hate speech on the online social media platforms of different television stations and newspaper outlets. Recurrent monthly monitoring-based research conducted by the Samir Kassir Foundation shows that gendered comments and slurs are an instrumental component of this hate speech.
Media training in Lebanon can be divided into two categories: training offered by international organizations, official institutions, and non-government organizations in the country, and formal academic training offered in select universities with a comprehensive curriculum. Any assessment of strengths and weaknesses should consider the progress and performance of both domains. Regarding formal academic training, there is a consensus among stakeholders that journalism and media studies in Lebanon “urgently needed more qualified faculty, locally oriented research, and relevant academic and technical resources”.
In Lebanon, a comprehensive media literacy curriculum was implemented in the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University. A product of the efforts of various foundations and international institutes and initiatives, such as the Salzburg Academy for Media and Global Change and the Open Society Foundations, the curriculum underwent a number of adaptations which made the training process more professional and implementable, but also reduced the foundational and theoretical rigor of the material. Due to the lack of adequate state preparation or intervention in these matters, alongside the fact that the question of media literacy has been confined to the programs of elite educational institutions, civil society initiatives, workshops, and programs have acted as an alternative field to discuss this issue.
Lebanon
Lebanon is governed by a sectarian system that influences all aspects of social and political life, including the media sector. As a result, the country’s competing sectarian forces have utilized various means of telecommunications to communicate with their constituents, invest in journalists, writers, intellectuals, and producers, and most importantly, shape and contribute to the public debate. This contradictory and “plural” reality of the system has allowed for an expanding margin of freedom of expression relative to its authoritarian neighbors in the region. Nevertheless, the active interventions of different political parties in the media sphere have led to issues of editorial independence and financial sustainability, particularly as different outlets have relied on political funding to sustain themselves.
Given the platform provided by these outlets, such practices and conditions interact with and reinforce a variety of societal taboos in the country. These include institutional taboos (e.g., insulting the President), religious taboos, and taboos related to gender and sexuality. Despite the plurality of the Lebanese media, the long-lasting monopoly of different political forces in the country on the media sector has allowed for an entrenched series of local despots, utilizing propaganda to justify a plethora of methods to repress oppositional actors and marginalized groups. In fact, since 2017, the number of violations against journalists, activists, and influencers in the country has dramatically increased.
In Lebanon, the media is officially governed by a system of laws that concern different sectors. Given the increasing presence and influence of news sites and alternative outlets in the online sphere, a new media law which seeks to regulate these new means of communications has also been under discussion for over a decade. Also, past studies which concern the ways in which governments have intervened in the sector have indicated that the execution of these laws and procedures has been inconsistent. Currently, the key and most relevant texts include the 1962 Press Law, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law (Law 382), the 1994 Satellite Broadcast Law (Law 531), and the 1947 Cinema Law.
The issue of pluralism in Lebanon is closely related to the country’s system. The consociational system is prevalent in different aspects of social, political, and economic life. Therefore, Lebanon does not follow the model of state-controlled monopolistic media outlets that are typically found in neighboring authoritarian Arab regimes. This has allowed for a certain degree of pluralism and cultural richness, leading to a rise in the number of newspapers, magazines, and cultural centers historically.
However, state-imposed laws and regulations have put restrictions on launching these outlets. Journalists have to navigate through repressive policies and bureaucratic avenues to operate in the media sector.
Today, social media has become the primary platform for communication in Lebanon, with a vast majority of the population using it. It has made access to information faster, and the ability to create and circulate content is more accessible to new media entrepreneurs. The availability of social media has expanded the country’s pluralistic capacity.
The question of media access also depends on the financial capacity of individuals to start new ventures, especially when the economic and security situation has not been favorable to media projects in recent years.
The absence of monopolistic state ownership does not suggest that problematic and exclusivist forms of ownership which reinforce political intervention do not exist in the sector. In fact, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) project (launched by the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders, then in partnership with the Global Media Registry) clearly demonstrates ways in which members of the influential elite and political class in the country have held shares in a variety of media outlets in the pursuit of influencing coverage and promoting the pertinent interests and frames which suit them.
Censorship in Lebanon occurs in various forms, with two significant categories being cultural censorship and political censorship. The former includes but is not restricted to banning forms of “sexual” expression and a variety of societal taboos that emerge in films, concerts, book events, and other artistic or social occasions. The latter, which is more contentious, ranges from suppressing implicit criticisms targeting key figureheads in the Lebanese political system to prohibiting “offensive” or disruptive imagery regarding the legitimacy of neighboring regimes, and initiating calls to no-platform films whose characters or plot can be linked to Israel, legally classified as an enemy country.
In the Lebanese context, while explicit violations of the principle of free speech are not uncommon, self-censorship is a much more pervasive sentiment. Through acts of intimidation and harassment, along with journalists’ increasing financial dependence on their outlets and various other political considerations, the country’s primary political forces and security institutions can impose indirect restrictions on free speech.
Despite being understudied in the Lebanese context, misinformation is a particular problem that regularly surfaces in the media sphere, especially on the much less regulated social media domain. In Lebanon, platforms such as Facebook or Twitter have their pages flooded by articles and posts riddled with fake news, which is circulated either deliberately for political purposes or unintentionally as supportive constituents are unable to isolate fake news and produce reliable information.
According to the “Access to Information” law (Law No.28) passed in 2017 (the first legal obligation for the state to publish financial and administrative documents originating from different ministries and judicial departments), and later amended in July 2021, journalists have the written right to request any document that concerns the public interest. However, regardless of these formal constraints, the actual bureaucratic process heavily relies on who is requesting the document and how political actors anticipate they will be utilized.
In Lebanon, he vast majority of press associations and syndicates are closely linked to the country’s primary sectarian political parties and figures. Due to this consistent lack of protection, journalists from different regions and domains in the country created the Alternative Media Syndicate in 2019.
All studies, indicators, and reports suggest that the basic security of journalists, media workers, reporters, researchers, and writers is being threatened. There are several dimensions to this quandary: (1) the number of direct, low-level violations constituting physical repression that have occurred in the past few years or so, (2) the continuous cycle of assassinations targeting journalists and writers with similar political patterns, and (3) character assassinations that revolve around the usage of social media to construct narratives aimed at dehumanizing specific persons and damaging their reputation, further providing the context for potential physical violence.
While the country’s economic crisis has made the status of journalists very difficult, the hardships faced by media workers preceded this crisis. This has its roots in the application of the country’s labor law, the reliance of various outlets on informal oral contracts, and the lack of reliable benefits packages, such as health insurance and productive device coverage. A study conducted by Samir Kassir Foundation raises important and crucial insights about the nature of labor rights within the media sector.
When assessing the tone, rhetoric, working conditions, and orientation in traditional media, the treatment of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community presents a clear issue in the way these matters are approached in the public domain. This treatment concerns not only the role and behavior of senior management but also how misogynistic, sexist, and homophobic discourse permeates the media sphere.
Women, the LGBTQ+ community, migrant workers, and refugees are just a few examples of marginalized groups who consistently receive discriminatory and hate speech on the online social media platforms of different television stations and newspaper outlets. Recurrent monthly monitoring-based research conducted by the Samir Kassir Foundation shows that gendered comments and slurs are an instrumental component of this hate speech.
Media training in Lebanon can be divided into two categories: training offered by international organizations, official institutions, and non-government organizations in the country, and formal academic training offered in select universities with a comprehensive curriculum. Any assessment of strengths and weaknesses should consider the progress and performance of both domains. Regarding formal academic training, there is a consensus among stakeholders that journalism and media studies in Lebanon “urgently needed more qualified faculty, locally oriented research, and relevant academic and technical resources”.
In Lebanon, a comprehensive media literacy curriculum was implemented in the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University. A product of the efforts of various foundations and international institutes and initiatives, such as the Salzburg Academy for Media and Global Change and the Open Society Foundations, the curriculum underwent a number of adaptations which made the training process more professional and implementable, but also reduced the foundational and theoretical rigor of the material. Due to the lack of adequate state preparation or intervention in these matters, alongside the fact that the question of media literacy has been confined to the programs of elite educational institutions, civil society initiatives, workshops, and programs have acted as an alternative field to discuss this issue.
Syria
The 2011 uprising has resulted in a radical change in the Syrian media landscape, specifically the reemergence of independent outlets after almost half a century of government suppression. However, due to the ongoing war since 2011, which has resulted in a de facto division of the country into four main areas of control, independent media and journalists struggle with myriad existential challenges, including financial, legal, security, and social difficulties. These challenges are not limited to Syria-based outlets and journalists but extend to those in exile, especially in neighboring countries where most of the independent Syrian media operate.
Except for a short period (1954-1958), Syria, since its independence from France in 1946, has been characterized by a lack of freedom of expression, including media freedom. Consequently, the Syrian media, specifically during Hafez al-Assad’s era (1971-2000), “was one of the most highly censored” media in the Middle East, dominated by state-run newspapers, radio, and television.
Expectedly, taboos for Syrian media include any criticism or discussion of issues linked to the president and his family and inner circle. Also, the taboos include the army and the security apparatuses, religion- and ethnicity-related issues (the Arab-Kurdish relationship and the sectarian question), the economic situation, and the Baath party.
As a result of the wide range of taboos and restrictions and the lack of security and stability, press freedom has deteriorated more in Syria since 2011. Between 2011 and 2022, the country ranked among the worst ten countries in media freedom, according to Reporters without Borders’ Annual Press Freedom Index.
Nonetheless, the 2011 revolution allowed for the mushrooming of Syrian media outlets. By 2016, the opposition-leaning Syrian Prints Archive estimated that “as many as 298 newspapers being circulated in different parts of the country during various periods of the uprising, in addition to 17 state-run or regime-affiliated newspapers.” However, the total number of media outlets established after 2011 could be as high as 600.
According to the latest mapping of the Syrian media, as of November 2019, there were 162 active Syrian media outlets dominated by websites, which accounted for 67, or 41.4% of the Syrian working media. In addition, there were 36 (22.2%) radio stations, 30 (18.5%) newspapers, 13 (8%) television stations, 10 (6.2%) news agencies, and six (3.7%) magazines. Among them, many independent outlets operate in non-regime controlled areas and exile.
Still, while most Syrian media (70.4%) is privately owned, it isn’t necessarily independent. It is well known that some privately owned media receive undeclared funds from regional governments, namely Qatar and UAE, or business people affiliated with governments. Consequently, they have become a tool in the regional media war between different countries or axis.
The regime’s and AANES’s media laws explicitly state (article 6 and article 2, respectively) that media is not subject to censorship. Nonetheless, as Syria-based journalists pointed out, reporting on issues deemed “sensitive” by the different authorities across Syria is subject to prior approval. Moreover, in regime-held territories, photography, shooting videos, and conducting interviews are prohibited without prior permission from the Ministry of Information.
The status of exiled Syrian media is no less complicated in some countries. Generally speaking, media outlets and reporters based in Western countries enjoy working legally and freely. Conversely, the work of media organizations and reporters in Syria’s neighboring countries is generally tolerated according to the “turning a blind eye” policy. Consequently, they practice high self-censorship concerning issues related to the host country to avoid retaliation, including the closure of the outlet and the arrest or deportation of journalists.
From its very first days, the Syrian revolution has been a struggle over the narrative concerning the reality of developments on the ground. Although protesters calling for freedom and dignity adhered to peaceful means over the first few months, the regime has depicted them as terrorists involved in a conspiracy funded by international and regional enemies. As such, Syrian media has become an arena of disinformation and misinformation since then.
Through the so-called Syrian Electronic Army, the Syrian regime is known to be responsible for some well-organized disinformation campaigns targeting its opponents. For example, in November 2021, Meta Incorporation, the parent company of Facebook, revealed that it disabled “Three separate hacking groups from Syria targeted a wide range of people in Syria, including civil society, journalists, humanitarian organizations and the anti-regime military forces. Each of these three hacking groups had links to the Syrian government, including Syria’s Air Force Intelligence.”
On the other hand, political polarization, low professional standards in some cases, and a lack of well-established fact-checking practices have paved the way for spreading misinformation.
Syria has never seen a law concerning the right to access information. The only related attempt was in 2019, but the draft law is yet to be approved by the government and later the parliament. However, this right is addressed and, hypothetically, guaranteed in the Media Law No. 108 of 2011 (articles 9 and 10) and AANES’s Law No. 3 of 2021 (article 10), making it a right for journalists exclusively.
In this context, it is noteworthy that the regime’s Media Law defines a journalist or media person as “Anyone whose profession is authoring, preparing, editing, or analyzing media content, or collecting the related necessary information, for publishing in a media outlet” (Article 1). Nonetheless, per article 10 of the internal statute of the Union of Journalists in the Syrian Arab Republic, “practicing journalism” in Syria is subject to the condition of being a member of the Union, which has the authority to issue press cards.
The availability of international funds during the early period following the 2011 uprising contributed to creating media jobs at the multiple institutions that flourished then. Conversely, the shrinking resources later led to a gap between the high supply of journalists and media workers and low demand on the institutions’ side, especially since the latter are small-sized organizations.
The 2011 uprising constitutes a milestone in Syrian women’s involvement in media work. Per a 2016 survey of several post-2011 emerging Syrian outlets, around 54% of workers in radio stations and 35% of print media staff were women, including part-timers and volunteers. However, only 38% occupied senior positions. Nonetheless, Syrian female journalists have been subject to multi-gender-based constraints while sharing the risk of being killed, arrested, and forcibly disappeared with other journalists. Between March 2011 and May 2022, six female journalists were killed, while six others were detained or forcibly disappeared.
Up until the revolution, Syria had only one media faculty (at the University of Damascus), established on March 1. In addition, the Syrian Virtual University, founded in 2002, has a media program.
Recently, four more media faculties or institutes exist in the newly established universities in the opposition- and HTS-held areas in the north, namely Aleppo University in the Liberated Areas, International University of Science and Renaissance, Başakşehir İslam Akademisi/Aleppo, and Idlib University. But aside from the unsolved accreditation issue of most universities in non-regime areas, the quality of journalism teaching, which is also the case at the Media Faculty at the University of Damascus, is questionable, according to media reports, as a result of the lack of necessary human and material resources.
Despite the official rhetoric about the importance of media literacy, there are no such related programs in Syrian schools (and universities). The only related effort is UNESCO-sponsored workshops and training implemented in cooperation with the Syrian government.
Also, given that Syrian media is extraordinarily controlled and monitored, any future media literacy programs are naturally expected to be ideology-driven and far from encouraging critical thinking, which is the core of media literacy.
Syria
The 2011 uprising has resulted in a radical change in the Syrian media landscape, specifically the reemergence of independent outlets after almost half a century of government suppression. However, due to the ongoing war since 2011, which has resulted in a de facto division of the country into four main areas of control, independent media and journalists struggle with myriad existential challenges, including financial, legal, security, and social difficulties. These challenges are not limited to Syria-based outlets and journalists but extend to those in exile, especially in neighboring countries where most of the independent Syrian media operate.
Except for a short period (1954-1958), Syria, since its independence from France in 1946, has been characterized by a lack of freedom of expression, including media freedom. Consequently, the Syrian media, specifically during Hafez al-Assad’s era (1971-2000), “was one of the most highly censored” media in the Middle East, dominated by state-run newspapers, radio, and television.
Expectedly, taboos for Syrian media include any criticism or discussion of issues linked to the president and his family and inner circle. Also, the taboos include the army and the security apparatuses, religion- and ethnicity-related issues (the Arab-Kurdish relationship and the sectarian question), the economic situation, and the Baath party.
As a result of the wide range of taboos and restrictions and the lack of security and stability, press freedom has deteriorated more in Syria since 2011. Between 2011 and 2022, the country ranked among the worst ten countries in media freedom, according to Reporters without Borders’ Annual Press Freedom Index.
Nonetheless, the 2011 revolution allowed for the mushrooming of Syrian media outlets. By 2016, the opposition-leaning Syrian Prints Archive estimated that “as many as 298 newspapers being circulated in different parts of the country during various periods of the uprising, in addition to 17 state-run or regime-affiliated newspapers.” However, the total number of media outlets established after 2011 could be as high as 600.
According to the latest mapping of the Syrian media, as of November 2019, there were 162 active Syrian media outlets dominated by websites, which accounted for 67, or 41.4% of the Syrian working media. In addition, there were 36 (22.2%) radio stations, 30 (18.5%) newspapers, 13 (8%) television stations, 10 (6.2%) news agencies, and six (3.7%) magazines. Among them, many independent outlets operate in non-regime controlled areas and exile.
Still, while most Syrian media (70.4%) is privately owned, it isn’t necessarily independent. It is well known that some privately owned media receive undeclared funds from regional governments, namely Qatar and UAE, or business people affiliated with governments. Consequently, they have become a tool in the regional media war between different countries or axis.
The regime’s and AANES’s media laws explicitly state (article 6 and article 2, respectively) that media is not subject to censorship. Nonetheless, as Syria-based journalists pointed out, reporting on issues deemed “sensitive” by the different authorities across Syria is subject to prior approval. Moreover, in regime-held territories, photography, shooting videos, and conducting interviews are prohibited without prior permission from the Ministry of Information.
The status of exiled Syrian media is no less complicated in some countries. Generally speaking, media outlets and reporters based in Western countries enjoy working legally and freely. Conversely, the work of media organizations and reporters in Syria’s neighboring countries is generally tolerated according to the “turning a blind eye” policy. Consequently, they practice high self-censorship concerning issues related to the host country to avoid retaliation, including the closure of the outlet and the arrest or deportation of journalists.
From its very first days, the Syrian revolution has been a struggle over the narrative concerning the reality of developments on the ground. Although protesters calling for freedom and dignity adhered to peaceful means over the first few months, the regime has depicted them as terrorists involved in a conspiracy funded by international and regional enemies. As such, Syrian media has become an arena of disinformation and misinformation since then.
Through the so-called Syrian Electronic Army, the Syrian regime is known to be responsible for some well-organized disinformation campaigns targeting its opponents. For example, in November 2021, Meta Incorporation, the parent company of Facebook, revealed that it disabled “Three separate hacking groups from Syria targeted a wide range of people in Syria, including civil society, journalists, humanitarian organizations and the anti-regime military forces. Each of these three hacking groups had links to the Syrian government, including Syria’s Air Force Intelligence.”
On the other hand, political polarization, low professional standards in some cases, and a lack of well-established fact-checking practices have paved the way for spreading misinformation.
Syria has never seen a law concerning the right to access information. The only related attempt was in 2019, but the draft law is yet to be approved by the government and later the parliament. However, this right is addressed and, hypothetically, guaranteed in the Media Law No. 108 of 2011 (articles 9 and 10) and AANES’s Law No. 3 of 2021 (article 10), making it a right for journalists exclusively.
In this context, it is noteworthy that the regime’s Media Law defines a journalist or media person as “Anyone whose profession is authoring, preparing, editing, or analyzing media content, or collecting the related necessary information, for publishing in a media outlet” (Article 1). Nonetheless, per article 10 of the internal statute of the Union of Journalists in the Syrian Arab Republic, “practicing journalism” in Syria is subject to the condition of being a member of the Union, which has the authority to issue press cards.
The availability of international funds during the early period following the 2011 uprising contributed to creating media jobs at the multiple institutions that flourished then. Conversely, the shrinking resources later led to a gap between the high supply of journalists and media workers and low demand on the institutions’ side, especially since the latter are small-sized organizations.
The 2011 uprising constitutes a milestone in Syrian women’s involvement in media work. Per a 2016 survey of several post-2011 emerging Syrian outlets, around 54% of workers in radio stations and 35% of print media staff were women, including part-timers and volunteers. However, only 38% occupied senior positions. Nonetheless, Syrian female journalists have been subject to multi-gender-based constraints while sharing the risk of being killed, arrested, and forcibly disappeared with other journalists. Between March 2011 and May 2022, six female journalists were killed, while six others were detained or forcibly disappeared.
Up until the revolution, Syria had only one media faculty (at the University of Damascus), established on March 1. In addition, the Syrian Virtual University, founded in 2002, has a media program.
Recently, four more media faculties or institutes exist in the newly established universities in the opposition- and HTS-held areas in the north, namely Aleppo University in the Liberated Areas, International University of Science and Renaissance, Başakşehir İslam Akademisi/Aleppo, and Idlib University. But aside from the unsolved accreditation issue of most universities in non-regime areas, the quality of journalism teaching, which is also the case at the Media Faculty at the University of Damascus, is questionable, according to media reports, as a result of the lack of necessary human and material resources.
Despite the official rhetoric about the importance of media literacy, there are no such related programs in Syrian schools (and universities). The only related effort is UNESCO-sponsored workshops and training implemented in cooperation with the Syrian government.
Also, given that Syrian media is extraordinarily controlled and monitored, any future media literacy programs are naturally expected to be ideology-driven and far from encouraging critical thinking, which is the core of media literacy.
