Country files
Morocco
Freedom of the press is guaranteed by Article 28 of the Moroccan Constitution. The sector is regulated by the Press and Publishing Law promulgated in 2016 Press Code. This law repealed the 2002 law, deemed restrictive. Several provisions have been amended. They include the abolition of prison sentences for press offenses, the recognition of freedom of access to information as a constitutional right, and the recognition of online media as media supports in their own right. Another positive adjustment was the creation of the National Press Council, charged with overseeing media performance and protecting the journalistic profession.
However, despite these reforms, the legislative environment relating to press freedom has its limits. While the new press code no longer provides for prison sentences, it retains most of the expressive offences provided for in the old 2002 code. These penalties, introduced by amendment to the penal code in July 2016, can lead a journalist to detention, particularly for writings or public speeches “undermining” the monarchy, the person of the King, Islam and the territorial integrity of Morocco.
In addition, other laws amended or enacted over the last six years have strengthened the judicial arsenal: the anti-terrorism law adopted after the Casablanca bombings in 2003 and the defamation law enacted in 2019, which provides for severe penalties to combat defamation on social networks.
In the field of audiovisual law, despite the end of the state monopoly in 2002 with the creation of the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA) and the various laws aimed at liberalizing the sector adopted in 2005, 2015 and 2016, the field remains tightly controlled. Indeed, although these laws have encouraged the emergence of new private radio stations – There are 19 private radio stations by 2022 – and public TV channels -9 channels-, the panorama of private TV channels has not expanded.
Finally, the law on access to information, which came into force in March 2020, lists thirteen categories of information that can be exempted from the right of access, such as national defense and privacy. However, the scope of these categories is not precisely defined, making access to information inequitable.
Television remains the most popular source of information in Morocco. However, the Moroccan audiovisual sector, whose main news channels are 2M and Al Aoula, is struggling to attract a large audience, who are more inclined to turn to pan-Arab satellite channels, particularly Qatar’s Al Jazeera.
Behind the mass media, the Internet is just as widespread, especially among young Moroccans aged 18 to 35. 87% of them get their news via the Internet and social networks, where information is no longer produced solely by professional journalists, but also by citizen journalists, influencers, bloggers and content creators.
There is still no map to record the number of sites flooding the Moroccan web, with varying estimates fluctuating between 2,000 and 5,000.
Although the traditional press has entered the digital space, it is struggling to establish itself, outstripped by the overwhelming popularity of Arabic-language pure players. These media, many of which cover regional, national and international news, have succeeded in carving out a place for themselves in the media landscape, such as Hespress, which ranks first with 19.3 million daily visits, or ChoufTV, a Web TV with an editorial line focused on sensationalism, which registers over 18 million subscribers on its Facebook page and exceeds one billion views per month for all its videos on YouTube.
Radio’s highest penetration is in urban areas, with 55% of listeners nationwide. Mohamed VI du Saint Coran, a public radio station, remains the most listened-to radio station, followed by Med Radio, the leading commercial radio station. Its programs allow direct listener participation and focus mainly on entertainment and social issues. According to the regulatory body, there are a total of 35 stations, 16 state-owned and 19 privately-owned.
Finally, the print media, already confined to urban areas due to the country’s high illiteracy rate and weakened by a structural crisis over many years, has not withstood the impact of the health crisis.
Behind this apparent pluralism, the media landscape is marked by a high concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few private groups. The study “Radioscopie des propriétaires des médias au Maroc“, carried out in 2017 by the Moroccan news website Le Desk and the NGO Reporters sans frontières (RSF), highlighted a significant concentration of Moroccan media in the hands of a few companies and influential figures in the country’s political and economic life, as well as the Société nationale d’investissement, a holding company owned by the royal family.
The radio sector remains largely state-controlled, but ownership is more diversified, with the presence of small companies. Private radio stations have grown rapidly over the years, with a steadily increasing audience share. However, the coverage of political issues in these media remains very limited. On the whole, stations broadcast entertainment, music and economic topics.
Finally, Moroccan audiovisual law does not allow community radio stations to broadcast over the airwaves, the internet remains the only free media in Morocco able to bypass such restrictions. Numbering 69 community radio stations in 2015, there are now just 15 or so.
The practice of self-censorship is high in Morocco. Journalists deliberately avoid sensitive subjects or modify them for fear of reprisals. Moreover, self-censorship concerns not only political subjects, but also societal issues such as sexuality and religion. According to the Centre for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ), almost 80% of media professionals admit to practicing it, mainly for economic reasons. Censorship remains widespread, but is mainly indirect, through economic pressure.
The exponential growth of online media has exacerbated the lack of ethical rigor that has already been prevalent in some media for several years.
Access to information is often hampered by a lack of transparency and communication on the part of the authorities. Journalists often find it difficult to obtain information and carry out in-depth investigations due to the reluctance of government officials to divulge sensitive or embarrassing information. The legal framework relating to access to information remains insufficient, although Morocco adopted a law on freedom of access to information in 2018, which came into force in March 2019, this law is not often applied and has not ensured easy and transparent access to information, particularly for independent journalists and alternative media.
The pandemic has weakened an already fragile profession. Job losses were significant, with some fifty positions eliminated, in addition to the multiplication of industrial disputes and staff cuts ranging from 20% to 50% during the period of the health crisis.
The rise of online media has led to a significant increase in the number of journalists working in the digital press, who today represent 40% of the Moroccan journalist workforce, or 1,360 information professionals.
Despite legislative advances and policies to promote gender equality in Morocco, women remain under-represented in the media, where almost 72% of journalists are men. Faced with obstacles such as discrimination, harassment and gender prejudice, they also remain under-represented in management positions and decision-making bodies in the Moroccan media. They also have fewer opportunities to cover sensitive topics, which limits their ability to develop professionally… According to the CNP (National Press Council), only 259 of the 1336 journalists working in the digital sector and holding a press card are women (2021).
Independent media are often created and managed by journalists keen to disseminate free and diversified information. However, these media, which tend to focus on sensitive subjects and provide critical coverage of current events, have difficulty reaching a wide audience and lack the financial resources to develop.
Finally, in Morocco, journalism training is provided by some thirty university courses, including 4 private schools and one public school, the Institut Supérieur de l’Information et de la Communication, better known by its acronym ISIC (isic.ac.ma). Founded in 1969, this is the country’s oldest institution, offering courses in Arabic and French. On average, the school welcomes around a hundred new students every year.
As far as media education is concerned, apart from the awareness-raising actions carried out by UNESCO in Morocco since 2012, through “Media Literacy Week”, national players are still slow to give concrete expression to their commitments in this area, notably through the introduction of this subject into national education curricula. For the time being, there are no media education programs in Moroccan school curricula.
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Libya
Since the begging of the Libyan civil war in 2014, journalists have become targets and the media weapons in the service of the warring factions. By becoming increasingly partisan, the media are perceived as stakeholders in the conflict.
Attacks on Libyan journalists are encouraged by the legal framework of the Gaddafi era, which has not been abolished, such as the 1972 press law, which provides for life imprisonment for the publication of news that could “damage the country’s reputation and the trust placed in it abroad”. New offences restricting freedom of expression and of the press were added by the authorities in power after 2011. Since 2018, the anti-terrorist agency, headed by an armed group, has had the power to censor “any information that could threaten the country’s security, the security of society or national security”.
Libya is a country where the majority of the population is Muslim and holds conservative values. The Media Ministry and social conventions prohibit the broadcasting of images or productions depicting the Prophet Mohamed and his companions.
Topics such as atheism, sexuality, gender minorities and feminist demands are sensitive and considered red lines not to be crossed by most media and public players. On the other hand, the question of women’s participation in political life is increasingly raised in the public arena. As in the rest of the world, women journalists are nevertheless prime targets for cyber harassment.
In terms of security, Libyan journalists have paid a heavy price in the civil wars that have followed one another since 2011. In the decade since the 2011 revolution, more than 30 journalists and bloggers have been killed in Libya, and in most cases the culprits have not been brought to justice. Since 2015, 247 journalists have been arrested or physically abused by military and paramilitary groups, according to Libya Platform.
Between May 2020 and May 2021, the Libyan Organization for independent Media (LOFIM) recorded violence against 54 journalists, 45% of them in Tripoli and 41% in Benghazi. They were victims of attacks, arrests, interrogations by security forces or telephone searches. In 2021 and 2022, LOFIM recorded 10 attacks, ranging from arrests to forced disappearances of journalists.
The implosion of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 led to the emergence of dozens of new media outlets, created by revolutionary groups and operating outside any form of regulation. Two years later, the parenthesis has closed and most of the media independent of the new authorities or armed groups have been attacked or closed down.
Despite the constitutional declaration guarantees freedom of the press, no decree protects its exercise. There is only a circular dated May 3, 2021, issued by the so-called Government of National Unity (GUN) prohibiting the arrest and detention of journalists. This government, formed in 2021 under the aegis of the UN, had pledged to restructure the bodies controlling the media. To date, no reforms have been undertaken. In Tripoli, a human rights council, attached to the government, has been created, but its actual activity remains opaque and unknown to the human rights defenders and independent journalists interviewed for this report.
Since 2014, a new legislative arsenal has targeted journalists. Insulting the authorities, state emblems and its flag are offenses punishable by imprisonment. The vague wording of these texts offers a broad interpretation to repressive authorities.
Journalists, bloggers and other media personnel are arrested and targeted by all sides, while judicial personnel are attacked to prevent the normal functioning of justice. Journalists are regularly arrested for not having work permits. In the Eastern part of Libya, several journalists have been prosecuted by military courts.
Libya
Depuis que la Libye s’est enfoncée dans la guerre civile en 2014, les journalistes sont devenus des cibles et les médias des armes au service des factions en conflit. En se montrant de plus en plus partisans, les médias sont perçus comme des parties prenantes du conflit.
Les attaques contre les journalistes libyens sont favorisées par le cadre légal de l’ère Kadhafi qui n’a pas été aboli, comme la loi sur la presse de 1972, qui prévoit des peines de prison à perpétuité en cas de publication de nouvelles pouvant « porter atteinte à la réputation du pays et la confiance qui lui est portée à l’étranger ». De nouveaux délits restreignant la liberté d’expression et de la presse ont été ajoutés par les autorités en place après 2011. L’agence anti-terroriste, chapeautée par un groupe armé, a le pouvoir, depuis 2018, de censurer « toute information pouvant menacer la sécurité du pays, la sécurité de la société ou la sécurité nationale ».
La Libye est un pays dont la majorité de la population est de confession musulmane et porte des valeurs conservatrices. Le ministère des médias et les conventions sociales interdisent la diffusion d’images ou productions qui montrent le prophète Mohamed et ses compagnons.
Les sujets sur l’athéisme, la sexualité, les minorités de genre, les revendications féministes sont sensibles et considérés comme des lignes rouges à ne pas franchir par la plupart des médias et acteurs publics. La question de la participation des femmes à la vie politique est en revanche un sujet de plus en plus évoqué dans l’espace public. Comme dans le reste du monde, les femmes journalistes sont néanmoins les cibles privilégiées de cyberharcèlement.Les journalistes ont payé un lourd tribu dans les guerres civiles qui se sont succédées depuis 2011. Dans la décennie qui a suivi la révolution de 2011, plus de 30 journalistes et blogueurs ont été tués en Libye et, dans la plupart des cas, les coupables n’ont pas été traduits en justice. Depuis 2015, 247 journalistes ont été arrêtés ou ont été victimes de violences physiques par des militaires et groupes paramilitaires selon Libya Platform.
Entre mai 2020 et mai 2021, la Libyan Organization for independent Media (LOFIM) a recensé des violences contre 54 journalistes dont 45% à Tripoli, 41% à Benghazi. Ils ont été victimes d’attaques, arrestations, interrogatoires par forces de sécurité ou fouilles de téléphone. En 2021 et 2022, LOFIM a recensé 10 attaques allant d’arrestations à des disparitions forcées de journalistes.
L’implosion du régime kadhafiste en 2011 a permis l’éclosion de dizaines de nouveaux médias, créés par des groupes révolutionnaires, hors de toute régulation. Deux ans plus tard, la parenthèse s’est refermée et la plupart des médias indépendants des nouvelles autorités ou groupes armées ont été attaqués ou fermés.
La déclaration constitutionnelle garantit la liberté de la presse mais aucun décret n’en protège l’exercice. Il existe seulement une circulaire datant du 3 mai 2021, émise par le gouvernement dit d’unité nationale (GUN) interdisant les arrestations et détentions de journalistes. Ce gouvernement formé en 2021, sous l’égide de l’ONU, s’était engagé à restructurer les organes contrôlant les médias. Aucune réforme n’a été engagé à ce jour. A Tripoli, un conseil des droits de l’Homme, rattaché au gouvernement, a été créé mais son activité réelle reste opaque et inconnue des défenseurs des droits humains et journalistes indépendants interviewés pour ce rapport.
Depuis 2014, un nouvel arsenal législatif cible les journalistes. Insulter les autorités, les emblèmes de l’Etat et son drapeau sont des délits passibles de prison. La formulation vague de ces textes offre une large interprétation aux autorités répressives.
Les journalistes, blogueurs et autres personnels de médias sont victimes d’arrestations et ciblés par toutes les parties, tandis que le personnel judiciaire est attaqué pour empêcher le fonctionnement normal de la justice. Les arrestations de journalistes au motif qu’ils ne possèdent pas de permis de travail sont régulières. A l’Est, plusieurs journalistes ont été poursuivis par des tribunaux militaires.
In 2020, the Libyan Organization For Independent Media (LOFIM), a leading NGO in Libya, counted 218 media outlets for the Libyan public, including 150 local radio stations and 22 TV channels, including those broadcasting from abroad. Around 50 local radio stations are said to have closed since the 2014 census, carried out by Legatum institute Libya Media wiki.
99% of Libyans own a satellite TV, and 76% of them watch it every day. Television is the main source of information, according to a 2015 study by BBC Media action. These statistics need to be put into perspective with the growing share of social media among Libyan Internet users. Facebook is the main platform used in Libya, ahead of Youtube and Twitter.
Until 2022, the media based in Libya and broadcasting from foreign countries (Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt) were divided in two, covering the two rival camps vying for control of power. In the West, public TV channels and media financed by Qatar and Turkey supported the Tripoli government’s line, while in the East, TV channels and news websites (funded by the United Arab Emirates) defended the opposing camp embodied by Marshal Haftar. This polarization has faded with the rapprochement between the two main leaders (Abdelhamid Dabaiba, the current Prime Minister, and Marshal Haftar) and between the regional powers involved in the Libyan conflict. Two Emirates-funded TV channels went off the air in 2022.
Today, the media landscape is largely controlled by the government in Tripoli. The media are under the authority of the Ministry of Communication and Political Affairs. Two separate Media Authorities continue to operate, maintaining a division between Tripoli (the capital, in the west) and Benghazi (in the east). In the east, the Libyan Authority holds the Libyan Radio and Television Authority. The public media have changed their names, but their governance remains similar to that of the Gaddafi era, with little or no change to their management teams. They are often divided geographically between East and West, following the political division of the country. In the west, the Jamahiriya Arab News Agency (JANA) has become the Libyan Arab News Agency, delivering government communications based in Tripoli. The Jana News Agency, in the east, is supported by Russia and takes a pro-Gaddafi stance.
There is no provision for media pluralism. The Libyan authorities have the power to authorize, dissolve or suspend the activities of associations and journalists, whether they work for local or international media. The authorities are exploiting the constitutional vacuum to continue Gaddafi’s repressive media regime. In July 2019, authorities in eastern Libya banned 11 satellite channels accused of operating without licenses, supporting terrorism and extremism, or threatening Libya’s social fabric.
Confidence in the Libyan media is low among the population due to their partisan bias and lack of transparency regarding their funding. According to several reports on the subject and journalists interviewed by Journalisme & Citoyenneté, the majority opinion is that all media follow an agenda dictated by the political interests of their owner (or main financial backer), who is himself affiliated to a particular camp. 82% of Libyans would like private media to declare the source of their income. A few independent media outlets have emerged since 2011, but are struggling to survive;
The spread of misinformation and hate speech is linked to the polarization of the media landscape, which makes it difficult to distinguish established facts from “false information” disseminated by one camp to discredit the other. The media on both sides mix verified information with unverified or even hateful information, confusing the public. The Internet and social networks are seen as secondary sources of information for verifying information given by television, but the level of mistrust towards them is very high. Three quarters of Libyans are in favor of the existence of a state-funded media covering the whole country.
Libyan journalists, citizens and analysts all report to the huge challenge of obtaining reliable, quantified and detailed information on Libyan news, regulations and national statistics. This situation is largely due to the legacy of the Gaddafi regime’s 40 years of propaganda, which set out to destroy intermediary bodies and producers of information competing with its ideology. Few independent polling organizations exist.
The law promoted by the Government of National Accord (GAN replaced in 2021 by GUN) on publications gives the Media Authority the absolute right to license print and online media, both public and private. This authority sometimes even goes beyond the conditions set by law to restrict access to these licenses. In 2016, the Ministry of Media (of the GAN) asked all media to provide it with their sources of income and internal audit as well as their broadcasting license.
Audiovisual media obtain their broadcasting licenses from the Public Institution for Radio and Television, which reports to the Prime Minister, or from the Media Authority. In both cases, the issuing of these licenses is discretionary. In eastern Libya, under the control of Khalifa Haftar’s forces, a similar body exists, with the same discretionary powers. According to NGOs, this opaque body answers directly to Commander Khalifa Haftar.
The Libyan Media Foundation created by the Government of National Accord in 2020, and widely criticized for its lack of independence, was abolished in June 2021. The public media are now placed under the authority of the Prime Minister, thus still not guaranteeing their independence.
The 2011 constitutional declaration stipulates (article 15) that the State guarantees the freedom to create political parties, associations and any other civil society organization. But there is no law governing the formation of trade unions and political organizations. A first journalists’ union was created in 2012, but has remained inactive to this day. In June 2022, a new independent union of Libyan journalists was formed. This new body appears to be more representative than the previous one, and is keen to defend press freedom.
At the same time, a dozen Libyan journalists’ organizations have formed an alliance in 2022 to defend press freedom, reform of the media sector and the adoption of a media regulation law supported by LOFIM.
Independent journalists have also created the Libyan Journalists Independent Syndicate, which works to identify attacks on journalists and advocate new regulations to protect press freedom.
Media and citizens alike point to the climate of insecurity and constant threats to journalists. They are aware that this is one of the main causes of misinformation. In a 2014 study, they estimate that if the media report events with credibility and balance, pointing the finger at armed groups responsible for exactions, they immediately become the target of violence.
The main obstacle to the development of media independent of political and military powers is the control exercised by the authorities, via the commission in particular, over civil society – itself controlled by the intelligence services. According to decree 286 of March 2019, all funds from abroad destined for associations are subject to its authorization. Any meetings with foreigners also require prior approval.
Professional and technical training for journalists is rare in Libya, despite the needs for it. Most media trainings are organized in Tunis, which excludes journalists who cannot travel to Tunisia, especially women for whom traveling alone is socially frowned upon. Yet half, if not the majority, of journalism students are women.
There are twelve public universities in Libya with media programs : University of Benghazi, Tripoli University, the Open University of Libya, Misrata University, the University of Zawia, Azzaytuna University, the Omar Mukhtar University in Bayda, Elmergib University, Sirte University, Tobrouk University, Ajdabia University and Sabha University.
Their program remains essentially theoretical, with no practical application, as the professors are not journalists or have never or rarely practiced journalism. The content of the curricula dates back to the Gaddafi era and has not been fundamentally revised.
File available soon.
Palestine
Reporters without Borders Index (most recent): 163
Freedom House Index: Gaza Strip 2/100. West Bank 22/100
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): N/A
Freedom of Expression
The war in Gaza and the ongoing Israeli escalation in the West Bank have impacted the freedom expression not only through the deliberate targeting of journalists but also with the wider freedom of expression. The main concerning issue regarding freedom of expression is the polarizations between those who believe that the events of October 7th resulted in a catastrophe for Palestinians, and those who say that Israel did not want an excuse to destroy the Gaza Strip or continue commenting crimes in the West Bank. This also applies to the critics of Hamas who have been portrayed as “traitors” or “betrayals” or even accused of being “collaborators” with Israel. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA), defamation was one of the most common patterns faced by journalists, with 55.6% of journalists being subjected to organized campaigns across digital platforms to defame them, followed by hacking and data theft at 48.1%, and electronic surveillance at 46.3%, in addition to other forms of digital violence such as digital harassment, threats, bullying, hate speech and identity theft.
Social media companies are still playing a vital role is viloating the Freedom of expression in Palestine. According to 7amleh’s Deceomber 2025 report “A total of 7 violations were documented involving account restrictions, along with 6 cases of content removal, 3 cases of account suspensions, and 2 instances of shadow banning, while 5 additional cases were distributed across various other types of digital sanctions.”
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
There have been no fundamental changes to media laws in Palestine. The Cybercrime Law continues to be a major concern for policymakers, journalists, and civil society organizations. Following numerous objections, the Palestinian Cabinet decided on April 30, 2025, to form a national committee to amend Decree-Law No. (10) of 2018 concerning cybercrimes, communications crimes, and information technology, and its amendments. The committee includes representatives from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Public Prosecution, the Ministry of Communications and Digital Economy, the General Secretariat of the Cabinet, and civil society organizations. The committee’s objective is to review the objections and submit recommendations to the government.
As for the Right to Information Law, the Ministry of Justice published a draft decree-law on November 4, 2025, which reignited the debate surrounding it. Some considered the latest version an improvement over previous drafts, but still requires addressing several fundamental issues, most notably the expansion of security and economic exceptions and the absence of clear provisions to ensure the harmonization of legislation, making the Right to Information Law the supreme reference in case of any conflict. Supporters of the law, however, considered it a fundamental pillar for promoting integrity and preventing corruption, given that the exceptions are precisely defined.
Pluralism
Despite the large number of media outlets in Palestine, however, the media still suffers from a superficial and artificial diversity due to limited variety, innovation, and renewal in content and programming. Most of the programming in TV and radio, for example, follow the same pattern, they have become elitist, featuring mainly analysts, politicians and academics to discuss public matters, while ordinary citizens are rarely represented. Many local Palestinian media outlets have been transformed into propaganda tools for political parties, especially with the war on Gaza. In addition to the lack of diversity in presentation, particularly evident is the absence of investigative journalism, except for a few rare attempts. Furthermore, the Palestinian media has failed to fulfil its oversight role over political power. Print journalism has failed to engage with technological advancements in the new digital media landscape and has been unable to adapt to the evolving organizational structure and its relationship with young audiences. This has contributed to a decline in readership among Palestinian youth. Furthermore, print media suffers from a profound structural crisis across all levels, from distribution to editorial boards. This context has enabled the prominence of social media, mainly Facebook, the fact that generated a disillusion among the Palestinian public with democracy and media diversity.
Censorship & self-censorship
In Palestine, there is no pre-censorship on publications but post-censorship, mainly by Isreal, in addition to the Palestinian political system in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as social censorship, companies and advertisers. This has led media outlets and journalists to set their own self-censorship or ‘pre-censorship’ for subjects that may include controversial taboo topics, political criticism or corruption-related topics. In addition to the traditional forms of censorship, Palestinian journalists and activists are subject to digital threats and violations. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA) the Israeli occupation and the authorities in the West Bank and Gaza employ digital tools to monitor content, block accounts, or summon journalists based on their online activity.
Disinformation and Misinformation
A study published by the Palestinian Observatory for Fact-Checking and Media Literacy (Tahaqaq) revealed that misleading content (47.25%) dominated the Palestinian digital landscape during February and March 2025, followed by false content at 44.44%, and harmful content at 8.31%. The high percentage of false content reflects the significant overlap in the Palestinian information landscape, where errors are prevalent in contexts that can be misinterpreted or exploited. This type of content is often attributed to the recirculation of old material, ack of knowledge, or poor editing skills, rather than necessarily to direct manipulation. The study also reveals that there is a clear dominance of individual sources over the information landscape, as the pages of individuals and ordinary users contributed the largest share of misleading and false content. This is attributed to the limited information awareness among the public, in addition to the great emotional impact during crises, which leads to the circulation of information without verification. As for news platforms, their danger is doubled, as they give misleading information an appearance of formal credibility, which contributes to its wider spread, especially when it is quoted or republished through other platforms linked to entities with political orientations.
Disinformation and misinformation are also part of the war on Gaza. Much of this content was widely disseminated online, with tens of millions of posts circulating on social media. A variety of sources, including government officials, media outlets, and social media influencers in various countries, contributed to the spread of this misinformation and disinformation. Several Palestinian institutions play a central role in combating misinformation and disinformation. The most prominent are 7amleh, Tahaqaq and Kashif. Additionally, some outlets play a major role in challenging misleading narratives through investigative journalism by providing documented reporting that helps counter widespread misinformation about Palestine.
Access to Information
The absence of a right to information law in Palestine creates a fertile ground for the spread of rumours, fabricated news, and misinformation. Those seeking information who cannot find it through official channels and legal means will resort to alternative methods, which may yield accurate information, rumours, distorted information, or outright fabrication. The national debate surrounding the right to information law has resurfaced following the publication of the draft law for 2025, which was first proposed over twenty years ago but never passed. The most significant problem with the 2025 draft lies in its vague exceptions related to broad concepts such as “national security,” “national economy,” and “public interest.” These terms could be used to deny citizens access to information if left undefined. Furthermore, the draft prioritizes other laws of a confidential or security nature in cases of conflict, potentially rendering the new law ineffective. (Please see section 2 Media Laws)
Journalists Security
Despite the ceasefire in Gaza, Isreal continues to target journalists. On 21 January 2026, an Israeli drone strike on a vehicle in central Gaza killed freelance photographer Abed Shaat, a regular contributor to Agence France-Presse (AFP), Mohammad Qeshta, a spokesperson for the Egyptian Committee who reported news to his Telegram, and Anas Ghnaim, a freelance photographer and drone operator who worked for Smart Media. The attack came while the three journalists were on assignment for the Egyptian Committee.
The West Bank continues to be a hostile environment for journalists. Attacks against journalists are not limited to Israeli soldiers but also to Israeli settlers. Video images showed, on many occasions, the direct and deliberate targeting of journalists by Israeli soldiers, whether in the form of physical attacks or by firing teargas and stun grenades at them, in some cases live ammunition was used.
Israeli settlers, often guarded by soldiers, have also been attacking journalists. Most prominent was the attack on Reuters photojournalist Raneen Sawafta, who escaped death after being severely beaten by settlers in the village of Beita north of the West Bank. Sawafta was accompanied by Reuters security adviser Grant Bowden who was beaten as he tried to protect her.
Media Business Models
Within the complexity of the political, economic and social context, the media business models in Palestine remain the same. The most significant is the donor-funded one, depending on projects supported by international donors. However, this source of funding is no longer as used to be due to the lack of funding at origin. The other model is advertisingbased which is limited and inconsistent due to the small market size, political and economic constrains, as well as competition with social media adverting. Most of the media outlets adopt a hybrid Nonprofit–Commercial Models combining donor funding, advertising, and commercial services.
Independent Media: state and challenges
Independent media in Palestine represent a rare space for free expression amidst a complex political environment and immense security and economic pressures. Independent journalists operate under exceptional circumstances, facing restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation, including arrests, harassment, and bans on coverage, as well as internal challenges related to political division and political polarization. Among the most prominent are Ma’an News Agency, Watan Media Network, Palestine Media Network, Nisaa FM Radio, Ajyal Network, 24 FM and Youth Radio Shabab FM, among others. However, these media outlets face significant challenges. In addition to political and security pressures, they suffer from weak funding and, more recently, a near-complete absence of advertising revenue due to the political situation and competition from social media.
Independent media attracts a broad audience seeking reliable information that is not subject to political authority or Palestinian factions. This audience comprises diverse groups, including young people, who constitute the largest segment of society, activists and those interested in public affairs, as well as the general public seeking an independent narrative.
Media literacy: development and challenges
Palestine is witnessing increasing activity in media and information literacy (MIL) to promote critical thinking and fact-checking, especially in light of the spread of misinformation. Institutions such as the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, UNESCO Palestine, PYALARA, Al-Quds Open University, and the Ministry of Education, to name a few, are leading comprehensive training programs and initiatives targeting students and teachers, focusing on digital literacy, countering hate speech and cyberbullying, and fact-checking, as part of efforts to protect social and national awareness.
Despite this, there are still a number of challenges to MIL in Palestine; the lack of institutional awareness of the importance of media and information literacy, the weakness of qualified personnel to implement media and information literacy, the lack of necessary material and technological resources, and the impact of political and economic conditions on the development of education in the field of media and information literacy.
Gender and media
Gender is an essential part of the Palestinian media landscape, both in terms of female representation in newsrooms and the nature of media discourse itself. Palestinian media provides extensive coverage of women’s issues, but it does so within a highly complex socio-political context, where gender issues are intertwined with the occupation, war, and economic and social pressures. This coverage is not uniform; it ranges from highlighting women’s role in the struggle and society to focusing on their daily suffering and offering limited criticism of social structures. In addition to issues related to the occupation, Palestinian media covers women’s issues related to domestic violence, discrimination in the labour market, early marriage, and women’s role in politics and society. However, these issues often recede in the face of political coverage. That said, some media coverage is influenced by stereotypes that often portray women as victims or secondary figures, rather than highlighting their essential role in political and social life.
Recent years have witnessed the rise of Palestinian media initiatives that seek to promote gender equality, whether through producing content that sheds light on women’s issues or by training and empowering young female journalists in the digital sphere. Social media platforms have also played a significant role in giving women a wider space to express their opinions and challenge traditional narratives. However, achieving a more gender-sensitive Palestinian media remains contingent on institutional reforms, the development of equitable editorial policies, and a deeper cultural shift within society.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Environmental issues in Palestine generally receive little media attention unless directly linked to the conflict with Israel. For example, there have been numerous reports on the environmental impacts of chemical waste from West Bank settlements that flows into Palestinian agricultural land, or on the effects of Israel’s construction of the separation wall in the West Bank. During the war in Gaza, some reports were published on the war’s environmental impacts. This lack of attention to environmental issues stems from the Palestinian media’s preoccupation with rapidly unfolding events and its focus on breaking news and issues related to the occupation. Discussions of environmental issues in the media are usually conducted by specialized civil society organizations such as the Applied Research Institute or the Ma’an Development Centre, as well as by the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority. In addition, there were some initiatives. In 2022, the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority and the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University launched a training program for young environmental journalists, implemented by Revolve Mediterraneo with funding from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, whereby 25 male and female students from 6 universities in the West Bank and Gaza participated: Palestine, Birzeit, Al-Aqsa, Hebron, An-Najah, and Al-Quds Open University. They presented visual and written journalistic materials addressing various environmental topics.
Coverage of the migration topic
Coverage of migration and displacement in Palestinian media is directly linked to the political, social, and economic realities experienced by Palestinians both within Palestine and in the diaspora. The issue of migration is an integral part of the conflict itself. Therefore, Palestinian media addresses it on three levels: internal displacement resulting from wars and Israeli aggression; external migration due to economic and political circumstances; and historical displacement since 1948, along with its associated narratives and rights.
Palestinian media focuses on the humanitarian dimension, highlighting the suffering of displaced families, the loss of homes and livelihoods, homelessness, and giving particular attention to children, women, and the elderly. On the political front, it emphasizes the connection between displacement and Israeli policies such as forced displacement and collective punishment. It also highlights the role of the international community and human rights organizations, presenting the Palestinian narrative in contrast to the Israeli narrative. On the economic and social front, Palestinian media focuses on issues such as poverty, the labour market, unemployment, and the lack of services and infrastructure in refugee camps, whether in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or in the Palestinian diaspora, especially the situation of refugees in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Sometimes, the Palestinian media highlights stories of success and integration in Europe, America, Canada and other countries of refuge.
AI development and use in the media sector
Palestine is still moving slowly towards using AI in media, due to the lack of a clear strategy for ethical guidelines, and the shortage of qualified personnel and expertise in AI-related technologies. Among the initiatives seeking to introduce AI into newsrooms is a study prepared by the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, funded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), entitled “How to Integrate Artificial Intelligence into Journalism and Media Education?”, given its growing necessity in the media industry.
In October 2025, the World Association of Publishers and News Makers (WAN IFRA) held a meeting with editors-in-chief of Palestinian media outlets to discuss ways to integrate AI into newsrooms, ensuring it serves as a partner rather than a replacement for journalists.
While content production with the use of AI may be relatively little, Palestinian media institutions use AI in several areas, such as big data analysis, deepfake detection, and faster translation and content production. It also helps monitoring global media discourse on the Palestinian issue and understanding its trends. However, the greatest challenge remains the potential bias in algorithms and the lack of technical resources, making the development of independent Palestinian tools a crucial step in strengthening the presence of the Palestinian narrative in the digital sphere.
Palestine
Reporters without Borders Index (most recent): 163
Freedom House Index: Gaza Strip 2/100. West Bank 22/100
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): N/A
Freedom of Expression
The war in Gaza and the ongoing Israeli escalation in the West Bank have impacted the freedom expression not only through the deliberate targeting of journalists but also with the wider freedom of expression. The main concerning issue regarding freedom of expression is the polarizations between those who believe that the events of October 7th resulted in a catastrophe for Palestinians, and those who say that Israel did not want an excuse to destroy the Gaza Strip or continue commenting crimes in the West Bank. This also applies to the critics of Hamas who have been portrayed as “traitors” or “betrayals” or even accused of being “collaborators” with Israel. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA), defamation was one of the most common patterns faced by journalists, with 55.6% of journalists being subjected to organized campaigns across digital platforms to defame them, followed by hacking and data theft at 48.1%, and electronic surveillance at 46.3%, in addition to other forms of digital violence such as digital harassment, threats, bullying, hate speech and identity theft.
Social media companies are still playing a vital role is viloating the Freedom of expression in Palestine. According to 7amleh’s Deceomber 2025 report “A total of 7 violations were documented involving account restrictions, along with 6 cases of content removal, 3 cases of account suspensions, and 2 instances of shadow banning, while 5 additional cases were distributed across various other types of digital sanctions.”
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
There have been no fundamental changes to media laws in Palestine. The Cybercrime Law continues to be a major concern for policymakers, journalists, and civil society organizations. Following numerous objections, the Palestinian Cabinet decided on April 30, 2025, to form a national committee to amend Decree-Law No. (10) of 2018 concerning cybercrimes, communications crimes, and information technology, and its amendments. The committee includes representatives from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Public Prosecution, the Ministry of Communications and Digital Economy, the General Secretariat of the Cabinet, and civil society organizations. The committee’s objective is to review the objections and submit recommendations to the government.
As for the Right to Information Law, the Ministry of Justice published a draft decree-law on November 4, 2025, which reignited the debate surrounding it. Some considered the latest version an improvement over previous drafts, but still requires addressing several fundamental issues, most notably the expansion of security and economic exceptions and the absence of clear provisions to ensure the harmonization of legislation, making the Right to Information Law the supreme reference in case of any conflict. Supporters of the law, however, considered it a fundamental pillar for promoting integrity and preventing corruption, given that the exceptions are precisely defined.
Pluralism
Despite the large number of media outlets in Palestine, however, the media still suffers from a superficial and artificial diversity due to limited variety, innovation, and renewal in content and programming. Most of the programming in TV and radio, for example, follow the same pattern, they have become elitist, featuring mainly analysts, politicians and academics to discuss public matters, while ordinary citizens are rarely represented. Many local Palestinian media outlets have been transformed into propaganda tools for political parties, especially with the war on Gaza. In addition to the lack of diversity in presentation, particularly evident is the absence of investigative journalism, except for a few rare attempts. Furthermore, the Palestinian media has failed to fulfil its oversight role over political power. Print journalism has failed to engage with technological advancements in the new digital media landscape and has been unable to adapt to the evolving organizational structure and its relationship with young audiences. This has contributed to a decline in readership among Palestinian youth. Furthermore, print media suffers from a profound structural crisis across all levels, from distribution to editorial boards. This context has enabled the prominence of social media, mainly Facebook, the fact that generated a disillusion among the Palestinian public with democracy and media diversity.
Censorship & self-censorship
In Palestine, there is no pre-censorship on publications but post-censorship, mainly by Isreal, in addition to the Palestinian political system in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as social censorship, companies and advertisers. This has led media outlets and journalists to set their own self-censorship or ‘pre-censorship’ for subjects that may include controversial taboo topics, political criticism or corruption-related topics. In addition to the traditional forms of censorship, Palestinian journalists and activists are subject to digital threats and violations. According to a study by the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom (MADA) the Israeli occupation and the authorities in the West Bank and Gaza employ digital tools to monitor content, block accounts, or summon journalists based on their online activity.
Disinformation and Misinformation
A study published by the Palestinian Observatory for Fact-Checking and Media Literacy (Tahaqaq) revealed that misleading content (47.25%) dominated the Palestinian digital landscape during February and March 2025, followed by false content at 44.44%, and harmful content at 8.31%. The high percentage of false content reflects the significant overlap in the Palestinian information landscape, where errors are prevalent in contexts that can be misinterpreted or exploited. This type of content is often attributed to the recirculation of old material, ack of knowledge, or poor editing skills, rather than necessarily to direct manipulation. The study also reveals that there is a clear dominance of individual sources over the information landscape, as the pages of individuals and ordinary users contributed the largest share of misleading and false content. This is attributed to the limited information awareness among the public, in addition to the great emotional impact during crises, which leads to the circulation of information without verification. As for news platforms, their danger is doubled, as they give misleading information an appearance of formal credibility, which contributes to its wider spread, especially when it is quoted or republished through other platforms linked to entities with political orientations.
Disinformation and misinformation are also part of the war on Gaza. Much of this content was widely disseminated online, with tens of millions of posts circulating on social media. A variety of sources, including government officials, media outlets, and social media influencers in various countries, contributed to the spread of this misinformation and disinformation. Several Palestinian institutions play a central role in combating misinformation and disinformation. The most prominent are 7amleh, Tahaqaq and Kashif. Additionally, some outlets play a major role in challenging misleading narratives through investigative journalism by providing documented reporting that helps counter widespread misinformation about Palestine.
Access to Information
The absence of a right to information law in Palestine creates a fertile ground for the spread of rumours, fabricated news, and misinformation. Those seeking information who cannot find it through official channels and legal means will resort to alternative methods, which may yield accurate information, rumours, distorted information, or outright fabrication. The national debate surrounding the right to information law has resurfaced following the publication of the draft law for 2025, which was first proposed over twenty years ago but never passed. The most significant problem with the 2025 draft lies in its vague exceptions related to broad concepts such as “national security,” “national economy,” and “public interest.” These terms could be used to deny citizens access to information if left undefined. Furthermore, the draft prioritizes other laws of a confidential or security nature in cases of conflict, potentially rendering the new law ineffective. (Please see section 2 Media Laws)
Journalists Security
Despite the ceasefire in Gaza, Isreal continues to target journalists. On 21 January 2026, an Israeli drone strike on a vehicle in central Gaza killed freelance photographer Abed Shaat, a regular contributor to Agence France-Presse (AFP), Mohammad Qeshta, a spokesperson for the Egyptian Committee who reported news to his Telegram, and Anas Ghnaim, a freelance photographer and drone operator who worked for Smart Media. The attack came while the three journalists were on assignment for the Egyptian Committee.
The West Bank continues to be a hostile environment for journalists. Attacks against journalists are not limited to Israeli soldiers but also to Israeli settlers. Video images showed, on many occasions, the direct and deliberate targeting of journalists by Israeli soldiers, whether in the form of physical attacks or by firing teargas and stun grenades at them, in some cases live ammunition was used.
Israeli settlers, often guarded by soldiers, have also been attacking journalists. Most prominent was the attack on Reuters photojournalist Raneen Sawafta, who escaped death after being severely beaten by settlers in the village of Beita north of the West Bank. Sawafta was accompanied by Reuters security adviser Grant Bowden who was beaten as he tried to protect her.
Media Business Models
Within the complexity of the political, economic and social context, the media business models in Palestine remain the same. The most significant is the donor-funded one, depending on projects supported by international donors. However, this source of funding is no longer as used to be due to the lack of funding at origin. The other model is advertisingbased which is limited and inconsistent due to the small market size, political and economic constrains, as well as competition with social media adverting. Most of the media outlets adopt a hybrid Nonprofit–Commercial Models combining donor funding, advertising, and commercial services.
Independent Media: state and challenges
Independent media in Palestine represent a rare space for free expression amidst a complex political environment and immense security and economic pressures. Independent journalists operate under exceptional circumstances, facing restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation, including arrests, harassment, and bans on coverage, as well as internal challenges related to political division and political polarization. Among the most prominent are Ma’an News Agency, Watan Media Network, Palestine Media Network, Nisaa FM Radio, Ajyal Network, 24 FM and Youth Radio Shabab FM, among others. However, these media outlets face significant challenges. In addition to political and security pressures, they suffer from weak funding and, more recently, a near-complete absence of advertising revenue due to the political situation and competition from social media.
Independent media attracts a broad audience seeking reliable information that is not subject to political authority or Palestinian factions. This audience comprises diverse groups, including young people, who constitute the largest segment of society, activists and those interested in public affairs, as well as the general public seeking an independent narrative.
Media literacy: development and challenges
Palestine is witnessing increasing activity in media and information literacy (MIL) to promote critical thinking and fact-checking, especially in light of the spread of misinformation. Institutions such as the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, UNESCO Palestine, PYALARA, Al-Quds Open University, and the Ministry of Education, to name a few, are leading comprehensive training programs and initiatives targeting students and teachers, focusing on digital literacy, countering hate speech and cyberbullying, and fact-checking, as part of efforts to protect social and national awareness.
Despite this, there are still a number of challenges to MIL in Palestine; the lack of institutional awareness of the importance of media and information literacy, the weakness of qualified personnel to implement media and information literacy, the lack of necessary material and technological resources, and the impact of political and economic conditions on the development of education in the field of media and information literacy.
Gender and media
Gender is an essential part of the Palestinian media landscape, both in terms of female representation in newsrooms and the nature of media discourse itself. Palestinian media provides extensive coverage of women’s issues, but it does so within a highly complex socio-political context, where gender issues are intertwined with the occupation, war, and economic and social pressures. This coverage is not uniform; it ranges from highlighting women’s role in the struggle and society to focusing on their daily suffering and offering limited criticism of social structures. In addition to issues related to the occupation, Palestinian media covers women’s issues related to domestic violence, discrimination in the labour market, early marriage, and women’s role in politics and society. However, these issues often recede in the face of political coverage. That said, some media coverage is influenced by stereotypes that often portray women as victims or secondary figures, rather than highlighting their essential role in political and social life.
Recent years have witnessed the rise of Palestinian media initiatives that seek to promote gender equality, whether through producing content that sheds light on women’s issues or by training and empowering young female journalists in the digital sphere. Social media platforms have also played a significant role in giving women a wider space to express their opinions and challenge traditional narratives. However, achieving a more gender-sensitive Palestinian media remains contingent on institutional reforms, the development of equitable editorial policies, and a deeper cultural shift within society.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Environmental issues in Palestine generally receive little media attention unless directly linked to the conflict with Israel. For example, there have been numerous reports on the environmental impacts of chemical waste from West Bank settlements that flows into Palestinian agricultural land, or on the effects of Israel’s construction of the separation wall in the West Bank. During the war in Gaza, some reports were published on the war’s environmental impacts. This lack of attention to environmental issues stems from the Palestinian media’s preoccupation with rapidly unfolding events and its focus on breaking news and issues related to the occupation. Discussions of environmental issues in the media are usually conducted by specialized civil society organizations such as the Applied Research Institute or the Ma’an Development Centre, as well as by the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority. In addition, there were some initiatives. In 2022, the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority and the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University launched a training program for young environmental journalists, implemented by Revolve Mediterraneo with funding from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, whereby 25 male and female students from 6 universities in the West Bank and Gaza participated: Palestine, Birzeit, Al-Aqsa, Hebron, An-Najah, and Al-Quds Open University. They presented visual and written journalistic materials addressing various environmental topics.
Coverage of the migration topic
Coverage of migration and displacement in Palestinian media is directly linked to the political, social, and economic realities experienced by Palestinians both within Palestine and in the diaspora. The issue of migration is an integral part of the conflict itself. Therefore, Palestinian media addresses it on three levels: internal displacement resulting from wars and Israeli aggression; external migration due to economic and political circumstances; and historical displacement since 1948, along with its associated narratives and rights.
Palestinian media focuses on the humanitarian dimension, highlighting the suffering of displaced families, the loss of homes and livelihoods, homelessness, and giving particular attention to children, women, and the elderly. On the political front, it emphasizes the connection between displacement and Israeli policies such as forced displacement and collective punishment. It also highlights the role of the international community and human rights organizations, presenting the Palestinian narrative in contrast to the Israeli narrative. On the economic and social front, Palestinian media focuses on issues such as poverty, the labour market, unemployment, and the lack of services and infrastructure in refugee camps, whether in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or in the Palestinian diaspora, especially the situation of refugees in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Sometimes, the Palestinian media highlights stories of success and integration in Europe, America, Canada and other countries of refuge.
AI development and use in the media sector
Palestine is still moving slowly towards using AI in media, due to the lack of a clear strategy for ethical guidelines, and the shortage of qualified personnel and expertise in AI-related technologies. Among the initiatives seeking to introduce AI into newsrooms is a study prepared by the Media Development Centre at Birzeit University, funded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), entitled “How to Integrate Artificial Intelligence into Journalism and Media Education?”, given its growing necessity in the media industry.
In October 2025, the World Association of Publishers and News Makers (WAN IFRA) held a meeting with editors-in-chief of Palestinian media outlets to discuss ways to integrate AI into newsrooms, ensuring it serves as a partner rather than a replacement for journalists.
While content production with the use of AI may be relatively little, Palestinian media institutions use AI in several areas, such as big data analysis, deepfake detection, and faster translation and content production. It also helps monitoring global media discourse on the Palestinian issue and understanding its trends. However, the greatest challenge remains the potential bias in algorithms and the lack of technical resources, making the development of independent Palestinian tools a crucial step in strengthening the presence of the Palestinian narrative in the digital sphere.
Freedom of the press is enshrined in Article 15 of the Jordanian Constitution. The sector is mainly regulated by the Press and Publications Act and the Broadcasting Act, which covers electronic publications. In the last 10 years, several specific laws have also encroached on the freedom of the press: the law against terrorism, the law on cybercrime (2018)… Today, there are more than 20 laws and regulations governing the exercise of freedom of the press.
The law on the press and publications of 1993 and 1998The law, which has been amended several times, has allowed the emergence of many private media, granted the protection of sources and established the basis for access to public information. But it has also provided for the establishment of a license for any media, printing, bookstore or advertising agency or translation, polling institute or even research centers. In other words, the authorization is limited.
The Jordanian government adopted a National Media Strategy in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring, a strategy designed to establish “an independent Jordanian media rooted in the principles of freedom, pluralism and professionalism ». Yet, shortly thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, two amendments to the press law forced nearly 290 news sites to close because they could not meet the new regulatory requirements for licensing by the Media Commission.
Liberalized twenty years ago in 2002 with the end of the Jordanian Radio Television (JRTV) monopoly, the audiovisual sector is controlled. The broadcast media law combined the regulators (one for print and one for broadcast) into one, the Jordan Media Commission (JMC). The Commission is fully funded by the state (€1.5 million in 2019) and its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for validating – or not – the Commission’s decisions to award broadcasting licenses to radio and television stations. Less exposed, the Commission de Régulation des Télécoms has been determining the available frequencies and the conditions for broadcasting telecom services since 1995. 39 radio stations have a license, 20 of which are governmental (and 6 for universities).
The Ministry of Information has been replaced by government spokespersons who exercise supervision over the sector and the state media, alongside the Ministries of Culture, Information Technology and Finance.
As for access to information, the absence of an independent Access to Information Commission makes it impossible to obtain information on a regular basis or to seek redress when obstacles arise. In addition, the practice of transparency is selective: for example, the police reserve the exclusivity of service information on the traffic situation for their own radio station.
Jordanians are moving away from their traditional media (television and newspapers) and are getting most of their information from social networks: 88% were connected in 2018 compared to 23% in 2012. According to IPSOS (IPSOS 2018 result cited in USAID’s JORDAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT published in June 2021), during the same period (between 2012 and 2018), television consumption dropped from 93% to 80%, radio from 30% to 26%, and daily newspapers from 18% to 6% (with precipitous drops in official newspapers – Al Rai, Al Ghad and Ad Dustour).
The English-language press, which has an extremely marginal audience among the Jordanian population, is generally freer than the Arabic-language press, although monotonous and uniform; it is aimed at a mainly foreign audience, diplomats or members of NGOs.
Among the commercial media, the private television Ro’yaand its website (http://roya.tv) dominate the advertising market. Ro’ya and some private radio stations like Masaj, Dahab and Fun or again Rotana FM, share the audience with Al Ghad and the website in english Jordan News launched in 2021.
Some professional media with an information mission exist under the status of private companies without being commercial: the site 7iber, the radio Al Balad and his website AmmanNet which tries to federate local and community radio stations with an exchange of information programs, or the webTv Aramram which only broadcasts on social networks.
Jordan’s official media actors are organised in the Jordan Press Association (JPA), a single Jordanian affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists.
There is no organization for independent or unofficial media in Jordan. The community radios have grouped together in a federation that brings together the radios Al Balad, Voice of Karak, New Maan radio, Yarmouk FM and Farah Al-Nas, among others, were beneficiaries of the European support programme for Jordanian media in 2015.The Community Media Network joined the coalition of 15 Jordanian civil society organisations HIMAM.
The Jordanian market cannot absorb the large number of graduates from the seven main journalism training institutions every year. Initiated in 1982 at the public university of Yarmouk in Irbid, these trainings remain mainly theoretical and are given by professors who have never been journalists and who have no direct link with the media. The practice of journalism, the concrete phase of the profession, is therefore not part of the training.
Only two of seven universities offer electronic media courses. Six universities have radio and television production studios, and several publish student newspapers. The offer is complemented by master’s degree courses offered by the Jordan Media Institute (JMI) and by the training centers of the national television, the official news agency and the private television Ro’ya.
An independent commission on secularization education is working on the preparation of an educational curriculum to include media literacy, the result of the analysis made by UNESCO in 2015. A national strategy has been adopted until 2023, with training for primary, secondary and university teachers under the auspices of the Jordan Media Institute (JMI).
Freedom of the press is enshrined in Article 15 of the Jordanian Constitution. The sector is mainly regulated by the Press and Publications Act and the Broadcasting Act, which covers electronic publications. In the last 10 years, several specific laws have also encroached on the freedom of the press: the law against terrorism, the law on cybercrime (2018)… Today, there are more than 20 laws and regulations governing the exercise of freedom of the press.
The law on the press and publications of 1993 and 1998The law, which has been amended several times, has allowed the emergence of many private media, granted the protection of sources and established the basis for access to public information. But it has also provided for the establishment of a license for any media, printing, bookstore or advertising agency or translation, polling institute or even research centers. In other words, the authorization is limited.
The Jordanian government adopted a National Media Strategy in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring, a strategy designed to establish “an independent Jordanian media rooted in the principles of freedom, pluralism and professionalism ». Yet, shortly thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, two amendments to the press law forced nearly 290 news sites to close because they could not meet the new regulatory requirements for licensing by the Media Commission.
Liberalized twenty years ago in 2002 with the end of the Jordanian Radio Television (JRTV) monopoly, the audiovisual sector is controlled. The broadcast media law combined the regulators (one for print and one for broadcast) into one, the Jordan Media Commission (JMC). The Commission is fully funded by the state (€1.5 million in 2019) and its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for validating – or not – the Commission’s decisions to award broadcasting licenses to radio and television stations. Less exposed, the Commission de Régulation des Télécoms has been determining the available frequencies and the conditions for broadcasting telecom services since 1995. 39 radio stations have a license, 20 of which are governmental (and 6 for universities).
The Ministry of Information has been replaced by government spokespersons who exercise supervision over the sector and the state media, alongside the Ministries of Culture, Information Technology and Finance.
As for access to information, the absence of an independent Access to Information Commission makes it impossible to obtain information on a regular basis or to seek redress when obstacles arise. In addition, the practice of transparency is selective: for example, the police reserve the exclusivity of service information on the traffic situation for their own radio station.
Jordanians are moving away from their traditional media (television and newspapers) and are getting most of their information from social networks: 88% were connected in 2018 compared to 23% in 2012. According to IPSOS (IPSOS 2018 result cited in USAID’s JORDAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT published in June 2021), during the same period (between 2012 and 2018), television consumption dropped from 93% to 80%, radio from 30% to 26%, and daily newspapers from 18% to 6% (with precipitous drops in official newspapers – Al Rai, Al Ghad and Ad Dustour).
The English-language press, which has an extremely marginal audience among the Jordanian population, is generally freer than the Arabic-language press, although monotonous and uniform; it is aimed at a mainly foreign audience, diplomats or members of NGOs.
Among the commercial media, the private television Ro’yaand its website (http://roya.tv) dominate the advertising market. Ro’ya and some private radio stations like Masaj, Dahab and Fun or again Rotana FM, share the audience with Al Ghad and the website in english Jordan News launched in 2021.
Some professional media with an information mission exist under the status of private companies without being commercial: the site 7iber, the radio Al Balad and his website AmmanNet which tries to federate local and community radio stations with an exchange of information programs, or the webTv Aramram which only broadcasts on social networks.
Jordan’s official media actors are organised in the Jordan Press Association (JPA), a single Jordanian affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists.
There is no organization for independent or unofficial media in Jordan. The community radios have grouped together in a federation that brings together the radios Al Balad, Voice of Karak, New Maan radio, Yarmouk FM and Farah Al-Nas, among others, were beneficiaries of the European support programme for Jordanian media in 2015.The Community Media Network joined the coalition of 15 Jordanian civil society organisations HIMAM.
The Jordanian market cannot absorb the large number of graduates from the seven main journalism training institutions every year. Initiated in 1982 at the public university of Yarmouk in Irbid, these trainings remain mainly theoretical and are given by professors who have never been journalists and who have no direct link with the media. The practice of journalism, the concrete phase of the profession, is therefore not part of the training.
Only two of seven universities offer electronic media courses. Six universities have radio and television production studios, and several publish student newspapers. The offer is complemented by master’s degree courses offered by the Jordan Media Institute (JMI) and by the training centers of the national television, the official news agency and the private television Ro’ya.
An independent commission on secularization education is working on the preparation of an educational curriculum to include media literacy, the result of the analysis made by UNESCO in 2015. A national strategy has been adopted until 2023, with training for primary, secondary and university teachers under the auspices of the Jordan Media Institute (JMI).
Lebanon
Lebanon is governed by a sectarian system that influences all aspects of social and political life, including the media sector. As a result, the country’s competing sectarian forces have utilized various means of telecommunications to communicate with their constituents, invest in journalists, writers, intellectuals, and producers, and most importantly, shape and contribute to the public debate. This contradictory and “plural” reality of the system has allowed for an expanding margin of freedom of expression relative to its authoritarian neighbors in the region. Nevertheless, the active interventions of different political parties in the media sphere have led to issues of editorial independence and financial sustainability, particularly as different outlets have relied on political funding to sustain themselves.
Given the platform provided by these outlets, such practices and conditions interact with and reinforce a variety of societal taboos in the country. These include institutional taboos (e.g., insulting the President), religious taboos, and taboos related to gender and sexuality. Despite the plurality of the Lebanese media, the long-lasting monopoly of different political forces in the country on the media sector has allowed for an entrenched series of local despots, utilizing propaganda to justify a plethora of methods to repress oppositional actors and marginalized groups. In fact, since 2017, the number of violations against journalists, activists, and influencers in the country has dramatically increased.
In Lebanon, the media is officially governed by a system of laws that concern different sectors. Given the increasing presence and influence of news sites and alternative outlets in the online sphere, a new media law which seeks to regulate these new means of communications has also been under discussion for over a decade. Also, past studies which concern the ways in which governments have intervened in the sector have indicated that the execution of these laws and procedures has been inconsistent. Currently, the key and most relevant texts include the 1962 Press Law, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law (Law 382), the 1994 Satellite Broadcast Law (Law 531), and the 1947 Cinema Law.
The issue of pluralism in Lebanon is closely related to the country’s system. The consociational system is prevalent in different aspects of social, political, and economic life. Therefore, Lebanon does not follow the model of state-controlled monopolistic media outlets that are typically found in neighboring authoritarian Arab regimes. This has allowed for a certain degree of pluralism and cultural richness, leading to a rise in the number of newspapers, magazines, and cultural centers historically.
However, state-imposed laws and regulations have put restrictions on launching these outlets. Journalists have to navigate through repressive policies and bureaucratic avenues to operate in the media sector.
Today, social media has become the primary platform for communication in Lebanon, with a vast majority of the population using it. It has made access to information faster, and the ability to create and circulate content is more accessible to new media entrepreneurs. The availability of social media has expanded the country’s pluralistic capacity.
The question of media access also depends on the financial capacity of individuals to start new ventures, especially when the economic and security situation has not been favorable to media projects in recent years.
The absence of monopolistic state ownership does not suggest that problematic and exclusivist forms of ownership which reinforce political intervention do not exist in the sector. In fact, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) project (launched by the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders, then in partnership with the Global Media Registry) clearly demonstrates ways in which members of the influential elite and political class in the country have held shares in a variety of media outlets in the pursuit of influencing coverage and promoting the pertinent interests and frames which suit them.
Censorship in Lebanon occurs in various forms, with two significant categories being cultural censorship and political censorship. The former includes but is not restricted to banning forms of “sexual” expression and a variety of societal taboos that emerge in films, concerts, book events, and other artistic or social occasions. The latter, which is more contentious, ranges from suppressing implicit criticisms targeting key figureheads in the Lebanese political system to prohibiting “offensive” or disruptive imagery regarding the legitimacy of neighboring regimes, and initiating calls to no-platform films whose characters or plot can be linked to Israel, legally classified as an enemy country.
In the Lebanese context, while explicit violations of the principle of free speech are not uncommon, self-censorship is a much more pervasive sentiment. Through acts of intimidation and harassment, along with journalists’ increasing financial dependence on their outlets and various other political considerations, the country’s primary political forces and security institutions can impose indirect restrictions on free speech.
Despite being understudied in the Lebanese context, misinformation is a particular problem that regularly surfaces in the media sphere, especially on the much less regulated social media domain. In Lebanon, platforms such as Facebook or Twitter have their pages flooded by articles and posts riddled with fake news, which is circulated either deliberately for political purposes or unintentionally as supportive constituents are unable to isolate fake news and produce reliable information.
According to the “Access to Information” law (Law No.28) passed in 2017 (the first legal obligation for the state to publish financial and administrative documents originating from different ministries and judicial departments), and later amended in July 2021, journalists have the written right to request any document that concerns the public interest. However, regardless of these formal constraints, the actual bureaucratic process heavily relies on who is requesting the document and how political actors anticipate they will be utilized.
In Lebanon, he vast majority of press associations and syndicates are closely linked to the country’s primary sectarian political parties and figures. Due to this consistent lack of protection, journalists from different regions and domains in the country created the Alternative Media Syndicate in 2019.
All studies, indicators, and reports suggest that the basic security of journalists, media workers, reporters, researchers, and writers is being threatened. There are several dimensions to this quandary: (1) the number of direct, low-level violations constituting physical repression that have occurred in the past few years or so, (2) the continuous cycle of assassinations targeting journalists and writers with similar political patterns, and (3) character assassinations that revolve around the usage of social media to construct narratives aimed at dehumanizing specific persons and damaging their reputation, further providing the context for potential physical violence.
While the country’s economic crisis has made the status of journalists very difficult, the hardships faced by media workers preceded this crisis. This has its roots in the application of the country’s labor law, the reliance of various outlets on informal oral contracts, and the lack of reliable benefits packages, such as health insurance and productive device coverage. A study conducted by Samir Kassir Foundation raises important and crucial insights about the nature of labor rights within the media sector.
When assessing the tone, rhetoric, working conditions, and orientation in traditional media, the treatment of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community presents a clear issue in the way these matters are approached in the public domain. This treatment concerns not only the role and behavior of senior management but also how misogynistic, sexist, and homophobic discourse permeates the media sphere.
Women, the LGBTQ+ community, migrant workers, and refugees are just a few examples of marginalized groups who consistently receive discriminatory and hate speech on the online social media platforms of different television stations and newspaper outlets. Recurrent monthly monitoring-based research conducted by the Samir Kassir Foundation shows that gendered comments and slurs are an instrumental component of this hate speech.
Media training in Lebanon can be divided into two categories: training offered by international organizations, official institutions, and non-government organizations in the country, and formal academic training offered in select universities with a comprehensive curriculum. Any assessment of strengths and weaknesses should consider the progress and performance of both domains. Regarding formal academic training, there is a consensus among stakeholders that journalism and media studies in Lebanon “urgently needed more qualified faculty, locally oriented research, and relevant academic and technical resources”.
In Lebanon, a comprehensive media literacy curriculum was implemented in the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University. A product of the efforts of various foundations and international institutes and initiatives, such as the Salzburg Academy for Media and Global Change and the Open Society Foundations, the curriculum underwent a number of adaptations which made the training process more professional and implementable, but also reduced the foundational and theoretical rigor of the material. Due to the lack of adequate state preparation or intervention in these matters, alongside the fact that the question of media literacy has been confined to the programs of elite educational institutions, civil society initiatives, workshops, and programs have acted as an alternative field to discuss this issue.
Lebanon
Lebanon is governed by a sectarian system that influences all aspects of social and political life, including the media sector. As a result, the country’s competing sectarian forces have utilized various means of telecommunications to communicate with their constituents, invest in journalists, writers, intellectuals, and producers, and most importantly, shape and contribute to the public debate. This contradictory and “plural” reality of the system has allowed for an expanding margin of freedom of expression relative to its authoritarian neighbors in the region. Nevertheless, the active interventions of different political parties in the media sphere have led to issues of editorial independence and financial sustainability, particularly as different outlets have relied on political funding to sustain themselves.
Given the platform provided by these outlets, such practices and conditions interact with and reinforce a variety of societal taboos in the country. These include institutional taboos (e.g., insulting the President), religious taboos, and taboos related to gender and sexuality. Despite the plurality of the Lebanese media, the long-lasting monopoly of different political forces in the country on the media sector has allowed for an entrenched series of local despots, utilizing propaganda to justify a plethora of methods to repress oppositional actors and marginalized groups. In fact, since 2017, the number of violations against journalists, activists, and influencers in the country has dramatically increased.
In Lebanon, the media is officially governed by a system of laws that concern different sectors. Given the increasing presence and influence of news sites and alternative outlets in the online sphere, a new media law which seeks to regulate these new means of communications has also been under discussion for over a decade. Also, past studies which concern the ways in which governments have intervened in the sector have indicated that the execution of these laws and procedures has been inconsistent. Currently, the key and most relevant texts include the 1962 Press Law, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law (Law 382), the 1994 Satellite Broadcast Law (Law 531), and the 1947 Cinema Law.
The issue of pluralism in Lebanon is closely related to the country’s system. The consociational system is prevalent in different aspects of social, political, and economic life. Therefore, Lebanon does not follow the model of state-controlled monopolistic media outlets that are typically found in neighboring authoritarian Arab regimes. This has allowed for a certain degree of pluralism and cultural richness, leading to a rise in the number of newspapers, magazines, and cultural centers historically.
However, state-imposed laws and regulations have put restrictions on launching these outlets. Journalists have to navigate through repressive policies and bureaucratic avenues to operate in the media sector.
Today, social media has become the primary platform for communication in Lebanon, with a vast majority of the population using it. It has made access to information faster, and the ability to create and circulate content is more accessible to new media entrepreneurs. The availability of social media has expanded the country’s pluralistic capacity.
The question of media access also depends on the financial capacity of individuals to start new ventures, especially when the economic and security situation has not been favorable to media projects in recent years.
The absence of monopolistic state ownership does not suggest that problematic and exclusivist forms of ownership which reinforce political intervention do not exist in the sector. In fact, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) project (launched by the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders, then in partnership with the Global Media Registry) clearly demonstrates ways in which members of the influential elite and political class in the country have held shares in a variety of media outlets in the pursuit of influencing coverage and promoting the pertinent interests and frames which suit them.
Censorship in Lebanon occurs in various forms, with two significant categories being cultural censorship and political censorship. The former includes but is not restricted to banning forms of “sexual” expression and a variety of societal taboos that emerge in films, concerts, book events, and other artistic or social occasions. The latter, which is more contentious, ranges from suppressing implicit criticisms targeting key figureheads in the Lebanese political system to prohibiting “offensive” or disruptive imagery regarding the legitimacy of neighboring regimes, and initiating calls to no-platform films whose characters or plot can be linked to Israel, legally classified as an enemy country.
In the Lebanese context, while explicit violations of the principle of free speech are not uncommon, self-censorship is a much more pervasive sentiment. Through acts of intimidation and harassment, along with journalists’ increasing financial dependence on their outlets and various other political considerations, the country’s primary political forces and security institutions can impose indirect restrictions on free speech.
Despite being understudied in the Lebanese context, misinformation is a particular problem that regularly surfaces in the media sphere, especially on the much less regulated social media domain. In Lebanon, platforms such as Facebook or Twitter have their pages flooded by articles and posts riddled with fake news, which is circulated either deliberately for political purposes or unintentionally as supportive constituents are unable to isolate fake news and produce reliable information.
According to the “Access to Information” law (Law No.28) passed in 2017 (the first legal obligation for the state to publish financial and administrative documents originating from different ministries and judicial departments), and later amended in July 2021, journalists have the written right to request any document that concerns the public interest. However, regardless of these formal constraints, the actual bureaucratic process heavily relies on who is requesting the document and how political actors anticipate they will be utilized.
In Lebanon, he vast majority of press associations and syndicates are closely linked to the country’s primary sectarian political parties and figures. Due to this consistent lack of protection, journalists from different regions and domains in the country created the Alternative Media Syndicate in 2019.
All studies, indicators, and reports suggest that the basic security of journalists, media workers, reporters, researchers, and writers is being threatened. There are several dimensions to this quandary: (1) the number of direct, low-level violations constituting physical repression that have occurred in the past few years or so, (2) the continuous cycle of assassinations targeting journalists and writers with similar political patterns, and (3) character assassinations that revolve around the usage of social media to construct narratives aimed at dehumanizing specific persons and damaging their reputation, further providing the context for potential physical violence.
While the country’s economic crisis has made the status of journalists very difficult, the hardships faced by media workers preceded this crisis. This has its roots in the application of the country’s labor law, the reliance of various outlets on informal oral contracts, and the lack of reliable benefits packages, such as health insurance and productive device coverage. A study conducted by Samir Kassir Foundation raises important and crucial insights about the nature of labor rights within the media sector.
When assessing the tone, rhetoric, working conditions, and orientation in traditional media, the treatment of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community presents a clear issue in the way these matters are approached in the public domain. This treatment concerns not only the role and behavior of senior management but also how misogynistic, sexist, and homophobic discourse permeates the media sphere.
Women, the LGBTQ+ community, migrant workers, and refugees are just a few examples of marginalized groups who consistently receive discriminatory and hate speech on the online social media platforms of different television stations and newspaper outlets. Recurrent monthly monitoring-based research conducted by the Samir Kassir Foundation shows that gendered comments and slurs are an instrumental component of this hate speech.
Media training in Lebanon can be divided into two categories: training offered by international organizations, official institutions, and non-government organizations in the country, and formal academic training offered in select universities with a comprehensive curriculum. Any assessment of strengths and weaknesses should consider the progress and performance of both domains. Regarding formal academic training, there is a consensus among stakeholders that journalism and media studies in Lebanon “urgently needed more qualified faculty, locally oriented research, and relevant academic and technical resources”.
In Lebanon, a comprehensive media literacy curriculum was implemented in the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University. A product of the efforts of various foundations and international institutes and initiatives, such as the Salzburg Academy for Media and Global Change and the Open Society Foundations, the curriculum underwent a number of adaptations which made the training process more professional and implementable, but also reduced the foundational and theoretical rigor of the material. Due to the lack of adequate state preparation or intervention in these matters, alongside the fact that the question of media literacy has been confined to the programs of elite educational institutions, civil society initiatives, workshops, and programs have acted as an alternative field to discuss this issue.
Syria
Reporters Without Borders Index: 177 / 180 (2025)
Freedom House Index: 5 / 100 – Not Free (2025)
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): 12 / 100 (2024)
Freedom of Expression
Since overthrowing the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Syria has experienced unprecedented freedom of expression, reflected in rare progress on both Reporters Without Borders’ Freedom of the Press Index (2025) and Freedom House’s Freedom Index (2025). According to the Ministry of Information (MoI), 19,200 work permits have been issued to local journalists over the past year. However, this newfound freedom is not protected by laws or well-established institutions, including independent syndicates.
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
Apart from the Constitutional Declaration (Temporary Constitution) of March 13, 2025, which states that “The State guarantees freedom of opinion, expression, information, publication, and the press” (Article 13), Syrian media remains, at least in theory, governed by largely repressive laws from the Assad regime era since the new parliament has not yet convened.
Pluralism
Syrian media pluralism emerged from the 2011 revolution, enabling the rise of independent outlets, including those in non-Arabic languages like Kurdish. These outlets operated in exile and in regions outside the control of the former Assad regime. Currently, it is safe to say that this pluralism still persists. Since the collapse of the previous regime, 636 registration requests have been submitted by media outlets.
Censorship & self-censorship
The collapse of the Assad regime has, consequently, led to the disappearance of many previous taboos and red lines, especially related to the president, his family, his inner circle, as well as the military, security forces, ethnic issues, and the economic situation. However, the ambiguity surrounding laws and high social tensions compel journalists to practice self-censorship. For example, both local and foreign journalists have expressed fears of being denied a visa or access to officials for criticizing the government. Additionally, journalists worry about facing physical and online threats from the public because of their work.
Disinformation and Misinformation
Since the 2011 revolution, news related to Syria has become a battleground for misinformation. This situation has worsened with the collapse of the Assad regime, as more organized misinformation campaigns—sponsored and promoted regionally—seek to delegitimize the new Syrian government and, more importantly, to incite sectarian and ethnic hostility and violence among Syrians. In response, fact-checking platforms such as Verify-Sy, true_platform, Fareq, and Radar have been established. Many outlets also collaborate with specialized organizations to verify their reports before publishing. Furthermore, the MoI has launched an initiative to develop a code of conduct, including 16 workshops across different governorates, attended by 600 journalists.
Access to Information
Syria has never enacted a law guaranteeing the right to access information. Since the fall of the Assad regime, access to information has significantly improved, allowing journalists to work more freely within the country. However, access to officials remains limited, and Syrian journalists have voiced concerns and frustration about the preferential treatment given to foreign journalists or to Syrian journalists working for international media outlets and news agencies.
Journalists’ Security
Despite significant changes since December 2024, Syrian journalists still face serious threats. According to the France-based Syrian Journalists Association (SJA), three journalists were temporarily arrested by government forces in June 2025. Additionally, the new government’s reactivation of Cybercrime Law No. 20 of 2022 poses a real threat to journalists in particular. This law has been criticized since its enactment for restricting freedom of expression through vague restrictions and harsh penalties, and there has reportedly been a sharp increase in legal complaints over online incitement and sectarianism.
However, the most serious threats originate outside government restrictions, due to security concerns, sectarian violence, longstanding grievances from the war, and regional instability. SJA has documented the killing of three journalists, while two others were injured in May, June, and July 2025, by known perpetrators. Additionally, several journalists survived Israeli attacks in southern Syria or were temporarily detained by Israeli forces.
Media Business Models
Due to decades of authoritarian rule, over ten years of war, and international sanctions, Syrian media now heavily rely—if not entirely—on external funding. While government-affiliated outlets receive official support, independent ones depend on international aid. Additionally, some media organizations are backed by regional powers, such as Syria TV, which is funded by Qatar. However, recent sanctions relief could allow revenue from advertising, especially on social media platforms and apps.
Independent Media: state and challenges
The resurgence of independent media has been one of the most significant outcomes of the 2011 revolution. The most notable among those still operating are Enab Baladi, Al Jumhuriya, Syria Direct, Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism (SIRAJ), Radio Rozana, and Radio Arta. Besides relying on international funds, all these outlets—except for Enab Baladi, which announced in March 2025 that it would resume printing and distribution in Damascus—are only available online, limiting their reach and influence. According to Datareportal, Syria’s internet penetration rate was 35.8 percent of the total population at the start of 2025. More importantly, these outlets face the challenge of navigating and impacting a highly polarized environment without sacrificing their objectivity and other professional standards.
Media literacy: development and challenges
The increase in misinformation and disinformation, along with regime change in Syria, has boosted interest in media literacy. The most recent and notable effort is the Syria Media Literacy Lab project. However, at this early stage, it still seems mainly focused on journalists.
Gender and media
The 2011 uprising marked a pivotal moment in Syrian women’s participation in the media. However, only 38% of them, according to a 2016 study, held “positions of responsibility.” With support from Syrian independent media and international donors, the past year has seen notable efforts to empower female journalists through various training programs and fellowships.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Although Syrian outlets specializing in environmental issues remain scarce or nonexistent, environmental concerns appear to be a priority for the existing media and journalists. This rapidly growing awareness and interest are driven by three main factors: the devastating environmental effects of the recent years’ war, the clear negative impacts of climate change—especially drought—and the increasing donor support for the media’s role in raising awareness and helping find solutions.
Coverage of the migrations topic
Due to years of war, Syria has become a source of refugees rather than a destination. However, there is an immigration-related issue involving Palestinian refugees who arrived in the country after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and have since had all civil rights (but not political rights), similar to their Syrian counterparts. In this context, Syrian media freely and favorably report on any situation involving Syrian-Palestinians.
AI development and use in the media sector
Three clear positions can be identified among Syrian media regarding the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Among exiled, independent outlets, some believe that AI distorts the essence of journalism. Conversely, others are convinced that wisely adopting this technology could improve the quality and reach of media. On the other side, due to numerous technical issues, mainly poor internet connectivity, local outlets seem unable to participate in such a debate.
Syria
Reporters Without Borders Index: 177 / 180 (2025)
Freedom House Index: 5 / 100 – Not Free (2025)
Index of Corruption (Transparency International): 12 / 100 (2024)
Freedom of Expression
Since overthrowing the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Syria has experienced unprecedented freedom of expression, reflected in rare progress on both Reporters Without Borders’ Freedom of the Press Index (2025) and Freedom House’s Freedom Index (2025). According to the Ministry of Information (MoI), 19,200 work permits have been issued to local journalists over the past year. However, this newfound freedom is not protected by laws or well-established institutions, including independent syndicates.
Media Laws (recent evolutions)
Apart from the Constitutional Declaration (Temporary Constitution) of March 13, 2025, which states that “The State guarantees freedom of opinion, expression, information, publication, and the press” (Article 13), Syrian media remains, at least in theory, governed by largely repressive laws from the Assad regime era since the new parliament has not yet convened.
Pluralism
Syrian media pluralism emerged from the 2011 revolution, enabling the rise of independent outlets, including those in non-Arabic languages like Kurdish. These outlets operated in exile and in regions outside the control of the former Assad regime. Currently, it is safe to say that this pluralism still persists. Since the collapse of the previous regime, 636 registration requests have been submitted by media outlets.
Censorship & self-censorship
The collapse of the Assad regime has, consequently, led to the disappearance of many previous taboos and red lines, especially related to the president, his family, his inner circle, as well as the military, security forces, ethnic issues, and the economic situation. However, the ambiguity surrounding laws and high social tensions compel journalists to practice self-censorship. For example, both local and foreign journalists have expressed fears of being denied a visa or access to officials for criticizing the government. Additionally, journalists worry about facing physical and online threats from the public because of their work.
Disinformation and Misinformation
Since the 2011 revolution, news related to Syria has become a battleground for misinformation. This situation has worsened with the collapse of the Assad regime, as more organized misinformation campaigns—sponsored and promoted regionally—seek to delegitimize the new Syrian government and, more importantly, to incite sectarian and ethnic hostility and violence among Syrians. In response, fact-checking platforms such as Verify-Sy, true_platform, Fareq, and Radar have been established. Many outlets also collaborate with specialized organizations to verify their reports before publishing. Furthermore, the MoI has launched an initiative to develop a code of conduct, including 16 workshops across different governorates, attended by 600 journalists.
Access to Information
Syria has never enacted a law guaranteeing the right to access information. Since the fall of the Assad regime, access to information has significantly improved, allowing journalists to work more freely within the country. However, access to officials remains limited, and Syrian journalists have voiced concerns and frustration about the preferential treatment given to foreign journalists or to Syrian journalists working for international media outlets and news agencies.
Journalists’ Security
Despite significant changes since December 2024, Syrian journalists still face serious threats. According to the France-based Syrian Journalists Association (SJA), three journalists were temporarily arrested by government forces in June 2025. Additionally, the new government’s reactivation of Cybercrime Law No. 20 of 2022 poses a real threat to journalists in particular. This law has been criticized since its enactment for restricting freedom of expression through vague restrictions and harsh penalties, and there has reportedly been a sharp increase in legal complaints over online incitement and sectarianism.
However, the most serious threats originate outside government restrictions, due to security concerns, sectarian violence, longstanding grievances from the war, and regional instability. SJA has documented the killing of three journalists, while two others were injured in May, June, and July 2025, by known perpetrators. Additionally, several journalists survived Israeli attacks in southern Syria or were temporarily detained by Israeli forces.
Media Business Models
Due to decades of authoritarian rule, over ten years of war, and international sanctions, Syrian media now heavily rely—if not entirely—on external funding. While government-affiliated outlets receive official support, independent ones depend on international aid. Additionally, some media organizations are backed by regional powers, such as Syria TV, which is funded by Qatar. However, recent sanctions relief could allow revenue from advertising, especially on social media platforms and apps.
Independent Media: state and challenges
The resurgence of independent media has been one of the most significant outcomes of the 2011 revolution. The most notable among those still operating are Enab Baladi, Al Jumhuriya, Syria Direct, Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism (SIRAJ), Radio Rozana, and Radio Arta. Besides relying on international funds, all these outlets—except for Enab Baladi, which announced in March 2025 that it would resume printing and distribution in Damascus—are only available online, limiting their reach and influence. According to Datareportal, Syria’s internet penetration rate was 35.8 percent of the total population at the start of 2025. More importantly, these outlets face the challenge of navigating and impacting a highly polarized environment without sacrificing their objectivity and other professional standards.
Media literacy: development and challenges
The increase in misinformation and disinformation, along with regime change in Syria, has boosted interest in media literacy. The most recent and notable effort is the Syria Media Literacy Lab project. However, at this early stage, it still seems mainly focused on journalists.
Gender and media
The 2011 uprising marked a pivotal moment in Syrian women’s participation in the media. However, only 38% of them, according to a 2016 study, held “positions of responsibility.” With support from Syrian independent media and international donors, the past year has seen notable efforts to empower female journalists through various training programs and fellowships.
Coverage of the environmental issues
Although Syrian outlets specializing in environmental issues remain scarce or nonexistent, environmental concerns appear to be a priority for the existing media and journalists. This rapidly growing awareness and interest are driven by three main factors: the devastating environmental effects of the recent years’ war, the clear negative impacts of climate change—especially drought—and the increasing donor support for the media’s role in raising awareness and helping find solutions.
Coverage of the migrations topic
Due to years of war, Syria has become a source of refugees rather than a destination. However, there is an immigration-related issue involving Palestinian refugees who arrived in the country after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and have since had all civil rights (but not political rights), similar to their Syrian counterparts. In this context, Syrian media freely and favorably report on any situation involving Syrian-Palestinians.
AI development and use in the media sector
Three clear positions can be identified among Syrian media regarding the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Among exiled, independent outlets, some believe that AI distorts the essence of journalism. Conversely, others are convinced that wisely adopting this technology could improve the quality and reach of media. On the other side, due to numerous technical issues, mainly poor internet connectivity, local outlets seem unable to participate in such a debate.
